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5Preface
The Department of Regional Development Geography, University of Gdańsk, has
been enhancing its cooperation with other institutions doing research into changes
in European post-communist countries since the very beginning of its activity. As
a result, a few conferences have been held, numerous papers have been issued
and a few books have been published. The book which has just been published
deals with the above mentioned subject.
The book analyses chosen aspects of transformation processes in European
post-communist countries. The first chapter serves as an introduction and dis-
cusses main social processes which have been carried out in European post-com-
munist countries. All chapters are divided into four parts.
The first part consists of three chapters devoted to transborder cooperation.
This is a very important issue which is relatively new in the analysed part of
Europe. During the communist era state borders served as barriers between na-
tions. Citizens deprived of permanent passports had to apply for them each time
they wanted to leave their countries. The permission was granted mainly on the
basis of political affiliation. The collapse of the communist regimes entirely
changed the situation regarding human rights, including the right to cross bor-
ders. As a consequence, transborder cooperation  started to develop.
The second part includes seven chapters which analyse chosen aspects of
changes in demographic and social situations in European post-communist coun-
tries. Transformation processes have caused considerable demographic deterio-
ration whereas social situation has improved, particularly with regard to reli-
gious freedom as well as ethnic minorities’ rights.
The third part is made up of nine articles in which their authors discuss politi-
cal and economic aspects of transformation processes. Nations and governments
of this part of Europe, in spite of their indisputable succeses, still face serious
challenges. The main hindrance, which the analysed countries face, is the neces-
sity of carrying out further economic  reforms in order to fully transform the
centrally steered system into a free market economy. At the same time post-com-
munist countries have to live up to certain expectations and requirements im-
posed by globalization processes. As far as political situation is concerned, most
of the post-communist countries have managed to free themselves from the So-
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:405
6viet domination. On the other hand, the political internal scene and public safety
still leave a lot to be desired.
The last fourth part of the book consists of three articles on territorial planning
and protection of the environment. Both aspects of economic activity in their spa-
tial dimension were so important during the communist rule that they were con-
trolled by the central authorities. Little attention was paid to the role and specific
features of particular regions. Problems of protection of the environment were
notoriously neglected.
The editor has decided to incorporate all the articles in their original versions,
as provided by the authors.
It is my great pleasure to express very special thanks to Dr hab. Tadeusz
Palmowski from Department of Regional Development Geography, University
of Gdańsk (Poland) and Prof. Alexandru Ilieş from Department of Geography,
Tourism and Territorial Planning, University of Oradea (Romania) for their in-
volvement and invaluable support which were indispensable to those who con-
tributed to the publishing of this book.
Tomasz Michalski
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7A Geographic Approach to the Transformation Process
in European Post–Communist Countries
Tomasz Michalski
Instead of introduction – Occupation and enslavement by the USSR
Nations of the Middle and Mid–Eastern Europe lost their freedom and were sub-
jected to the rule of the USSR after World War II. The Soviet rule lasted until 1980
when the Solidarity movement in Poland started their sweeping changes. It took
almost ten years to bring freedom and sovereignty to most of the previously en-
slaved countries.
The political situation in communist countries was far from being uniform
(Table 1). On the one hand, there were countries which did not stand a chance of
sovereignty after World War I (Ukraine, Belarus) or were annexed in 1940 by the
USSR (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). Bessarabia shared the plight of the above
mentioned countries when it was separated from Romania and became part of
the USSR. On the other hand, there were countries which were “sold” to commu-
nists in the course of the second world war by the USA and Great Britain. It was
made a legal treaty during “peace” conferences in Teheran and Yalta. As a result,
such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, Roma-
Source: Author’s own study.
Table 1. Degrees of enslavement of European nations by the communist system after 1945
(classification according to the present list of countries)
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nia and Bulgaria became theoretically independent but in reality they were con-
trolled by the USSR. Within a few years Albania and Yugoslavia got rid of the
Soviet control but it hardly influenced the plight of these two nations as they
were still governed by communists. The reasons for controlling Germany and
Austria were slightly different. After the collapse of Hitler’s Reich both countries
were divided into occupation zones. In the case of Austria the occupation zones
were unified to form one country. In turn, Austria was to remain “neutral” to-
wards the USSR. Finland, for other reasons, also had to maintain “neutrality”.
The main aim of this paper is to show broadly understood social changes in
their spacial aspect after the collapse of the communist system in Europe. It was
not until 1989 when nations in this  part of Europe began regaining their identity
and actual independence.
The process itself is complex and takes various directions. There are countries
which are close to its completion, but in some other countries reforms seem to have
come to a halt. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to set a strict time limit to how
long the process may last. This paper assumes the following time points: 1990 (when
the first non–communist government in this part of Europe in power in Poland for
the whole year) and 2003 (the last year before some countries of this region joined
the EU). The territory range covers all European post–communist countries exclud-
ing GDR (which was incorporated by Germany) and Russia (whose authorities
consider themselves to be successors of the former USSR). Yet, Russia is sometimes
included into analyses for reasons of comparison, like the EU – 15 countries.
As a full analysis goes beyond the recommended limits of an article, the author’s
research concentrates on a few, in his view, important issues. The research takes
into account three aspects:
• socio – political;
• socio – economic;
• demography and health.
Socio–political changes
Most of the European post–communist countries were enslaved by the commu-
nist regime for over fifty years, i.e. since the times of World War II. To be more
precise some of them (Eastern Belarus, Eastern and Mid Ukraine) lost their inde-
pendence even earlier, at the end of World War I. Such a long period caused
a widespread cultural devastation which contributed to the creation of a new
kind of man. Prof. Tiszner called him homo sovieticus. One may say that the evil
heritage of communism is still valid until the legacy of homo sovieticus is not over-
come and done away with. There are numerous ways of getting rid of this legacy
within the socio–political sphere. The most affective are given below.
One of the typical features of the analysed countries was to subordinate the army
to the communist party authorities. No wander new governments in most of the
post–communist countries made every effort to limit the leading position of commu-
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nists in the army. Poland, former Czechoslovakia and Hungary were the first coun-
tries (1989) which did away with political military boards and political organizations
in the army (Z. Trejnis, 2003). Besides, governments of many countries started to make
abrupt demands for the removal of the soviet troops from their bases located in post–
communist countries. The situation was very difficult particularly in those countries
which were part of the former USSR (cf. M. Sobczyński, 2002). This process of the
removal of the former Soviet troops has not been finished yet. Suffice to say that
a huge Russian military base still operates in Sevastopol (Ukraine). Similarly, the sepa-
ratist Republic of Transnistria in Moldova (Figure 1) does not allow the president of
this country to enter the Republic.
In all eight analysed countries it took as long as two years after the collapse of
the communist system to reform the law concerning operational rules of political
parties and the organization of the election system. A quick and spontaneous
process of setting up new political parties was another typical feature of the
region’s countries. The emergence of numerous political parties did not stabilise
the political system but let the former communists to continue their efforts to
Figure 1. The main street of Tyraspol (the capital of the Republic of Transnistria in Moldova)
with the symbols of this “state”
Source: The photograph taken by the author.
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regain political power. On the other hand, some countries saw a successful politi-
cal comeback of right–wing Christian Democratic and agrarian parties. For ex-
ample, Christian Democratic Party in 1994 in Lithuania was third biggest party in
that country (A. Jankauskas, 1996). In most of the post–communist countries the
first democratic election was won by political groups and parties which had been
members of the anticommunist underground movement.  J. Wojnicki (2003) draws
the reader’s attention to direct relations between the stability of the political sys-
tem and the progress of market reforms in a given country. The rule is that those
countries which have made the greatest progress on their way to free market
economy have, at the same time, the most stable political systems. One should
also not underestimate slightly different ways of understanding democracy and
freedom in particular countries (see: A. Bianchetti, D. Lombardi, 2002; J. Wendt,
2004). Here, examples of how rules of freedom and democracy may be taken to
the extremes are shown by present leaders of Russia and Belarus.
Reforms of the legal system play a very important role in transformation pro-
cesses taking place in post–communist countries. Their importance comes from the
fact that during the communist era the independence of judges and prosecutors was
fictitious as they had to serve the ruling communist party. These were reasons why
reforms of the legal system paid so much attention to the independence of judges.
The enforcement of human rights and legal regulations of market economy includ-
ing privatisation processes were of no less importance (see: I. Malinowska, 1996).
In general, most of the countries have succeeded in passing many reformist
legal regulations. Unfortunately, the practical implementation of the newly
adopted regulations proved difficult and sometimes unsuccessful. It is mainly
due to moral vacuum and lack of respect for legal order which have been inher-
ited from the communist system. As a result social pathologies are spreading
around: crime increase, corruption, informal business connections, political ex-
tremes, etc. (K. A. Wojtaszczyk, 2003).
The mass media market has seen changes of two kinds. Firstly, free and inde-
pendent mass media have appeared. It even has led to the effect of synergy, when
the mass media free from censorship have become one of the most important
guardians of freedom. G. Edelstam (2002) draws our attention to the fact that the
mass media are not only about scandals and scoops but also about providing the
public with full information concerning legal changes. One of the examples of
how the press may affect the political establishment was the bribe scandal re-
vealed by “Gazeta Wyborcza”. That was one of the reasons which made the post–
communist government in Poland led by L. Miller to resign in 2004.
Another change concerning the mass media market is related to their owner-
ship. New owners of the mass media appeared on the market (they mainly came
from western European countries and represented big media corporations) at the
same time when most of the governments strove to gain control over the theoreti-
cally public television. The latter process happening in democratic post–commu-
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nist countries was particularly evident in Croatia when F. Tudman was in gov-
ernment (see: G. Vilović, 2002).
A characteristic quality of changes affecting the social sphere is the creasing
activity of local communities. Incentives may come from upper or lower levels of
a country. Revival of local governments is stimulated by upper level organiza-
tions while forming NGOs is the initiative of local communities.
Local governments during the communist rule were quite fictitious (see:
A. J. Kozłowski, 1997). It was not until the collapse of the communist system when
parliaments of particular countries started passing laws on forming real local govern-
ments. However, the process is not smooth as political elites in capital cities are used
to exercising as much power as possible from the capital city. Transferring financial
resources to lower levels of central and local governments meets enormous difficul-
ties. The situation created by “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine may be considered to
be a model example of such problems (for example in the sphere of legal regulations
concerning local governments: Політична палітра Львівщини, 2003).
Local initiatives aiming at setting up NGOs were always regarded by the former
authorities as a threat to the leading role of the communist party and its supporting
organizations. Most of the currently existing NGOs in post–communist countries
deal with health care, social care and education. This type of NGOs in Poland consti-
tuted more than half of all organizations (S. Rzyski, 2004). There are, however, a few
post–communist countries where real reforms have not been introduced so far. In
these countries NGOs are still seen as a threat to their governments. The first social
strategy for the development of cities in Belarus may serve as a good example of the
above mentioned thesis (see. Барысаў i рэгіëн. Стратэгія разьвіця, 2004).
The most evident effect of political changes in post–communist countries – from
the international point of view – was the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organi-
zation and gaining admission to NATO by eleven countries. In 1990 GDR joined
NATO after the reunification of Germany. Poland, The Czech Republic and Hun-
gary followed suit and joined NATO in 1999. Even more countries joined NATO in
2004 including Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and three countries which
fifteen years before were part of the USSR: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russia is
still losing its influential position which is confirmed by the result of the recent
election held in Ukraine, Georgia and to some extent, in Moldova. In all these coun-
tries the winning politicians declared their pro–western stance. Another good ex-
ample of the process of political changes are attempts to revive GUUAM1 .
1 GUUAM was set up in 1997 to counterbalance Russia’s dominance of the countries which became
independent after the dissolution the USSR. It is hardly been active for a few years. At present Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova are its formal members. The revival of GUUAM seems possible in the
light of democratic revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine as well as a pro-Western turnabout in Moldova’s
politics. Although the summit held in Kishiniov (22.04.2005) did not strengthen the organization it proves the
alliance to be active. It becomes clear that new political authorities of Ukraine strive to take over the regional
leadership. GUUAM seems to be a good tool to achieve this goal (information based on the report by J. Wróbel;
Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pub/koment/2005/04/050428.htm).
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Socio – economic changes
In the late 80s of the last century it became obvious that a centrally planned
economy based on socialist principles in their communist version is inefficient
(more information in:  I. T. Berend, 1996; A. Biagini, T. Guida, 1998). Shortage of
goods and insufficient supply of services led to the introduction of coupons in
some countries for certain goods over long periods of time (coupons were quite
common during the period of martial law in Poland after 1981).
The process of transition from socialist rules of economy to capitalist free mar-
ket required profound reforms in almost all spheres of economic activity including:
• sweeping reforms in the sector of large scale production where the industry
and agriculture needed restructuring and services required freeing from state
control;
• changes in the financial sector – for example: organizing a modern banking
sector and setting new rules of co–operation with foreign countries;
• changes in the legal as well as administrative systems – for example: creating
a new tax system.
Post–communist countries differ greatly in respect of the advancement of eco-
nomic reforms. It is due to several reasons of which two seem to be the most
important: political stability and election of the government.
Internal unrest has caused a long–term pause in carrying out economic re-
forms in: Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina (long lasting war);
Macedonia (problems with Albanian minority); Albania (a financial crisis in 1997
and riots caused by fraudulent “financial pyramids”); Moldova (partly under the
control of the Russian army); to a smaller extent Croatia (a short war with the
former Yugoslavia or, being more exact, Serbia).
Fortunately, large scale political unrest was avoided in Lithuania, Latvia and
Estonia although Slav minorities, which had been left by the former Russian oc-
cupant, were expected to cause trouble. Slovenia’s separation from the former
Yugoslavia and the division of Czechoslovakia were also successful. Undoubt-
edly, almost bloodless dissolution of the former USSR appears to be the greatest
success. It also shows how artificial this country was.
After having regained their sovereignty or independence all post–communist
countries started their reforms. The deepest reforms were seen in the former GDR
after it had joined its Western counterpart. This part of Germany after its unifica-
tion did not show any tangible signs of success in terms of social and economic
progress. The territory of the former GDR has sucked in a large amount of finan-
cial support but it has not brought the expected results. Most of the territory suf-
fers from depopulation whose pace is fast. If we do not take into account the
specific case of the former GDR, then the analysed countries can be divided into
several groups (Table 2). The worst situation is seen in Belarus, where
Łukaszenka’s regime is doing their best to deprive the country of economic re-
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forms and in Russia, where the state is increasing its control over the economic activ-
ity after the defeat of liberals (cf. А. Цuпкo, 2004). It becomes obvious that the most
advanced reforms have been carried out in those countries where anticommunist
opposition took over political power. In contrast, the countries, where post–commu-
nist formed their governments, saw a prolonged period of seeming reforms which
led them to a deep crisis. Consequently, the population of these countries has become
poorer. A good example of this kind of mechanism is Bulgaria where communists
were in government in the early 90s of the last century. This period was characterized
by a considerable drop in the production of all economic sectors in Bulgaria. The
economic situation was particularly unfavourable in the years 1966–1967. Numerous
negative economic processes emerged to mention only the most important: a very
sharp decrease in the production volume and GDP; the greatest depreciation of the
Bulgarian currency (the lowest level was reached in February 1997 when $ 1 was
worth almost 3000 levas); the collapse of the banking system and the highest inflation
(the peak value was reached in February 1997 with its three–digit indicator – 2505).
The economic situation changed for the better in the middle of 1997. One of the first
financial decisions made by the new non post–communist government was estab-
lishing a stable relation between leva and the German mark. Then came the next step
which was the leva’s denomination (1000 “old” levas = 1 “new” leva). Still, there was
a stable exchange rate showing the Bulgarian leva’s value against the German mark
(after the introduction of the new European currency Euro was used instead of the
German mark). After a few years Bulgaria saw a macroeconomic stability leading to
further progress (M. Ilieva, T. Michalski, 2002).
The most painful outcome of economic changes was unemployment. Unem-
ployment did not officially exist in all analysed countries. When the communist
system collapsed the situation on the labour market in the above mentioned coun-
tries became similar to the rest of the world. The dynamics of unemployment
divided the analysed countries into three groups. Theoretically, the best situation
is enjoyed by these countries which have retained a lot of state control over their
Table 2. The division of European post-communist countries according to the degrees
of advancement of economic reforms
Source: Author’s own study.
Type Countries
Completed reforms part of Germany (the former DDR)
Reforms close to completion Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
Advanced reforms Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia
Actual reforms have just begun or have been
declared to start shortly
Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, Ukraine,
Moldova
Lack of reforms Belarussia
Turning back from advanced reforms Russia
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economies. This, in turn, makes reforms very weak and superficial. Old establish-
ment is maintained to favour big and unprofitable state firms. Belarus seema to
be the best example of such countries. Countries ruined by wars with unstable
internal situation make up another group. Here Macedonia as well as Bosnia and
Herzegovina may serve as a good example. However, the majority of the post–
communist countries do not go to extremes and stay somewhere in the middle.
They differ in terms of the pace of unemployment which may rise quickly (Hun-
gary) or slowly (the Czech Republic). The intensity of unemployment also differs.
On the one hand, there are countries which show medium rate of unemployment
(Hungary and the Czech Republic). On the other hand Croatia has a high rate.
Not surprisingly, high rates of unemployment are observed in the countries which
have carried out reforms, but they have been either too slow or there were vari-
ous anomalies in their political systems (Figure 2).
The least changes were needed in the service sector because in many post–
communist countries services have always been private businesses. A much worse
situation characterised industry and agriculture.
T. Stryjakiewicz (1999) analysed the Polish industry as it was when economic
reforms started. The following structural characteristics were identified:
• the structure of industrial branches was distorted as the industries which used
up too much energy and materials were too big while consumer industries
were neglected;
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Figure 2. Unemployment rate in % in chosen post-communist countries in the years 1990–2003
Source: Author’s own study based on European Health for all database,  2005.
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• the state sector, as a form of ownership, prevailed;
• the main drawback of the industrial structure was predominance of big firms
which overwhelmed medium and small firms;
• the organizational structure favoured monopolization of the internal market
and production;
• the main drawback of the spatial structure was excessive concentration of in-
dustrial production in old centres without making any efforts to restructure
them.
The above mentioned analysis matches also the remaining post–communist coun-
tries. There is, however, one vital difference concerning those countries where
large state structures were divided into smaller ones. Broken co–operational links
with other countries made their situation even worse. This remark concerns coun-
tries which were formed on the territories of the former USSR and Yugoslavia
rather than the former Czechoslovakia.
In the era of the third industrial revolution innovations are a very important
factor which increases firms’ competitiveness. According to Z. Chojnicki (1990)
lack of market mechanisms and separation from the world’s global economy
caused a lot of disadvantages. First of all boards of directors as well as employees
(mainly in big companies) lost interest in competitiveness. They also did not ap-
preciate innovations and lowered outlays on research and development.
All these negative aspects resulted in the cumulative effect of a rapid drop in
the volume of industrial production in all post–communist countries which had
decided to introduce economic reforms. Fortunately, it was a transient process in
most of the analyzed countries. If we assumed that the industrial output in 1989
equals 100, then Poland was the first post–communist country to exceed this thresh-
old (it was 109.0 in 1997). Other countries which emerged from the ruins of larger
state organisms saw a much worse situation (e.g. Lithuania’s dynamics of indus-
trial output in 1997 compared with the year 1989 was merely 35.2). The same
deterioration of the level of production referred to a few countries which lagged
behind with their reforms (e.g. Romania’s dynamics were 58.5)2 .
In the 80s of 20th century in most analysed countries (excluding Poland and
Yugoslavia) collectivised agriculture was predominant. The end of communist
era brought about decollectivisation. This process faced a strong resistance in the
countries which emerged from the former USSR (excluding the Baltic republics).
In other countries it was not smooth but caused less reluctance. The change in
ownership of land in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine met with strong opposition
due to the fact that the agriculture sectors had been collectivised there as early as
before World War II. The remaining countries experienced collectivisation much
later, i.e. after World War II.  As a result, only the second group of countries was
2 source: Economic Survey of Europe, 1998, No. 2, p. 148.
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able to retain the tradition of farmers working on their own land (S. Grykień,
2004). For various reasons any changes in the agriculture sector in the analysed
group of countries should be handled with caution and understanding. In these
countries – unlike in the rich countries of the “old” EU – agriculture is still play-
ing a very important role in economic development and thus greatly affects social
status of a large part of the population living in rural areas (cf. S. Baum,
P. Weingarden, 2004).
The restructuring of collective farms was carrying out according to a few mod-
els. S. Grykień (2004) distinguishes five of them:
• shallow restructuring (Slovenia, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia);
• thorough  restructuring (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, countries of
the former Yugoslavia);
• disappearance of collective farms (Albania);
• shallow restructuring and disappearance of collective farms (Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova);
• thorough restructuring and disappearance of collective farms (Romania, Bul-
garia).
The introduction of market economy and completion of the process of
decollectivisation  resulted in considerable changes in rural areas. Farms changed
ownership and agriculture suffered from a transient crisis. Fortunately, most of
the countries have now overcome the difficulties. Some of the discussed coun-
tries joined the EU in 2004 and have become its members. As a result, they have
been involved in European common agricultural policy. Most probably this
involvment will shortly become the most important factor differentiating agri-
cultural situation in this part of Europe.
Besides, changes in agriculture have their social aspect. The period  of socialist
economy saw great waves of migration (mostly young people) from rural areas
to towns. This was caused by industrialization and industrial urbanization car-
ried out in all analysed countries. Consequently, rural population gradually be-
came smaller and older. Even demographically young countries, such as Moldova,
cannot avoid the problem of ageing population (A. Ţurcan, 2005).
Recently new forms of earning money have become quite popular with people
living in the countryside. Many people have turned to tourism and agrotourism
which have little to do with agriculture. (cf.  I. Markow, 2002; R. Petrea, 2004).
The service sector in post–communist countries develops at a quick pace but at
the same time it shows numerous shortcomings. The main drawback is the politi-
cal past. Communist authorities, on the one hand, promoted development of the
industry at the expense of services and agriculture – on the other hand, the cen-
tralized economy did not favour private businessmen who made attempts to suc-
ceed in services. In some countries, e.g. Poland, the authorities allowed a small
private sector to operate. In this way certain negative social consequences of the
centrally controlled economy were alleviated. In other countries (especially in
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:4016
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Albania and the former USSR) private economic activity even in services was
banned because the communist authorities wanted to control everything without
paying much attention to resultant shortcomings of the whole economic system.
Hungary (Figure 3) may serve as a good example to analyse the above described
mechanism. Communist authorities followed a policy of intense industrializa-
tion, mainly at the expense of agriculture. Services were also neglected and were
not able to meet consumer needs. It was not until the collapse of communism
when broadly understood services received adequate attention and started to
develop very quickly. This, in turn, increased employment in the service sector.
It goes without saying that post–communist governments have not only to
reform their countries but also modernize them to make them more innovative
and competitive. Unfortunately, it is easier said then done as numerous hindrances
stand in the way of smooth development. Some of them are of internal nature, to
mention only the political past, weakness of the state and insufficient national
resources. Others are of external nature; for example inappropriate attitude of
international financial institutions (Table 3).
The changes presented above exert their direct and indirect impact on the stan-
dard of living. To analyse this category real gross domestic product, PPP$ per
capita was used (Figure 4). The group of analysed countries is not uniform if
a closer look is taken at two aspects. The first one informs whether there was
Figure 3. Changes in the employment rates of economically active persons in Hungary’s
national economy in the period 1950–2001
Source: Author’s own study based on yearbooks of international statistics by GUS.
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Table 3. Barriers to the growth of innovations and development based on knowledge
in the economies of Middle and Eastern Europe
Source: A. Kukliński, B. Kacprzycki, 1995, p. 307, with slight changes.
a decline in the standard of living in the 90s or not. This decline is clearly seen in
three groups of countries: republics of the former USSR, countries which waged
wars and also Bulgaria and Albania (where communists in power have not imple-
mented any significant reforms). In all remaining countries the standard of living
continues to rise almost in the whole analysed period. The other aspect takes into
account the general level of the countries’ wealth. The richest countries, which
were never part of the USSR, have quickly and effectively carried out their eco-
nomic reforms (Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia). The sec-
ond group is much more diversified. Here we have Poland with a similar process
of development to the above mentioned countries but less success in implement-
ing reforms. Then comes Estonia as the only country of the former USSR which
has achieved a great success in terms of reforms. Finally, there is Croatia  which
sees quick economic reforms but loses a lot of momentum because of previously
waged wars on Serbia and Montenegro. Croatia’s nationalistic politics is not an
asset, either. All the above mentioned countries (excepting Croatia) belong to the
EU. The rest of the countries is characterised by a lower level of wealth in the
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analysed period. This group includes, first of all, those countries which emerged
from the ruins of the former USSR (including Latvia and Lithuania which now
belong to the EU), the former Yugoslavia (excepting Croatia and Slovenia) and
then three other countries: Bulgaria, Romania and Albania.
Demographic and health changes
The breakdown of the communist system revealed changes in procreation atti-
tudes and health situation. Suffice to say that at the very beginning (1990) most of
the countries observed a positive natural increase of the population (excepting
Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia) while in 2004 only Albania and Macedonia did
so well. No doubt, the drop in the natural increase of the population partly stems
from general reasons typical of the whole Europe3 . However, we cannot ignore
regional factors typical of the analysed area. First of all, it is a rapid change in
procreation attitudes coming from:
• the willingness to „catch up” with richer European countries which is stronger
in richer post–communist countries;
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Albania
Estonia
Hungary
Romania
Ukraine
EU members before May 2004
Figure 4. Real gross domestic product, PPP$ per capita in chosen post-communist countries
and  EU–15
Source: Author’s own study based on  European Heath for all database, 2005.
3e.g. natural increase in EŪ–15 was 1.84‰ in 1990 while in 2002 it fell to 0.89‰
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:4019
Tomasz Michalski20
• the feeling of lack of prospects for making living conditions better which is
stronger in the poorest post–communist countries, particularly in these coun-
tries where market reforms have not been carried out or have been bungled.
Furthermore, there is an increasing trend of young people to leave the region for
richer European countries. As a result, the birthrate rapidly decreases (Table 4). We
may get the impression that the second factor has a more destructive impact on
the falling birthrate. Thus lack of economic prosperity being beyond reach plays
the most important role in changing procreation attitudes of young people. This
remark is especially valid for the poorest countries.
In most of the analyzed countries the death rate has increased. There are three
main reasons which account for this negative indicator: pauperization of com-
munities, deterioration of health services and the increase of unhealthy social
habits (especially alcoholism, smoking cigarettes, insecure sex and drug addic-
tion). All these three factors have the worst results in the countries of the former
USSR. Their impact is less harmful in better  off countries, particularly those coun-
tries which joined the EU in 2004. Half of these countries observed a fall in death
rates while the other half saw a slight increase (cf. T. Michalski, 2005).
Demographic changes in Macedonia appear to be quite different from the ones
described above. If a detailed analysis is used then the differences turn out to be
less obvious. It is a matter of statistical data which cannot be relied on rather than
actual differences between the processes of demographical changes.
Table 4. Changes in the natural growth of the population in the period  1990–2003
with the impact of main component elements
Macedonia – increase of the natural growth of the population;
Latvia – decrease of the natural growth of the population;
Belarus – very big decrease of the natural growth of the population;
Serbia and Montenegro: the period 1992–2002;
Slovakia: the period 1990–2002;
Bosnia and Herzegovina: lack of reliable data for  2003 – the table contains estimated data.
Source: Author’s own study based on  European Heath for all database, 2005.
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Differences in the health situation between communities of the analysed region
were medium in 1990. With the passing of time up to the year 2003 they became
much bigger. Two groups of factors contributed to the widening gap. The first group
lies in the very nature of communism which tried to make chances and possibilities
equal for all countries. It was also the case with the health situation. At the very
moment of the breakdown of the communist system the countries which belonged
to it did not differ much. If there were any differences they were insignificant and
mainly came from cultural dissimilarities (cf. T. Michalski, 2003a).
Shortly after the end of the communist era the situation of particular countries
in the analysed region began to change (Figure 5). The main factor causing quick
changes was actual economic situation and impressions people had about their
material status. The level of resources affects the level of financial outlays (com-
ing both from private and state sectors) on health services. Consequently, the
wealthier a population is the better health habits are. If there is some spare money
people are likely to spend it on additional medical check–ups or on becoming fit.
Spending money on health services in well–off countries seems as obvious as
investing money, for instance, in education. Undoubtedly, all efforts made to catch
up with rich countries in Western Europe only add to the stress and frustration
which badly affect the health situation of the population of richer post–commu-
nist countries. At the other end of the spectrum are countries plunged into eco-
nomic chaos after waging wars or suffering from incompetent or antimarket eco-
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Figure 5. Changes in the natural growth of the population in chosen countries
in the period  1990–2003 reflecting the impact of its main component elements
Source: see Table 4.
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nomic policies. Bad economic situation in these countries gives rise to pessimistic
thoughts about the future. As a result, neglected health services cannot cope with
the increase in unhealthy habits. The increasing number of people in these coun-
tries starts to choose escapism – they try to forget about tough real life by indulg-
ing in alcohol, drugs or sex. The second factor involves political past, especially
in the case of those countries which belonged to the former USSR. It seems that
the attachment to the USSR influences the discussed countries in two ways. On
the one hand there are numerous minorities in these countries. National friction
also influences health attitudes and habits. On the other hand the population of
these countries will have to be intensely indoctrinated as the idea of homo sovieticus
– with all its negative consequences – is deeply instilled into people’s conscience.
The third factor affecting the health situation in the region includes various
cultural aspects.
Infectious diseases may serve as a particularly useful research tool to show
evident differences in health situation among the post–communist European coun-
tries. Table 5 presents the incidence of the three diseases which are regarded as
good indicators to describe health situation.
Table 5. Incidence of chosen infectious diseases per 100000 inhabitants, as of 2003
Gonococcal infection, data for: (a) 2001, (b) 2002.
Source: European Heath for all database, 2005.
Country Tuberculosis Viral hepatitis B Gonococcal infection
Albania 17.50 17.02 0.64
Belarus 51.71 5.87 58.31
Bosnia and Herzegovina (b) 45.64 3.57 0.50
Bulgaria (a) 39.23 12.33 4.60
Croatia (b) 30.53 4.05 0.59
Czech Rep. 10.79 3.63 9.87
Estonia 41.15 12.78 39.30
Hungary (b) 24.75 1.41 10.93
Latria 72.51 14.49 20.69
Lithuania 74.87 5.07 14.56
Macedonia 32.22 8.29 0.15
Moldova (a) 114.73 13.37 35.45
Poland 25.34 4.74 1.75
Romania 130.36 9.34 11.62
Serbia and Montenegro 27.19 3.50 1.12
Slovakia 16.73 2.59 no data
Slovenia 13.77 1.15 2.80
Ukraine 77.77 14.72 42.94
Russian Federation (a) 86.47 13.02 109.01
EU-15 10.38 3.04 9.93
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The incidence of tuberculosis in Europe is the biggest in poor countries (par-
ticularly bad housing conditions, malnutrition). Another disease, viral hepatitis
type B, is spread mainly in hospitals in Europe (without going into details, it may
be assumed that most post–communist countries provide enough financial means
and doctors to perform operations but often not enough money is spent on proper
prevention from hospital infections). The incidence of gonococcal infection de-
pends mostly on whether health habits are observed.
Table 5 confirms the above mentioned inferences. The worst health situation
is seen in poor countries which emerged from the former USSR and in poor Balkan
countries. In contrast, the richest post–communist countries which joined the EU
in 2004 and did not belong to the former USSR enjoy the best health situation.
This conclusion is also confirmed by analyses of the incidence of HIV and death
rate concerning AIDS. Although statistical data in both cases are incomplete there
is still enough evidence to prove the conclusion is right. On the whole, the worst
situation is observed in the former USSR while the rest of the post–communist
countries may enjoy a better situation (cf. R. Goodwin and other authors, 2003;
T. Michalski, 2003b)
Summary
European post–communist countries can be divided into two groups if social,
demographic and health results of social, political and economic changes are taken
into account. The first group consists of the countries which joined the EU in 2004
and Croatia. The population of these countries can proudly look ahead expecting
prosperous future. Despite transient problems all of them will continue with their
economic growth. Their strength lies in political stability although it does not
mean that they will be able to avoid certain social, demographic and health ob-
stacles. The main threats which may disturb their development include: a danger
of national friction and unrest caused by national minorities (particularly in Esto-
nia, Latvia and Lithuania), an increase in the incidence of HIV/AIDS (particu-
larly in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), social unrest caused by high unemploy-
ment rates (especially in Poland) and intensification of emigration of young people
to countries of the “old” EU (all post–communist countries).
A very bad social, demographic and health situation is observed in Belarus,
Ukraine, Moldova, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Albania. All these countries suffer from bad economic conditions and un-
stable political systems.
Romania and Bulgaria find themselves somewhere in the middle between the
two previously described groups of countries.
Joining the EU and NATO by some post–communist countries as well as re-
cent changes in Moldova and Ukraine have raised hopes that in a few years’ time
most of the analysed region will change for the better. It remains to be seen what
role some suspended problems and hindrances will play. Certainly, the area on
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Transnistria (Moldova), Kosovo (Serbia and Herzegovina), unstable Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Macedonia and Lukaszenka’s regime in Belarus still pose prob-
lems to be solved. Depopulation processes which will bring more trouble in the
foreseeable future remain one of the main threats to the social sphere. They seem
to be unavoidable not only for reasons which have already affected the analysed
region, namely higher death rates in some countries and weakened procreation
attitudes. There is one more factor to threaten the region – increasing emigration
of young people to EU–15.
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Ukraine and Poland are the most powerful countries with high demographic,
economic and natural resources potential in Central and Western Europe. Taking
into consideration common features of the past and modern geopolitical proces-
ses, we can say that our countries are developing in the same civilization space.
Today Ukraine and Poland have chosen the way of democratization, creating of
open civil society and they also try to identify theirselves with euro Atlantic geo–
cultural environment. All these factors are a good basis for important Ukrainian
and Polish interstate cooperation in all spheres of social life.
However these favorable prospects of cooperation haven’t been implemented
in real life yet. Nowadays the potential of Ukrainian and Polish cooperation is
still unrealized in full. Such situation was caused by political and economic re-
asons as well.
From political point of view Ukraine is far behind Poland in the way of demo-
cratization and social reforms. While Ukraine was determining its strategic tasks,
Poland became a member enjoining full rights in such powerful organizations as
NATO and European Union (EU).
Ukraine has undergone serious problems related to its economic transformation.
Poland managed to overcome economic recession in 1993, but Ukraine – just in 2000.
Besides Ukraine didn’t reach the level of economic development that was before the
USSR collapse. Another important fact and obstacle at the same time in the process of
interstate intimacy of Ukraine and Poland is Poland joining EU. A new “iron curta-
in”, namely a western frontier of EU was created as a result of EU enlargement to the
East along the former western frontier of the USSR.
These circumstances considerably deepened the abyss between our countries,
despite the fact that after the USSR and world socialist system collapse there were
some opportunities that would help to overcome a lot of interstate contradic-
tions. It’s necessary to mention that previous decade of our history was a period
Аnatoliy Chemerys, Alexander Kuchabsky
Lvivska Oblast in the Context of Ukrainian and Polish
Cooperation: Problems and Prospects1
1 The statistic data of Ministry of Economy and European Integration of Ukraine, State Committee of
Statistics of Ukraine, Lviv oblast state administration office of foreign relations, foreign economic activity
and foreign investment were used in the article.
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of establishing of close relations between Ukrainian and Polish people. Ukrainian
authorities pay special attention to the development of Ukrainian and Polish re-
lationships: Poland is an official strategic partner of Ukraine, 2004 was announ-
ced as a year of Poland in Ukraine, etc. Our government is aware of the fact that
Ukraine integration into EU will be possible by means of strengthening Ukra-
inian and Polish cooperation. For example, The President of Ukraine in his di-
spatch to Verkhovna Rada said that “strategic partnership between Ukraine and
Poland could be one of the main values of modern Europe”.
Due to this policy, a lot of negative historic stereotypes, causing mutual hosti-
lity, were destroyed. International contacts on official level were strengthened by
the development of economic cooperation between the enterprises of our coun-
tries animated labor migration of some citizens. But even warmth of internatio-
nal relations couldn’t compensate economic and political losses. Besides, inter-
state intimacy was always official, formal and declarative.
Today Ukrainian and Polish relations, rapidly developed after the USSR col-
lapse, are in the process of stagnation. The case with rebuilding of Orlyats’ ceme-
tery in Lviv was another important factor that influenced this process.
Despite a great number of unfavorable circumstances, the development of
Ukrainian and Polish cooperation has significant strategic prospects. Both coun-
tries are interested in further intimacy and establishing close cooperation in all
spheres of social life.
It’s obvious that new conditions of Ukrainian and Polish relations, after Po-
land joining EU, demand working out a new model of cooperation. In any case,
it’s clear that Lvivska oblast will play an important role in this process.
At the meeting of Minister of Economy and European integration of Ukraine,
Mikola Derkach with Polish ambassador in Ukraine Marek Zulovski in March
2004 was said that one of the priority directions of countries’ cooperation was
creating peculiar “common transitional space”. The latter includes international
project of using large track Lugansk–Izuv–Hrubych–Slavkiv for transit cargo car-
riage from Far East to Western Europe, implementing of the second stage of the
project of Eurasian oil transport corridor (EOTC), building of a part of oil–pipeli-
ne Brody–Plotsk and also establishing transport destination Black Sea– Baltic Sea
(Odessa–Gdansk) as an important factor of further development of these ports.
Lvivska oblast is situated in the extreme West of Ukraine. Its geographical
position is the main factor that will help Ukraine to join European economic or-
ganizations and to establish Ukrainian and Polish political and economic coope-
ration soon.
However, governments of our countries have already made some steps in this
direction. For example, Lvivska oblast established close relations with Poland
(first of all, with Podkarpackie voivodeship (administrative unit)). Joint sessions
of councils of Zhovkva and Yavoriv rayons and of Lubachiv and Yaroslav po-
viats (administrative districts), concerning ecological, social and cultural issues
became traditional.
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There were also created two Euro–regions near Ukrainian and Polish frontier.
The first one is Carpathian (in 1993) and the second is – “Bug” (in 1995). Lvivska
oblast belongs to Carpathian euro region, but Zovkva and Sokal rayons of oblast
belong to euro region “Bug”. Annual economic forums, concerning the issue of
transfrontier cooperation and taking place in Lviv, are also very fruitful.
However, a great government contribution to establishing transfrontier co-
operation between Lvivska oblast and adjoining regions of Poland didn’t signifi-
cantly influence the realization of the strategic task that is oblast transformation
into the outpost of Ukrainian and Polish cooperation.
Historic circumstances and peculiarities of economic transformation led to the
fact that Poland didn’t take its proper place in economic life of Lvivska oblast.
One of the main reasons of this phenomenon is economic backwardness that can
be noticed not just in neighboring Polish rayons, but in other regions of Ukraine
as well.
The reasons of insufficient level of economic and social development of the
region lie in its history and related to its colonial past. Moreover, region’s tradi-
tional frontier position also played a significant role in this process.
Galychyna was outskirts of Polish state, empire of Gabsburgs, interwar Po-
land and Soviet Union at last. It’s necessary to remind that before forming tradi-
tions of transfrontier cooperation in Western Europe, this feature of geographical
position didn’t stimulate social and economic development of the region, but on
the contrary – just slowed it down.
In spite of the widespread stereotype that existed in soviet period, Lvivska
oblast was never a region with real high level of social and economic develop-
ment. For example, in Lvivska oblast the cost of fixed assets per capita was one
third lower than on average in Ukraine, and a level of population income was
behind the state index for 10–20%. The situation beyond oblast center, which con-
centrated a great deal of social and economic potential of Western Ukraine, was
much more worse.
After renewal of Ukraine independency in 1991, economic and social situation
of oblast underwent considerable changes. And, of course, they were not positive
ones. In comparison with other oblasts of Ukraine, Lvivska oblast transition to
market economy was much more complicated and painful. It was caused by the
structure of oblast economy that was formed in the USSR and aimed, first of all,
at military industrial complex. Only in 1999 Lvivska oblast managed to cease
production recession. The rates of growth over the past few years are amazing. In
comparison with last year, the growth of industrial output was 1.2% in 1999, 11.9%
in 2000, 42.3% in 2001, 13.5% in 2002.
However, it’s too early to speak about total overcoming of crisis phenomena
in oblast economy. First of all, unlike other oblasts of Ukraine, Lvivska oblast
underwent considerable industrial output recession after 1990. In 1998 the index
of industrial output in Ukraine was 49%, but in Lvivska oblast this index drop-
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ped to 27%. Another serious problem of oblast is a rapid growth of industrial out-
put that can be noticed over past few years, because it’s caused by the growth of
production just in several gigantic enterprises. For example, a share of oil–refine-
ment complex “Galychyna” in total volumes of oblast industrial output is 27%.
Despite favorable geographical position, today Lvivska oblast is far behind
other regions of Ukraine in the sphere of international economic cooperation. By
number of population a share of Lvivska oblast is 5.4% of total number of popu-
lation of Ukraine, but by volumes of goods exporting is only 2.1% in January
2004. The situation with index of correlation between volumes of import and export
is not attractive one. In general, in Ukraine the balance of goods importing and
exporting is positive and is 857.2 mln. hrn., but in Lvivska oblast, index of import
exceeds export index in 15.2 mln. hrn.
However, the most essential problem of international cooperation is region’s
geographical position. According to the analysis, Poland is not a main internatio-
nal partner of Lviv enterprises even in spite of its direct neighborhood.
For instance, according to the index of total volume of international trade of Lvi-
vska oblast enterprises, a share of Polish enterprises was just 5.7% ($138.4 mln.) in
January 2003, but a share of Russian enterprises was 47.7% ($1158.6 mln.).
The situation with attraction of Polish investments in Lvivska oblast economy is
not very optimistic. It’s clear that Lvivska oblast as a frontier region concentrated
more than one third of Polish investments in Ukrainian economy ($52.8 mln in
October 2003). Although the volumes of Polish investments are insufficient. The-
ir share in total amount of attracted foreign investment was just 18% in October
2003. Over 9 months 2003, Polish investors have invested $2.8 mln. in Lvivska
oblast economy, that is just 4.5% of total amount of receipts. The large amounts of
Polish investment are in JC “Credit Bank Ukraine”, ”Ukr–Pak” Plc, subsidiary
company “KronoLviv”, ”Zoshyt Ukrainy” Ltd, ”Multivita” Ltd and others.
Analysis of the process of attraction of Polish investments in Lvivska oblast
economy is an indicator that reveals the lack of favorable investment climate for
western investors. According to the information of Ukrainian nongovernmental
organization “Institute of reforms” that makes assessment of investment attrac-
tiveness of Ukraine regions, Lvivska oblast rating is constantly falling down (from
April 1999 till July 2002). Recent scandals between “Credit Bank Ukraine” and cen-
tral department store “Magnus”, that were highlighted in mass media and consi-
dered in the court, undermined oblast’s image in the eyes of Polish investors.
In order to surmount serious problems, our authorities have to determine not
just the priority of the development of transfrontier cooperation and stimulate
relations on different levels: oblast – voyevodstvo, rayon – povit, territorial com-
munity – gmina (administrative unit), but also to favor general economic recove-
ry, aimed at creating investment climate in oblast. All these projects can be reali-
zed just by cultivating maximum openness and transparency of local govern-
ment activity. First of all, it concerns supervisory bodies (customs and tax servi-
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ces) that sometimes regard their activity as mechanic replenishment of state bud-
get, but not as improving weak Ukrainian economy.
For Poland, Ukraine begins from Lvivska oblast. It’s predetermined not only
by geography, but also by political, economic, cultural and historic interests. That’s
why it’s necessary to realize that providing maximum conditions for Ukrainian
and Polish cooperation is not enough. First of all, it’s necessary that Poland will
be interested in Ukraine and regard it as a real economic partner. In opinion of
Polish people, it’ also important to use historic and cultural aspect in full, because
Lvivska oblast is the only region that deserves special attention.
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Anna Runge, Jerzy Runge
Determinants of Regional Transformations
in the Area of Polish–Czech Borderland
(Silesian Province, Moravian–Silesian Province)
Introduction
Increase of the interest of state borderland in Poland and other countries of Central–
East Europe has been an essential element of integration policy with West Europe
since the 1990s. It has also been part of activities aiming to equal differences in
level of regional development. These areas usually experience doubly negative
consequences in social–economic transformations (A. Klasik, O. Milerski (eds.),
2001, p. 29):
a) “in state regional system they belong to a group of peripheral regions; their
unfavourable location is mostly seen in relative isolation of borderlands from
politically and economically leading centres of the countries;
b) unfavourable element of location in borderland zone is its distance from main
transport routes of a country which usually means insufficient infrastructure”.
Similar views are stated by K. Heffner (1998, p. 7), who argued that investi–gations
of a borderland because of ... “numerous negative so far processes, acquire special
importance (e.g. deep demographic transformations in these areas, mass
migrations from villages to cities, depopulation of numerous towns and
administration districts, shortage of workforce in agriculture, low population
density, disproportions in development of settlement system in both sides of the
border)”.
Such phenomena were investigated in Polish–German borderland as early as
in the 1980s, especially in Sudety Mountains, which were treated as problem region
(e.g. A. Ciok, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1996; J. Łoboda (ed.) 1993) and also as an
object of empirical generalisation for different areas and also object of formulation
of theoretical conceptions (e.g. I. Bukowska–Floreńska, H. Rusek (eds.), 1997;
Z. Chojnicki, 1998; P. Eberhardt, 1996; K. Heffner, 1998; A. Klasik, O. Milerski
(eds.), 2001; A. Mync, R. Szul (eds.), 1999; T. Palmowski, 2000; J. Runge (ed.), 2003a,
2003b; J. Runge, F. Kłosowski (eds.), 2001; Z. Rykiel, 1985; 1990, 1991, 2001).
A. Mync, R. Szulc (eds. 1999, p. 229–231) stated the following:
1) As far as division of effects resulting from transfrontier contacts is concerned –
three situations are possible:
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• coordinance of both sides and also equal division of effects,
• asymmetry of sides consisting in domination of better economically develo-
ped side, which also offers cheaper and competitive in terms of quality pro-
ducts and services;
• asymmetry, where economically richer side influences transfrontier job divi-
sion and participates in most benefits resulting from this situation;
2) As the level of transfrontier co–operation is concerned – four levels of interac-
tion are distinguished:
• initial strangeness and  hostility;
• more or less developed present co–existence;
• economic co–operation;
• transfrontier integration;
3) As economic co–operation is concerned – three possible situations are may
occur:
• impulsive trade – carried out by individual people and informal groups;
• regular trade  – carried out by registered trade organisations;
• production co–operation;
4) As co–operation of local/regional authorities is concerned – the following sta-
ges occur:
• informal contact of authority representatives,
• formalisation of contacts through negotiations of co–operation agreements;
• activities in support of fast economic benefits (e.g. simplifications in crossing
borders, searching for and linking companies to co–operate on both sides of
a border);
• activities in favour of long–term economic benefits (common aims in spatial
management and social policy, common infrastructural investments, common
cultural or teaching activity, etc).
There is no doubt that the part of Polish–Czech border discussed here represents
a specific type. It separates, from one hand,  two territories which until 1920 had
been included in one state organism, and on the other hand, within both provinces
(Silesian and Silesian–Moravian) adjacent to state border, two traditional economic
regions developed, which show features of contact regions (Z. Rykiel, 1985, 1991).
In both cases the hitherto historical social–economic changes (F. Kłosowski,
J. Runge, R. Prokop, 2001, p. 24–25):
a) “were conducted in peripheral regions as compared to political–governing
centres; due to historical reasons, intensity of infrastructural development and
cultural traditions, this location made economic transformation easier rather
than difficult;
b) were based on predominated role of traditional industries (coal mining, iron
metallurgy, power industry, machine–building industry);
c) contributed to considerable population dislocations in form of communing
and permanent migration, because of the insufficient local workforce;
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d) caused the necessity of taking up immediate activities in order to rationalise
spatial management, creation of new housing districts especially for immi-
grants, which was connected with developing industries. Therefore first post–
war regional plans (1950s) of both countries concerned the areas discussed
here; a guiding principle was deglommeration of centres through the construc-
tion of satellite towns”.
Taking into account these and other characteristics of the borderland studied, the
aim of this paper is to point out the most important, according to the Authors,
and most currents perspective determinants of development of the area studied,
especially in the situation of integration of Central–East European countries in
the European Union.
Conditions of social–economic development
The borderland studied, according to the conception of contact region (Z. Rykiel,
1985), until the mid 17th century showed poorly developed spatial–functional in-
frastructure, usually in form of local economic links especially in agriculture, tra-
de, and craft. The discovery of hard coal and its exploitation and also develop-
ment of metallurgy became main factors which rapidly changed the peripheral
character of this area. Side by side with structural factors of changes, also secular
factors occurred (W. Długoborski, 1967). The structural factors revolutionised the
methods and range of use of natural resources and contemporary technology and
caused rapid changes in location and structure of dominating industries. The se-
cular factors are derivatives of the previous ones and they occur after some time
in gradual steady transformations. These transformations usually concern social–
demographic structures (e.g. increasing from generation to generation adapta-
tion to mining and metallurgy, increase of percentage of immigrants, problems of
social integration between autochthons and immigrants).
”The discovery of coal in the 18th century in the area of present Katowice co-
nurbation, Rybnik conurbation and also in the area of Ostrava and Karvina, acce-
lerated the process of demarcation of state boundaries at the contact of Prussia,
Austria and Poland“ (J. Runge (ed.), 2003b, p. 15). This contributed to creation of
borderland regions of Cieszyn Silesia and Upper Silesia. In the 20th century, this
contact regions originated (...). Social integration is here in initial stage (...). In
social terms the sub–areas  of this region contact with each other rather than in-
terrelate.
Changes of state boundaries after the 1st world war resulted in the origin of
Silesian contact region. Simultaneously, due to political assignations, the integra-
ted so far Cieszyn Silesia region was divided into Polish and Czech parts and it
became a borderland area.
”Due to intensive industrialisation and impulsive urbanisation, the division
of Upper Silesia by state boundaries after the Austrian–Prussian war and then
after partitions of Poland, only partially decreased internal social–economic links.
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In contrary, the occurrence of state border on the Olza river in the inter–war pe-
riod considerably limited contacts between Polish and Czech societies for many
years. Mutual distrust was reinforced by regrettable political activities both befo-
re the war and after 1945. Historical changes in the course of state boundary cau-
sed that many towns in this area played or still play the role of border towns.  In
the past following towns belonged to this group: Bielsko–Biała, Frydek–Mistek,
Karvina and Opava, and now Polish and Czech Cieszyn. In the whole course of
former state boundaries of Austria, Prussia (then Germany) and Poland such towns
occur most  often in the studied area of Cieszyn Silesia and its limits” (J. Runge
(ed.), 2003b, p. 16).
The fact that some Central–Eastern European countries joined European Union
encourages to wider outlook at these both border provinces in wider social–
economic context. The limitation of state border as an evidence of liquidation of
internal spatial barriers in translocation of population within the Union should
increase integration processes between Ostrava–Karvina region and its hinterland
and also between both conurbations in Silesian Province (Katowice and Rybnik)
and their borderland. No doubt that Cieszyn Silesia should play an important
role in this integration as it can join the areas studied in historical, social–economic
and transport sense.
The liquidation of internal barriers gives possibilities of creation of transfrontier
integrated region, i.e. the region which joins borderlands of both  neighbouring
countries. What are the premises in this aspect? The most essential factors include
(J. Runge, 2003, p. 249–250):
• external disintegrational factors – similarity of functional structure based ma-
inly on traditional industries (coal mining, iron metallurgy, machine building
industry) as a consequence of post–war economic activity of the state; peri-
pheral location in relation to government centres of the state;
• external integrational factors – common history of social–economic changes
until 1920; cultural and linguistic community; transfrontier location; aspira-
tion for joining European Union;
• internal disintegrational – so far poor development of common economic en-
terprises; misunderstandings between societies resulting mainly from diffe-
rences in life standards, priorities in favour of natural environment protection
(Stonava) or the role of border trade;
• internal integrational – numerous forms of co–operation between the societies
of both borderlands (e.g. euroregions).
Of course job market will play an important role in the integration process
including wide zone of services in attractive for tourists area of borderland.
The question should be asked – Does Cieszyn Silesia show the features of bor-
derland region after political–economic changes initiated in the 1990s, especially
when such forms of transfrontier co–operation as euroregions occurred? To an-
swer this question it should be remembered that borderlands are usually peri-
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pheral in two hierarchical systems – in a national scale and regional scale (K. Hef-
fner, 1998). As K. Heffer (op. cit, p. 24–25) states, “in case of Polish Czech border-
land, its whole area has got peripheral character in the system of both countries –
Poland and Czechs, but in regional scale only its some parts have distinctive pe-
ripheral character. Individual parts of the borderland studied belong to regional
systems of different conditions, rates and possibilities of development (...). In the
post–war period, until the 1980s, Polish–Czech boundary had a character of
a distinctive economic, settlement and transport spatial barrier, which limited
direct contacts of population in regional and local scales.  Distinctive peripherisa-
tion (expressed in e.g. negative economic, social and demographic consequences)
of borderland zone and the areas located in a long distance from the state boun-
daries occurred (...). In local and regional scales, as late as in the 1990s some possi-
bilities of enlivening of borderlands occurred. Taking into account only Cieszyn
Silesia and its surrounding, it should be underlined that, despite belonging to
different states between the 18th and beginning of the 20th century, the observed
transformations on both sides of the border on the Olza and Odra rivers had
similar character. These transformations occurred in peripheral areas of Austria
from one side and Prussia from other side and then Germany and Poland basing
for many years on dominating role of traditional industries such as coal mining,
iron metallurgy, power industry and machine building industry (F. Kłosowski,
J. Runge, R. Prokop, 2002; J. Runge, 2002). After 1945 both social economic re-
gions i.e. Ostrava–Karvina region and Katowice and Rybnik regions became in
Czech and Polish scale strategic economic areas and conditioned economic deve-
lopment of both countries for many years. Cieszyn Silesia occurred between the-
se regions and, simultaneously, in both sides of the state boundary.
Also significant autochthonous character of the inhabitants of Cieszyn Silesia
should be remembered, which influences numerous fammily connections between
the inhabitants of both sides. As a result of post–war political assignations and
internal policy of the country, autochthonous  population in other euroregions
left their lands and other population immigrated, usually with quite different
cultural–economic standards. Considerable physiographic handicap in form of
mountain ranges or rivers as well as political conditions made it very difficult or
impossible keep family connections (e.g. Bałtyk, Bug, Tatry  Euroregions). And,
of course, cognation of language as well as religion differentiation and frankness
played a significant role in creation of integrity of Cieszyn Silesia.
In terms of a character of mutual relations among people, the society of Cieszyn
Silesia developed with great influence of mass and often impetuous migrations.
Relatively closed, functionally simple, agricultural and settled from genera-
tions society of Cieszyn Silesia occurred in new, difficulty conditions of strong
industrialisation, in the area of rapidly growing social stratification. New categories
of industrial workers originated in jobs requiring new qualifications. The role of
intellectual potential increased with some delay in education, culture and in
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various technical–organisational initiatives. Because of development in transport
system, the access to different towns became easier.
Traditional agrarian area transformed fast into dynamically developing
industrial region. Social structure of villages inhabitants still depended on town
interests and was influenced by job market pressure  with job offers in industry.
The population migration from villages to towns increased. The contacts of Cieszyn
community were influenced by nationalistic structure, where Polish and Czech
population predominated and also, until 1945 German population, and in post–
war period also Slovakian, Roman and Greek population. At present it concerns
also foreigners especially from post–communistic countries. Generally, integration
processes favour the group, which is in majority in given area leading to
assimilation of population which is in minority.
Conclusions
Investigations of borderlands, because of their different character requires a specific
approach. According to many authors these areas are subjected to many problems
because of their location. Most often cited limitations include their peripheral
location in relation to political and economic centres of the country, considerable
distance from main transport routes, or insufficient development of infrastructure.
Moreover, poorly “permeable” boundaries considerably limit possibilities of co–
operation, which intensifies social–economic differences on both sides of the
border. Unquestionable influence of a boundary on economic processes was
discussed in many works. Many authors point out also time range of border
influence despite its formal liquidation.
Recently, together with liberalisation of border relations, quite new possibilities
occurred. The increase of a border “permeability” gives some possibilities to
increase the intensity of mutual relations. This may lead to obtain a substantial
dynamics of economic growth. In this light, a category of local development
acquires special importance, because, as it proceeds from the ranks, it may activate
areas, which are not properly noticed from the level of regional or state policy.
Plans of regional development are the bases to define general functions and
importance of individual areas on the background of macro–structures.
The institutions that support development of borderlands and also reinforce
co–operation between two sides of the border are euroregions, which originate
these areas. At present (25.01.2001) there are 15 euroregions along Polish boun-
daries and three of them are located in Silesian province. They include Silesia
Euroregion, Cieszyn Silesia Euroregion and Beskidy Euroregion. Among other
circumstances favouring development of co–operation is fact that south border
goes between the countries associated with European Union and represents an
internal border of countries belonging to Wyshegrad Group.
The occurrence of state boundary between Poland and Czechs in1920 disrupted
territorial integrity of Cieszyn Silesia and started the phase of “closed boundary”
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existence. In fact, for 70 next years until the beginning of political–economic
transformation in Central–Eastern Europe, the boundary on the Olza and Odra
rivers retarded the development of the adjacent area. Despite political declarations
of the unity and co–operation of former socialistic countries, the contacts between
both borderlands and especially contacts of families living on both sides of the
border were hampered.
At the beginning of the 1990s, the second part of transformations of the
borderland studied started, i.e. the “phase of a filter border”. It is observed in
liberalisation of cross–frontier traffic, creation of new border crossings, substantial
increase of migrations, accompanied by the process of equalisation of development
possibilities, which were accumulated in the borderlands but divided up to that
time by a hermetic spatial barrier in form of state boundary. The impulses of
development  first go along transport routes leading to car border crossings on
both sides of the border. This phase undoubtedly occurs now.
A perspective stage in the process of state boundary development is the phase
of “open boundary” identified with formal liquidation of the border after both
counties join European Union. Side by side with many similarities there are also
many differences concerning for example population dynamics, intensity of
services development, role of agriculture in economy or social infrastructure. Early
restructuring activities which were taken up in coal mining of Ostrava–Karvina
industrial region caused not only translocation of this industry from the central
part of the region but also diminished the consequences of political–economic
changes after 1990 (e.g. unemployment). In Katowice region this situation was
more complex because the delay in restructuring process was accompanied by
decreasing dynamics of demographic–social development, large number of
unemployed and emigrations abroad.
Simultaneously both parts of the euroregion  represent essential constituents
of regional settlement system of both countries creating system of agglomerating
social–economic bounds with distinctive concentration in Ostrava on the Czech
side and more complex system of bounds on Polish side. Here two settlement
systems of conurbation character occur (Katowice and Rybnik) and also two large
subregional towns, which, until 1998 were capitols of provinces (Bielsko–Biała
and Częstochowa). Therefore, side by side with strong subregional links with
Bielsko–Biała, the Polish side of Cieszyn Silesia shows numerous links with Rybnik
conurbation and also Katowice conurbation.
The following question arises – Do these features indicate integrational or
disintegrational character of the system studied? Despite the fact that Euroregion
Śląsk Cieszyński was established only several years ago, numerous transfrontier
relations have occurred here for a long time, including also family relations.
Differences in post–war economic situation of Poland and Germany caused
numerous social–living migrations in the boundary zone, which intensified in
the first years of liberalisation of custom regulations, when the “filter” stage of
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the border started. Economic links between both sides of Cieszyn Silesia on this
background are much weaker and they decrease together with the decrease of
coal mining importance as a main development factor on Czech side. The
employed there Polish citizens represent a small percentage of the workforce.
The results of investigations (including also inquiries with representatives of
local authorities on both sides of the border) show that Euroregion Śląsk Cieszyński
is now at the beginning of the process of economic–infrastructural integration. So
far it has concentrated in selected towns or areas and it grows weaker outwards
the border.
The second expressed earlier problem is identification of strong and weak
features of the euroregion in the light of integration processes with European
Union. The results of investigations revealed that despite many–century–long
traditions of common social–economic development, the separation of Cieszyn
Silesia in two different sides in 1920 caused diminishing of relations between
both communities, intensified by strong internal urbanisation including
immigration from outside the region (Jastrzębie Zdrój, Karvina, Orlova), iron
metallurgy (Trinec) or machine and ellectrical engineering industry (Cieszyn).
The next question arises here concerning development possibilities of Cieszyn
Silesia after joining European Union. The border infrastructure and realised by it
tasks will appear unnecessary. Decreasing recently market–place sales (including
alcohol sales) appears to be unnecessary because of the process of price
equalisation. Similar situation concerns other services at the state border like
catering business, money exchange offices, etc. The lack of the border will diminish
the scale of a hitherto every–day migrations for shopping, and then it may
contribute to changes in poorly used so far tourist–recreation infrastructure on
both sides of the Olza and Odra. Much wider marketing of different values of the
region among potential tourists will be required, which is very important
considering the fact that in the neighbourhood there are some touristic regions
with better developed tourist infrastructure and with larger tourist traffic. The
hitherto forms (like informing about different cultural or sports events organised
mainly in Cieszyn) are completely insufficient. There is no any regional travel
agency which would offer various recreation–tourist services in towns of Cieszyn
Silesia. There is also no wider co–operation between scientific institutions situated
in the borderland (Uniwersytet Śląski – Katowice– Cieszyn, Slezska Univerzita –
Opava – Karvina, Slezsky Ustav – Opava) or more intensive advertisement of
Księżnica Cieszyńska outside the region, or larger number of multi–field
investigations of the area studied. The limitation of the role of the state border on
the Olza and Odra or its perspective liquidation will cause further increase of
spatial mobility of the inhabitants including also job migrations. The state of the
job market of the whole Polish–Czech borderland will not only require
investigations and studies but also certain common practical activities on both
sides of the border. Common economic policy and development of job market
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represent the most important and, simultaneously, the most difficult tasks in the
process of borderland integrity. The lack of language problems or bilingualism of
many inhabitants represent additional factors favouring co–operation, which gives
Cieszyn Silesia better position as compared to other euroregions.
The factor which makes the spatial mobility of inhabitants easier is a suitable
transport accessibility including condition of roads, the associated infrastructure,
type and number of transport links. A transit location of Cieszyn Silesia on the
transport map of Europe will constrain in near feature integrated outlook at this
region, where many road investments have been taken up, but still not sufficient
enough in relation to the expected consequences of integration.
Taking into account the discussed above expectations, a similar situation may
occur here as it was in Katowice conurbation during the last 200 years when two
borderland areas transformed into one contact region. The difference is only
associated with the fact that in Katowice case it occurred together with some
changes in the course of the state border and in case of Cieszyn Silesia it will
occur in conditions of liquidation of state border.
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Zbigniew Puchajda
Co-operation of Warmia and Mazury with the Kaliningrad
Oblast of Russian Federation.
Directions and Areas of the Activity Intensification
1st May 2004 Poland joined the European Community with all the consequences
of this fact. They include also, or maybe first of all the Polish–Russian relations,
putting a new complexion on them. It is connected especially with the distinct
stabilisation of the role of the Kaliningrad oblast as a pilot region in the relations
between Russia and the European Union. It means that Kaliningrad oblast will be
included in the Baltic economic area on a larger scale. It also creates many possi-
bilities to animate economic relations between Poland, Kaliningrad and Baltic
Sea countries. However, comprehensive analyses and brave decisions are neces-
sary to realise it.
The 750th anniversary of Kaliningrad founding and the 60th anniversary of the
Kaliningrad oblast setting are coming soon. The opportunity should be taken to
use these events to promote Warmia and Mazury Region and to intensify the
activities connected with the co-operation with the Kaliningrad oblast.
The scope of the bilateral co–operation between Warminsko–Mazurskie Vo-
ivodship and the Kaliningrad oblast was defined in the agreement signed 19th
September 2001 by Marshal of Warminsko–Mazurskie Voivodship Andrzej Ryn-
ski and Governor of the Kaliningrad oblast Wladimir Jegorow. Nevertheless, ana-
lysing the content of this document it is easy to understand that not all the possi-
bilities resulting from the agreement were turned to good account. On the other
hand the distinct boom in the co–operation in the second semester of the previo-
us year was noticed and can be considered optimistic. The boom refers to various
spheres of life. Activitiy of municipalities and border towns is being slowly inten-
sified on the both sides of the border; the whole process is stimulated by the
Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Kaliningrad. Despite of the com-
plaints and endless discussions, the trade exchange with the Kalinigrad oblast
amounts to more than 300 mln USD now and would be even bigger if the infor-
mal trade exchange was taken into account. 26 institutions, organisations and
companies representing business, education, culture, science, infrastructure and
tourism maintain permanent relations with the Kaliningrad oblast. “Friendly
Neighbourhood Forum”, the initiative of Stefan Batory Foundation, can be consi-
dered as a particulary valuable. The initiative is realised by the Cultural Commu-
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nity “Borussia” and the Elblag Association for Support of Non–Governmental
Initiatives.
Economic co–operation is very important but makes only a part of the vast
opportunities of development of relations between Warmia and Mazury and the
Kaliningrad oblast. Its efectiveness depends on how well the communities of both
regions know each other. That is why an important role in the intensification of
mutual relations play such activities as:
• common structural projects co–financed by the European Union;
• co–operation on the field of infrastructure, including roads, border crossings,
communication etc.;
• cultural exchange;
• co–operation between universities and scientific institutes, either on the field
of teaching or research;
• exchange of experience on the education of young people;
• cross–border co–operation.
It is also important that in the Kaliningrad oblast live about 5 000 people of Polish
origin. They expect our cordiality and help. It can be also an essential factor to
promote Polish presence in the Kalinigrad oblast. Environment protection is a field
of special importance. It refers either to formulation of bilateral programmes or to
looking for possibilities to finance their realisation. Another important fields of co–
operation can be preservation of cultural heritage and restoration of historical mo-
numents.
Following activities should be considered as priorities in further co–operation
with the Kaliningrad oblast in 2004:
• implementation of activities planned in the „Agenda of co–operation between
Warmińsko–Mazurskie Voivodship and Kaliningrad oblast”;
• organisation of the Warmia and Mazury Days in Kaliningrad with the trade
fair, regional touristic offer, sport events etc.;
• providing Poviat Information Centres with knowledge on the Kaliningrad
oblast and on the implemented activities;
• elaboration of guiding principles for organisation of the Regional Office of
Warmia and Mazury in Kaliningrad; the office could play role of the Center of
Information on the Region and in the same time would also help in contacts
between institutions, organisations, companies and private persons from War-
mia and Mazury and the Kaliningrad oblast. In the future the office should
enlarge its operational scope on Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
The above presented proposals result immediately from the “Strategy of social
and economic development of the Province of Warmia and Mazury” ratified in
2000. The strategy gives priority to co–operation with the Kaliningrad oblast.
Development of the co–operation of Warmia and Mazury with the Kalinin-
grad oblast and its intensification require good co–ordination of the activities
undertaken, informing all the subjects interested in the co–operation with the
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Kaliningrad oblast and helping them to co me into bilateral contacts. European
Integration and International Cooperation Department of the Office of the Mar-
shal of Warmińsko–Mazurskie Voivodship is going to play that role.
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Introduction
Profound socio–economic transformations exert an important influence on demo-
graphic processes. This relates especially to matrimonial and procreational con-
ducts which depend mostly on the sole decision of the individual (E. Gołata, 1995).
The decision to contract a marriage and especially to set up a family is to an increas-
ing extent dependant on the temporarily deteriorating economic situation. This can
be acutely observed on the job market, in which unemployment poses a substantial
threat to women. The main cause seems to be the possession of offspring (the lack
of availability due to the nurturing of children, difficulties in raising qualifications
as well as the difficulty of balancing motherhood with a career).
In new economic situation there is also increase of diversified needs, whose
wide range was not accessible in the previous system. The possibilities of satisfy-
ing them, in the light of economic difficulties and the disappearance of the wel-
fare role of the state, are becoming more attractive than matrimonial or
procreational commitments, which are postponed or set aside altogether. More-
over, the deterioration of traditional norms and values, which accompanies sud-
den social changes, is conductive to the decrease of fertility and changes in
nuptiality (J. Dorbritz, 1995).
Lower fertility as well as increasing mortality, also determined by the deterio-
rating economic situation, result in depopulation which is observed in most of
the former European socialist countries that are undergoing conversion from cen-
trally–planned to market economy. The most severe decrease of population is
observed in those European countries that constituted a part of the USSR until
1991 (P. Eberhardt, 2002b).
This paper is an attempt to analyse the changes in fertility and nuptiality that
have occurred in the post–soviet part of Baltic Europe in the years 1990–2001. The
employed data present the situation just before the dissolution of the USSR in
1991 as well as the changes observed during the first ten years of the countries’
independence. They include, therefore, the period in which socio–economic re-
forms were introduced. In accordance with the delimitation proposed by
M. Dutkowski (1996), the research area includes the territory of Latvia, Lithuania
Renata Anisiewicz
Changes in Fertility and Nuptiality
in the Post–Soviet part of Baltic Europe
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and Estonia as well as Russian oblasts: the Kaliningrad Oblast, the Leningrad
Oblast and the autonomous city of Sankt Petersburg.
Changes in birth rate
In 2001 the analysed region was inhabited by around 14.5 million people, 1/3 of
which (i.e. 4.6 million) constituted the inhabitants of Sankt Petersburg. Other re-
gions were characterised by a comparatively small population: Lithuania
(3.5 million), Latvia (2.4 million), Leningrad Oblast (1.7 million), Estonia (1.4 mil-
lion) and Kaliningrad Oblast (0.95 million).
The population of the region has decreased in relation to 1990 by over 1 mil-
lion people. Loss has not been observed in merely the Kaliningrad Oblast, where
there has been an increase of population by 69 thousand inhabitants. The largest
decrease of population, however, was noted in Sankt Petersburg (396 thousand).
The population of Latvia decreased by 304 thousand, of Lithuania by 207 thou-
sand, of Estonia by 204 thousand, while of the Leningrad Oblast by merely
2 thousand. Depopulation affected chiefly the Baltic independent states – Estonia
and Latvia, where a 12% decrease of inhabitants was noted, while other regions
appear less affected – Sankt Petersburg (8%), Lithuania (6%) and the Leningrad
Oblast (0.1%).
A decline in the number of births in 1990s played a vital role in shaping the
population of the analysed region. Its first symptoms, however, emerged in the
1980s, before the socio–economic and political changes (A. Jagielski, 1998).
The birth rate in the Baltic region of the former USSR in 1990 ranged from
10.8‰ in Sankt Petersburg to 15.4‰ in Lithuania, being higher in the Baltic re-
publics and lower in areas belonging to the Russians. The decline of this rate in
the 1990s in the entire region under analysis was most dynamic in the first half of
the decade (Figure 1). During 3 years (until 1993) the birth rate in the oblasts of
the Russian Federation decreased between 30% in the Kaliningrad Oblast and
39% in Sankt Petersburg. Much smaller changes were observed in following years,
when the birth rate oscillated around 7‰ in Sankt Petersburg and the Leningrad
Oblast, while in the Kaliningrad Oblast between 7.4‰ and 9.2‰.
Other countries of the region were characterised by similar changes in the birth
rate (Figure 1). Its significant decline, however, drew to a close in 1994 in Lithuania
and Estonia, while in Latvia it lasted until 1997. Since mid 1990s there has also
been observed a fluctuation of rates, whose values were higher than in Russian
oblasts. A birth rate between 8.8‰ and 9.7‰ was registered in Estonia, while in
Latvia it amounted to between 7.6‰ and 9.6‰.
At the end of the 1990s, a slight increase in the birth rate per 1000 inhabitants
was noted. It was a result of the children of the post–war baby–boom generation
reaching their procreation age. (P. Szukalski, 1999). Merely Lithuania, in contrast
to the other countries, was characterised by a systematic decrease of the birth
rate, which reached in 2001 its lowest level of 9.1‰.
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In the final year of the period under analysis, the birth rates in the post–soviet
part of Baltic Europe ranged from 7.3‰ in Sankt Petersburg1  and the Leningrad
Oblast to 9.3‰ in Estonia. They were still higher in the Baltic countries than in
Russian oblasts. Within 11 years the most substantial decline was observed in
Latvia (41.5%), Lithuania (41%), next were the Kaliningrad Oblast (36%), Estonia
(35%), the Leningrad Oblast (34%) and Sankt Petersburg (32%).
Changes in fertility
A decline in number of births in 1990–2001 was related to the decrease in the fertil-
ity of women in the reproductive age (15–49). The fertility rate declined in the
analysed area by approximately 40% (Figure 2). The slightest decrease was observed
in Estonia (37%), while the most substantial in the Leningrad Oblast (45%) and
Kaliningrad Oblast (44%). Throughout the entire period under analysis the fertility
of women in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia was higher than of women in the Rus-
sian part. In the 1990s, however, the disproportion between the fertility rate in the
Russian oblasts and the independent Baltic republics diminished.
The analysis of age specific fertility rates (per 1000 of women) enabled a care-
ful assessment of the changes in the field of fertility. In the years 1990–2001 there
was a decline in fertility in all age groups among women in the post–soviet part
of Baltic Europe (Table 1 and Table 2). The rates had not changed in merely the
eldest group of women.
Figure 1. Live births per 1000 of population
Source: own studies.
1 Sankt Petersburg is characterised by the lowest birth rate among all Russian oblasts (P. Eberhardt,
2002a).
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At the beginning of the 1990s, a discernible peak of fertility in the entire region
related to women at the age of 20–24, while a lower intensity of procreation
characterised women at the age of 25–29. The highest rates in both age groups
were observed in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia (Table 1). The inhabitants of Rus-
sian oblasts, especially younger women living in Sankt Petersburg, were
characterised by lower fertility. The third place in the Baltic republics and Sankt
Petersburg was taken by women at the age of 30–34, while in the Kaliningrad and
Leningrad oblasts by women at the age of 15–19. Quite the opposite was true of
the fourth place. The fertility of older women was by far lower.
In 11 years, there had been a shift in the highest fertility rate from the age
group of 20–24 to 25–29 age group in Estonia, Latvia and Sankt Petersburg. Younger
women were still more fertile in Lithuania as well as the Leningrad and
Kaliningrad oblasts but a clear peak in fertility occurred only in Russian oblasts
Figure 2. Female fertility of age 15-49
Source: own studies.
Table 1. Female fertility in 1990
Source: own studies.
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(Table 2). In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well as Sankt Petersburg the fertility
of women at the ages of 20–24 and 25–29 varied slightly. In the Russian oblasts
(except for Sankt Petersburg), a significant decrease in the fertility of very young
women (15–19) as well as an increase of fertility in the age group of 30–34 was
observed.
The age shift was accompanied by a decline in the analysed rates, which has
been mentioned above. The most spectacular decrease was observed in the young-
est age groups. In 2001 the fertility of young women in the age group of 15–19 was
almost twice and in Latvia even thrice smaller than in 1990. A double decline in the
fertility rate (in Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) or almost double decline (Russian oblasts)
was observed among women from the following age group (i.e. 20–24). Such
a radical decrease in fertility could also be noted in the 35–44 age group in the
Kaliningrad and Leningrad oblasts. There was also, to a smaller extent, a decline
in fertility in the 25–34 age group of the entire region (between 18% in Sankt
Petersburg and 43% in other Russian oblasts).
The causes of fertility fluctuations, observed in the post–soviet part of Baltic
Europe in the last decade of the 20th century, should be sought in a series of social,
economic and psychological conditions. The destabilisation of the economy had
led to a deterioration of living conditions of families. A fall in income, uncertainty
on the job market, the preference of professional career over family life, a lack of
housing and faulty social infrastructure determined the postponed setting up of
families and possession of offspring, sparse opting for motherhood or desisting
from procreation altogether (P. Eberhardt, 2003). This becomes clearly reflected
in the shift of age of highest fertility from the age 20–24 age group to the 25–29 age
group as well as in the decline in fertility rate.
The cited factors have a universal character and accompany economic changes
occurring also in the other countries in transition. Post–soviet countries are
characterised, since the USSR, by widespread abortion, which is still regarded as
Source: own studies.
Table 2. Female fertility in 2001
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the principal method of birth control. On account of the unfavourable economic
situation, its use may even be more universal than before the collapse of the USSR
(M. Thorborg, 2002). The phenomenon occurs especially in Russia where two in
every three pregnancies are aborted (P. Eberhardt, 2003). It is estimated that due
to the committed abortions, even 1/3 of Russian women might be infertile, which
distinctly limits the reproduction of the population (M. Thorborg, 2002). The scale
of the problem is also prominent in other countries of the region. It was observed
in 1996 that there were 1397 abortions in Estonia and 1225 in Latvia for every 1000
births. Slightly less was observed in Lithuania – 759 (J. Jankevics, 1998).
A synthetic measure of fertility is total fertility rate (TFR). TFR stands for the
average number of children women give birth to during the reproductive period
(15–49 years), in the reproductive conditions characteristic of a specific moment
analysed. The measure of TFR indicates the type of reproduction occurring in
a population, while the value 2.11 in the developed countries is called replace-
ment level.
The post–soviet countries of Baltic Europe were characterised in the 1990s by
childbirths that did not guarantee the replacement of generations (TFR below
2.11). The decrease of TFR was observed in the entire region and constituted
a continuation of a trend that had begun before the formal dissolution of the USSR
in December 1991.
In the 1980s, TFR level underwent fluctuations, insubstantially exceeding, how-
ever, the replacement level (M. Macura, 1995). The maximum TFR was observed
in Latvia in 1986 (2.15), in Russia (2.22) and Lithuania (2.15) a year later and in
1988 in Estonia (2.26). An accelerated decrease in the rate (with the exception of
Lithuania, where the initial decrease was insignificant) began in the peak of the
perestroyka period in the years 1988–1989 and lasted until 1993 (A. Kowalska,
1999, Fig. 7, p. 137). In the following years the tempo of changes decreased, while
in the second half of the 1990s there was a slight rise of TFR.
Between 1990 and 2001 TFR dropped approximately by 40% in Latvia as well
as the Kaliningrad and Leningrad oblasts, while in Estonia and Lithuania by ap-
proximately 35%. A relatively minor decline (30%) was observed in Sankt Peters-
burg (Figure 3), where the lowest TFR level were noted throughout the entire
decade (1.49 in 1990 and 1.03 in 2001). This is typical for urban areas, in which the
model of families with fewer offspring appeared the earliest (P. Eberhardt, 2003).
A higher level of TFR was characteristic of the independent Baltic republics
(just above 2.00 in 1990 and more than 1.20 eleven years later). TFR in the Russian
oblasts was no greater than 2.00 in 1990 and was even below 1.15 in 2001. The
lowest statistics, as only 1.02 children were marked in the Leningrad Oblast. Due
to this, the Baltic oblasts of Russia were below the country’s average (1.25).
The decrease in TFR in the period of economic changes which took place re-
veals the possibility of adaptation to the new and more difficult conditions, where
numerous families are more liable to suffer poverty (P. Szukalski, 1999).
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:4050
Changes in Fertility and Nuptiality in the Post–Soviet part of Baltic Europe 51
Changes in nuptiality
In 1990, the number of marriages in the Baltic region, which belonged to the USSR,
ranged from 7.5 in Estonia to 10.3 marriages per 1000 of population in Sankt Pe-
tersburg2. In the 1990s a decline in new marriages was marked in all countries of
that region (Figure 4). However, in terms of the intensity of changes the regions
were divided into two groups.
Figure 3. Total fertility rate
Source: own studies.
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Figure 4. Crude marriage rate (per 1000 of population)
Source: own studies.
2 The rate of marriages has been presented by means of the crude marriage rate (per 1000 of population),
calculated as a relation between the number of marriages and the number of inhabitants. Its interpretation is
limited since the factor does not take into account the changes in the structure of the analysed population. It
does, however, give a general outlook on the tendencies occurring in those ranges. The crude divorce rate has
been calculated analogically.
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One group includes Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia where between the years
1990 and 2001 a twofold decrease in marriages was noted. During the whole de-
cade of the 1990s Lithuania was characterised by a systematic annual decline of
the marriage rate (from 9.8‰ in 1990 to 4.5‰ in 2001). In Latvia and Estonia the
decrease in the number of marriages occurred until 1996, after which there was
a stable period in which the rate remained at the level between 3.9 and 4.1 mar-
riages per 1000 inhabitants.
A separate group is formed by the oblasts of the Russian Federation, where
the decline of nuptiality at the time of noting was lower than in the Baltic repub-
lics and ranged from 21% in the Leningrad Oblast to 30% in the Kaliningrad Oblast
(Figure 4). This area was also characterised by a slightly different course of mar-
riage rate. The number of the latter decreased until 1998, whereas from 1999 an
increase in new relationships per 1000 inhabitants was noted. In comparison with
the Baltic republics, where at the beginning of the 21st century there were approxi-
mately 4 marriages per 1000 inhabitants, the Russian oblasts had a greater
nuptiality, between 6.5‰ in the Leningrad Oblast and 7.5‰ in Sankt Petersburg.
The differences between Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and the oblasts now be-
longing to the Russian Federation are more apparent in the subject of divorce.
A greater number of marriages is noted in Russia together with an alarmingly
higher divorce rate. This rose in the last decade of the 20th century by 20% (Figu-
re 5). In 2001 the statistics were 5–8% higher than the average in Russia (5.3‰)
and they could be found in the range of 5.7‰ (in the Kaliningrad Oblast) and
6.5‰ (in Sankt Petersburg).
A different situation was observed in the independent Baltic republics. These
were characterised by quite high divorce rates when compared to the countries of
Western Europe but lower than in the analysed Russian area (Figure 5). In the
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Figure 5. Crude divorce rate (per 1000 of population)
Source: own studies.
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1990s, divorces per 1000 inhabitants decreased in number and the greatest de-
cline was observed in Latvia (approximately 40%).
The data reveals a crisis in the marriage and family institution in the research
area. The difficult economic situation connected with the conversion to a market
economy had a profound influence on the above. The deteriorating living condi-
tions, lack of housing and the annihilation of the privileges that were pro young
married couples as well as the uncertainty on the job market were the main causes
that led to postponing decisions concerning marital status. This was visible espe-
cially in the Russian oblasts where, as an opposition to the young people of the
same age of Western Europe, the people here remain to live with their parents
who provide for them.
The decreasing number of marriages in Estonia and Latvia can be moreover
explained in the light of the spreading Scandinavian lifestyle, which is very fa-
miliar to these countries (A. Maryański, 1993). This has taken its course especially
among the younger age groups as the widely accepted informal relationships.
This model of behaviour is very popular among the native Estonian population.
The following statistics demonstrate this. At the beginning of the 1990s around
60% of the Estonian population at the age of 20–29 lived in consensual unions
(J. Indulski, J. T. Kowaleski, 1998). Cohabitation is more rare in the case of migrants
of the Slavic origin. Their emigration at the beginning of the 1990s had an impact on
the decrease of the rate of marriages in the independent Baltic republics.
The high divorce rates typical of the whole discussed region reflect the liberal
nature of dissolving marriages which dates back to the time of the USSR. A vital
consequence of the high level of divorces especially in the oblasts of Russia, is the
worsening conditions of bringing up children in incomplete families. In the
Kaliningrad Oblast every third child is brought up in such a family (V. Zhdanov,
V. Pustovgarov, G. Fedorov, 2002).
The alterations in marriages which occurred in the 1990s in the part of Baltic
Europe which this paper focuses on, were accompanied by the growth of extra-
marital births. In all the countries and oblasts of Russia an increase in the births of
illegitimate children was noted, although the intensity of the situation varied.
The greatest percentages of extramarital births can be found in Estonia and
Latvia (Figure 6). Already in 1990 Estonia revealed statistics of over 27% of such
births and Latvia about 17 %. In the Baltic oblasts of Russia their number was
higher than 10% in 1990, however, the lowest was in Lithuania (7%).
In the 1990s in Lithuania there was the highest noted rise in the percentage of
births of illegitimate children (above 3.5 times). In the year 2001 every fourth
child was born illegitimate. In the other countries and Russian oblasts this level
rose during eleven years by twice the number. At the beginning of the 21st cen-
tury above 56% of young Estonians3  and about 42% Latvians were born  to un-
3 The percentage of extramarital births in Europe was higher only in Iceland (66%) and Sweden (55%).
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married couples. The Baltic republics were characterised by a systematic annual
increase in such births as a contrast to the three analysed Russian oblasts, where
the rate of illegitimate births rose until 1998 and stabilised in the next years and
reached 28–29%.
The increase in illegitimate births has been under observation in most Western
and Northern Europe countries since the 1970s of the 20th century. According to
D.J. van de Kaa (P. Szukalski, 2000) the explanation for the occurring changes in
the extramarital procreation lies in the sphere of cultural patterns which form
human behaviours. In the recent years the domineering attitude is an assumption
that the aim of proper functioning is one’s own self–realisation and happiness.
The growth in number of illegitimate children could be therefore perceived as
a way of fulfilling the maternal instinct when there is lack of an appropriate part-
ner in a legal relationship.
Another reason of illegitimate births is the crisis of the marriage institution
and widespreading of consensual unions, where the birth of child is a planned
and awaited moment (P. Szukalski, 2000). The whole situation is supported by
the growing social acceptability of this pattern of procreation and in same coun-
tries it is the social and fiscal policies which favours illegitimate children. The
extramarital procreation is particularly popular in Scandinavia where the popu-
lation reproduction is mostly based on illegitimate births.
The increase in the number of illegitimate births in the area of research is
a reflection of the demographic trends observed in whole Europe. The evident
intensity of the occurrence in Estonia and Latvia after 1990 is an effect of the spread-
ing of cultural patterns which are close in nature to the Swedish or German cus-
toms (A. Maryański, 1993). The influence of the Catholic religion reflects a slightly
lower level of extramarital procreation in Lithuania.
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Kaliningrad Leningrad Sankt Petersburg
0%
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Figure 6. Births by marital status
Source: own studies.
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Summary
The evolution of procreational attitudes and marital behaviours observed in the
1990s of the 20th century in the post–soviet parts of the Baltic Europe is consistent
with the theory of the second demographic transition. The essence of the latter are
the changes in the family model, rules governing and breaking it (A. Kowalska,
1999). However, the driving force behind the observed changes in the analysed
areas like in other countries of the Central Eastern Europe, was by far the economic
situation connected with the introduction of the market economy reforms, rather
than a diffusion of postmodern demographic behavioural patterns (P. Szukalski,
1999). The first symptoms of the fertility decrease appeared in the 1980s before the
setting of social–political changes (A. Jagielski, 1998). The economic reforms
(perestroyka) began under M. Gorbachew government accelerated changes, whose
intensity was apparent after the dissolution of the USSR, at the beginning of the
last decade of the 20th century.
In the whole region the discussed demographic modifications were going in
the same direction (with the exception of divorces). However, as far as the spread
and the greatness of changes are concerned differences between independent Baltic
republics and the Russian part were observed. The decreasing rates of female
fertility and TFR were lower in Russian oblasts (in Sankt Petersburg they reached
a tragically low level). The growth of illegitimate births was also lower there. On
the other hand the higher fertility rate in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia was ac-
companied by a growth in the extramarital procreation. The latter two countries
reached similar statistics as the ones found in the Nordic culture. A considerably
longer decline of marriages than in the Russian part was registered in this part of
the region. However, there were different tendencies in the subject of divorces. In
the 1990s the dissolvement of marriages was stronger in the Russian oblasts as
a contrast to the other countries where the number of divorces had declined.
The disadvantageous tendencies in the fertility rate were brought about vio-
lent increase in the death rate, under observation in the post–soviet part of the
Baltic Europe since 1993. In the deteriorating economic conditions the rapidly
increasing death rates revealed an unsatisfactory level of health care and social
services (T. Michalski, 2001).
The negative consequence of the changes in fertility and death rates was a rapid
decrease in the natural increase rate which turned into a natural decline of popula-
tion, especially in the Russian oblasts, at the beginning of the 1990s (D. Ediev, 2001).
The decrease in this part of the former USSR was partly patched up by the surplus
migration rate (P. Eberhardt, 2002a). The lower level of the negative rates of natural
population growth in the Baltic republics with a negative or zero balance of migra-
tion was the cause of relatively higher losses of population in those countries.
In the opinions of demographers, the decrease of population of the postsocialist
countries will be an outcome of the fossilization of western patterns of life where
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the tendency to give birth is low (P. Szukalski, 1999). The demographic regres-
sion in this region will also undoubtedly increase in depth due to the population’s
tragic state of health and as a result of civilizations long–lasting neglect.
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Adverse Natural Population Changes in Bulgaria
During the Period of Transformation:
a Pressing Demographic Problem of Our Time
The fundamental political, social and economic restructuring, which took place
in Central and Eastern European countries during the last decade, influenced the
general and specific features of their demographic development. External migra-
tion of varying intensity originated alongside with the trends towards worsening
of the age structure and population aging, decreasing of birth rates, increasing of
death rates and adverse natural population natural changes. This outflow of young,
enterprising, working–age people will inevitably have a negative effect in the
next decades which will further deepen the demographic problems in the respec-
tive countries.
According to the number of its population Bulgaria belongs to the mid–sized
European states. It ranks 20th among the 46 nations on the European continent
with 7.9 million people (2002 data). The socio–economic transformations during
the years of transition to market economy in Bulgaria are accompanied by nume-
rous changes in the demographic characteristics and processes. Certain negative
trends in the dynamics of the demographic indices, which started in the last deca-
des, can be still distinguished. From the first census–taking in 1880 for the Princi-
pality of Bulgaria and in 1884 for Eastern Roumelia1  to the early 1990s (Figure 1)
Bulgaria’s population was steadily increasing. At the end of 1985 it was 8 948 600
people. Prognoses were made that in the second half of the 1980s it would grow
over 9 million but instead, at the beginning of the 21st century it dropped below
8 million.
Bulgaria’s population began to decrease since the mid–1980s. To be more pre-
cise the country experienced a perceptible population decline in 1989 when, as
a result of a forcible renaming of the population from the Turkish ethnic group,
a fairly large emigration wave was directed to Turkey. In the early 1990s for the
first time in the centenary census–taking practice the statistics showed a popula-
1 After the liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman oppression in 1878, the Berlin Congress (June, 1878)
divided the newly formed Bulgarian state into several parts, having different statute: the vassal Principality of
Bulgaria subject to Turkey, an autonomous region, known as Eastern Roumelia, vast areas which were re-
turned to Turkey and others – annexed to Romania and Serbia. In 1885 Eastern Roumelia and the Principality
of Bulgaria were integrated.
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tion decrease. The 1992 census–taking recorded a population decline by 450 000
people as compared to the 1985 – figures.
During the last decade the tendency towards a population decline persisted.
The census data indicate that in March 2001 the number of the population was
7 933 000 people. For the eight–year period between the last two census–takings
(December 1992 – March 2001) it decreased by 554 300 people. In the 1989–2000
period the decrease was by 975 000 people which was most marked in the early
1990s (Table 1). These adverse changes resulted from the unfavourable demogra-
phic processes and phenomena as well as from the complexly interwoven econo-
mic, social, political and other factors and causes.
Hence, the demographic processes are similar by nature to those in the rema-
ining European states but in Bulgaria their negative impact is stronger.
Significant changes occurred in birth–rates and death–rates during the last few
decades in the country. As А. Totev maintains (1992), in the beginning of the
1990s it entered the last stage of demographic transition, generating a new type of
population reproduction, which led to a new birth rate – death rate ratio.
Today Bulgaria is considered to be amidst the nations notable for their low
birth rates both on European and global scale in spite of the partially implemen-
ted pro–natal policy, initiated in 1973. The low birth rates cause a substantial
population drop, degrade the age structure, etc. For the years 1946–2002 they
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Figure 1. Number of Bulgaria’s population by censuses
Source: National Statistical Institute, Sofia.
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marked almost a 3–fold decrease – from 25.2‰ to 8.5‰ (Figure 2). They reached
their lowest level in 1997 – 7.7‰. The number of those, born throughout the 1990s
and in the first years of the 21st century, also considerably decreased (Таblе 2) –
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Figure 2. Birth rate and death rate in Bulgaria 1946–2002 (per 1000 of the population)
Source: National Statistical Institute, Sofia.
Year Thousands* Year Thousands*
1985 8949.9 1994 8427.4
1986 8966.5 1995 8384.7
1987 8976.3 1996 8340.9
1988 8986.6 1997 8283.2
1989 8992.3 1998 8230.4
1990 8669.2 1999 8190.9
1991 8595.4 2000 8149.5
1992 8484.8 2001 7929.5
1993 8459.7 2002 7845.8
Table 1. Change of the population in Bulgaria (1985–2002)
*At the end of the year
Sources:
1985–1989: Statisticheski Godishnik na Narodna Republika Bulgaria, 1991, National Stastical Institute;
1990–2001: Statisticheski Godishnik na Republika Bulgaria, 2002, National Statistical Institute;
2002; Naselenie 2002, 2002, National Statistical Institute.
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Table 2. Live births, deaths and natural increase of the population in Bulgaria
Source: Statistitscheski Godishnik 1992, 2000; Statistitscheski spravoschnik 2001, 2002; Naselenie 2002.
from 112 300 (1989) to 66 500 people (2002), i.e. by 40.8%. Generally, the low birth
rates were characteristic both of towns and villages. At a national level the last
decade recorded birth rates in the urban and rural areas, roughly alike. During
1990–2002 the birth rates in the towns decreased from 12.6%o to 8.8%o and in the
villages – from 10.9‰ to 7.9‰ (Figure 3). There are appreciable spatial differen-
ces in the birth rates of the individual municipalities – the smallest administrative
units in the country, 264 in number. Areas of low birth rates, especially as far as
the rural population is concerned, can be clearly outlined in Northwest and West
Bulgaria, in the Stara Planina central parts, in Sakar and even in some municipa-
lities of the Danube Plain and the Upper Thracian Lowland. Areas of higher birth
rates can be discerned in the Western Rhodopes, in the eastern corner of North
Bulgaria, in the Eastern Stara Planina, etc. (1993–2000) (Ch. Mladenov, 2002). Fi-
gure 4 illustrates the birth rate spatial differentiation for the delineated 28 regions
in the country.
Important role for slowing down the birth rates have the economic perfor-
mance of the country which became extremely gloomy in the beginning of the
transition period and in the years 1997–1998; they can be expressed in terms of
the socio–economic difficulties in Bulgaria as a consequence of the deeper econo-
mic crisis, the slower pace of economic and social reforms as compared to other
Year
Live births
(thousand)
Deaths
(thousands)
Natural increase
(thousands)
Natural increase
(‰)
1989 112.3 106.9 5.4 0.6
1990 105.2 108.6 -3.4 -0.4
1991 95.9 110.4 -14.5 -1.7
1992 89.1 108.0 -18.9 -2.2
1993 84.4 109.5 -25.1 -2.9
1994 79.4 111.7 -32.3 -3.8
1995 72.0 114.7 -42.7 -5.0
1996 72.2 117.1 -44.9 -5.4
1997 64.1 121.8 -57.7 -7.0
1998 65.4 118.2 -52.8 -6.4
1999 72.3 111.8 -39.5 -4.8
2000 73.7 115.1 -41.4 -5.1
2001 68.2 112.4 -44.2 -5.6
2002 66.5 112.6 -46.1 -5.8
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Figure 3. Birth rate, death rate and natural increase of the population in urban settlements
and rural areas in Bulgaria
Source: National Statistical Institute, Sofia.
Figure 4. Birth rate by districts (2002)
Source: National Statistical Institute, Sofia.
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nations in transition, the low incomes, the high living costs, the reduced employ-
ment, etc. Mention should be made of additional factors such as the degraded age
structure, the intense emigration of young people during the 1990s and in the
beginning of the 21st century, the improved educational level, the ethnic compo-
sition, the reduced cohort of women in fertile age, the high share of employed
women, the lower female fertility, the decreasing number of marriages, the delay
of marriages, the greater use of contraceptives, the introduction of “new” pat-
terns of reproductive behaviour, etc.
In 1989–2001owing to social, economic, psychological and other reasons,
a marked restriction of the number of marriages and of the crude marriage rate
was observed (Table 3) in spite of the fact that Bulgaria has a traditionally high
share of legitimately married couples. This can be attributed to the more widely
accepted practice of establishing extramarital relations on a consensual basis.
Nowadays more and more young couples choose to live together without ente-
ring into a legal matrimony. This adversely affects the crude birth rate because
usually the couples postpone their first child. In the years of transition the avera-
ge age at first marriage goes up – from 24.7 (1990) to 28.1 (2002) for males and
from 21.7 to 24.8 for females which is associated with various economic, social,
psychological and other causes. Bulgaria is among the European countries with
Table 3. Marriages and divorces (1989–2001)
Sources: Statisticheski Godishnik na Republika Bulgaria 1990, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2003; Naselenie 2002.
Year
Marriages
(Thousands)
Divorces
(Thousands)
Crude marriage rate
(‰)
Crude divorces rate
(‰)
1989 63.3 12.6 7.0 1.4
1990 59.9 11.4 6.9 1.3
1991 48.8 11.0 5.6 1.3
1992 44.8 9.5 5.2 1.1
1993 40.0 7.3 4.7 0.9
1994 37.9 8.0 4.5 0.9
1995 36.8 10.7 4.4 1.3
1996 35.7 10.0 4.3 1.2
1997 34.8 9.4 4.2 1.1
1998 35.6 10.4 4.3 1.3
1999 35.5 9.8 4.3 1.2
2000 35.2 10.6 4.3 1.3
2001 32.0 10.3 4.0 1.3
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the lowest total fertility rate – 1.24 (1997). Only Italy, the Czech Republic and
Spain rank after it (Evolution demographic…, 1997). In 2002 this rate was 1.21.
The statistical data imply insignificant differences in the number of divorces
and the crude divorce rate by age groups (Table 3). At the same time the average
marriage duration before the divorce tends to increase from 9.4 years (1990) to
12.8 years (2002). The crude divorce rate in the towns (1.6‰), where young pe-
ople predominate, is twice as high as that in the villages (0.7‰).
The abortions are assumed to be a traditional birth rate limiting factor. Their
number, especially in the early 1990s, significantly exceeded the number of live
births. Only in the last years (1999–2001) this trend began to change (Figure 5). At
the same time the share of the illegitimate births grew. For a comparatively short
period (1990–2002) it rose from 12.4% to 42.8%. The growth of illegitimate births
is due to the increasing number of couples, who live together without being legi-
timately married, and to the earlier age at which the young people begin sexual
intercourse as they ignorant of sexual issues and are unaware of the conventional
preventive measures. Therefore Bulgaria takes one of the leading positions in
Europe with regard to juvenile natality to which contribute mostly gypsy girls.
Within the framework of the 2001 census–taking a representative questionna-
ire was filled out, which showed that the Bulgarian families had revised their
views about the reproductive pattern. The number of those, willing to have one
child grew, while the number of people, inclined to have two children, decreased
(Table 4). During the last years transformations occurred in the reproductive be-
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Figure 5. Live births and registered abortions (1990–2001)
Source: Sources: Statisticheski Godishnik na Republika Bulgaria 2002; Naselenie 2002.
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haviour of the ethnic groups. In the near past the Turkish (757 800 people, 2001)
and gypsy (365 700 people) ethnic groups were remarkable for their higher birth
rates than the Bulgarian one. The curtailed cohort of females in fertile age as
a consequence of the massive emigration movement of Turks in 1989 and the
aggravated social and economic conditions reduced the birth rate. The gypsies
have still preserved high birth rates and two– or many children family pattern.
For the majority of the Bulgarians (60%) the two–children reproductive pattern
seems to be perfect. The tendency towards birth rate decrease is not typical only
of Bulgaria. Low birth rates are recorded in many of the European countries, too
– Germany (9.3‰), Italy (9.3‰), Slovenia (9.1‰), the Czech Republic (8.8‰), the
Latvian Republic (8.5‰), Ukraine (7.8‰), etc. (Recent Demographic…, 2001).
The death rate as a social and biological phenomenon also chiefly depends on
the social, economic and biological factors and conditions. The socio–economic
conditions, the standard of living, the age and sex structure of the population, the
educational level, the health services and health status, the general and health
knowledge, the norms, culture and structure of nutrition, the environmental pol-
lution, the comfort of living environment, the working conditions and their safe-
ty, the safety of roads and means of transport, the behaviour of motor drivers, the
natural calamities, the accidents in production enterprises, etc., contribute enor-
mously to the death rate level.
The death rates slightly grew in the 1970s and the 1980s. More substantial
increase was observed in the 1990s (Figure 2) when the negative changes in the
socio–economic, social–psychological, health and other factors and condition exer-
ted a stronger impact. The peak death rates were recorded in 1997 (14.7‰ – the
highest for the period after 1946). During the next years they insignificantly de-
creased. The investigations indicate that the rising death rates in the 1990s resul-
ted mainly from the death rate increase in the older age groups. The population
aging will promote the upward trend of death rates in the future years.
The death rates show considerable variations between towns and villages. In
the villages they are much higher and continue to grow (Figure 3) which is ascri-
Table 4. Reproductive ideals and real number of children in Bulgarian family
Source: National Statistical Institute, Sofia.
Number of
children
How many children have
to have Bulgarian Family?
How many children like to
have you personaly?
How many children had
you till now?
No 4.0 3.1 7.7
One 17.8 13.4 19.0
Two 63.1 64.6 59.8
Tree and more 15.1 17.4 13.5
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bed to the greater share of old–aged population, the declining health care servi-
ces during the period of transition, the adverse consequences of the economic
crisis which were more impressive in the villages, the lower incomes of the popula-
tion, etc. The high death rate over 20‰, reached in the mid–1990s, is still preserved.
Considering the specific features of the demographic processes, this trend of high
death rate in the villages will persist in the future as well until their population age
structure normalizes by natural causes. In addition, the high death rates will acce-
lerate the depopulation process, which is more evident in the northwestern areas of
the country, in the western border regions, in the Pre–Balkan zone, in the Central
Stara Planina, in Strandzha–Sakar, etc. Throughout the period of investigation the
variations in the death rate level of the urban population are smaller than those of
the rural population (Figure 3). So, it can be suggested that during the last few
years the values of this indicator tended to remain stable. The above mentioned
variations reflected on the death rate differentiation by regions (Figure 6).
The death rate varies by age and sex groups. It still keeps higher for males (15.7‰,
2002), as it used to be, than for females (13‰). This is due to the higher death rate
for working–age males, which in turn is associated with their employment in the
production sphere where the working conditions are more dangerous, as well as
with smoking, with retirement at older age than women, etc. As a whole, the death
rate both for males and females in the villages is higher than that in the towns.
The different death rates for males and females determine different life expec-
tancy, which rises from 70.91 in the beginning of the transition period to 71.87 in
< 12,0 ‰
12,0 - 13,9 ‰
14,0 - 15,9 ‰
16,0 - 17,9 ‰
>=20,0 ‰
Figure 6. Death rate by districts (2002)
Source: National Statistical Institute, Sofia.
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2002. The rise for females is 75.37 years and for males – 68.54 (2002 data) or fema-
les live 7 years longer than males.
While dealing with the issues of death rate, infant mortality deserves particu-
lar attention from scientific, demographic and humane viewpoint. The infant
mortality rate is an integral index, revealing the standard of living, the socio–
economic development, the efficiency of health and demographic policy. The achie-
vement of the lowest infant mortality rate (13.6‰, 1988) is a matter of fact and
should be attributed to the implemented governmental policy. After 1989 the in-
fant mortality rate increased and displayed variability – 14.8‰ (1990), 17.5‰
(1997) the highest value throughout the period of investigation), 13.3‰ (2002).
These values are too high in comparison with the advanced states such as Swe-
den, Switzerland, France, Norway, Finland, Japan, etc. Despite the high level of
urbanization in Bulgaria (69.6‰ of the population live in towns, 2002 data) and
the equalization of living conditions in the urban and rural areas, the infant mor-
tality in the villages remains higher. During 1995–2000 it reached its peak in So-
uth–eastern Bulgaria and in certain municipalities of North–western and North–
eastern Bulgaria while the lowest values were recorded in the central parts of
North and South Bulgaria (Ch. Mladenov, 2002). The high infant mortality neces-
sitates an adequate state policy (demographic, health, socio–economic), which
will bring it down to the infant mortality level in the advanced West–European
nations. This is undoubtedly an important resource for population growth and
for improvement of the demographic situation in the country.
By its crude death rate Bulgaria takes an unenviable position among the Euro-
pean states. In 2000 higher death rate was recorded only in the Russian Federa-
tion (15.3‰) and Ukraine (15.4‰). That is why the causes for the high death rate
have to be carefully studied. The National Statistical Institute provides data, which
indicate that in 95% of the cases death is disease–related (1990–2001) (Table 5),
Table 5. Deaths by causes (Thousand)
Source: National Statistical Institute, Sofia.
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caused especially by blood circulatory system disorders, neoformations, etc. Unfor-
tunately Bulgaria ranks among the leading states in Europe with respect to car-
dio–vascular illnesses (infarction), malignancies and brain injuries (insults).
The unfavourable birth and death rates bring about a drastic decline in natural
increase. In addition, the powerful emigration wave in the end of the 1980s and
the first half of the 1990s and the impact of the economic and socio–psychological
factors have also to be taken into account. A negative natural increase was first
recorded in 1990 (–0.4‰). Until 1997 its downward trend was accelerating (Ta-
ble 2). At the end of the period under investigation the situation slightly impro-
ved. A comparison with other European states indicate that the natural increase
in them is negative but remains higher than that in Bulgaria – e.g. in Hungary it is
–3.8‰, in Estonia –4.8‰ (1999). In few countries the natural increase is lower –
the Russian Federation (–6.6‰) and some others.
The surveys show that during the last two census–takings only the negative
natural increase generated a population decline by 337 000 people approximately
(I. Balev, P. Bozhikov, 2002). By analyzing the natural population changes in Bul-
garia and comparing them with the figures about the other European countries it
becomes obvious that a serious problem in the present–day demographic situ-
ation is the maintenance of a high death rate level rather than the low birth rate
level.
At a regional level the natural increase displays different characteristics and
trends which depend on the number and age structure of the population, the
ethnic composition, the socio–economic conditions, etc. The available differences
in the natural increase by regions are demonstrated in Figure 7. Since 1994 the
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Figure 7. Natural increase of the population by districts (2002)
Source: National Statistical Institute, Sofia.
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natural increase assumed negative values even in the towns – in 2002 it was –
2.9‰. Very disturbing is the situation in the villages where the natural increase
acquired negative values as early as the mid–1970s. Afterwards it continued to go
down and in 1997–1998 reached its lowest level (from –13.3 to –13.9‰).
The elaborated demographic prognoses (D. Filipov, 1998 etc.) somehow differ
as they have used different methodologies and techniques. Now a new prognosis
about the changes in the population number is being worked out, based on the
2001 census data and on the influence of the demographic processes during the
transition period. According to the initial prognostic estimates on the population
reproduction potential, which have employed census data and statistics for the
natural population changes during 1998–2000 (without taking into account the
potential external migration), in 2021 Bulgaria’s population is predicted to be 7.2
million people and in 2030 – 6.5 million (Ch. Mladenov, 2002). For the above men-
tioned 20–year period the decrease will be by 10% and for the 30–year one – by
18.5%, i. e. there will be a trend towards a rapid population drop by natural cau-
ses.
A common feature of all prognoses is that they forecast a steady population
decline. This unfavourable and persistent tendency requires an adequate natio-
nal policy, aimed at:
• economic revival with a view to reaching a stable growth and sustainable eco-
nomic development at macro– and micro–level;
• application of a comprehensive approach, guaranteeing not only a higher rate
of population natural increase but also qualitative changes in the younger ge-
nerations;
• a broader and more active involvement of the state, of the government and
non–government bodies and organizations in the implementation of pro–na-
tal policy throughout the country;
• turning the demographic policy into a primary component of the social policy;
• restriction of unemployment and creating better job opportunities;
• improvement of health services and reduction of crude death rate and of in-
fant mortality rate;
• more extensive application of family planning, resulting in birth rate growth;
• creation of the necessary conditions and prerequisites by the government for
reducing the number of the potential and real emigrants;
• full protection of children by the state;
• establishing an ecological comfort as part of the living environment.
The implementation of such a policy in combination with other effective deci-
sion–makings will stabilize the current demographic development and improve
the future demographic situation. This is an important necessity, which in the
next centuries will allow Bulgaria, one of the oldest European states, to remain on
the map of Europe.
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Alena Sedláková
The City–Periphery Migration and
the Process of Suburbanisation
in Czech and Slovak Post–Communist Cities
Introduction
The Czech and Slovak post–communist cities undergo a dynamic transformation
since the beginning of the 1990s. Over forty years of their common existence in
one socialist state enable us to compare them in larger extent. Former socialist
cities, as Sýkora writes, have not been quickly and fully transformed into capital-
ist one. Their development exhibits many specific features. They now develop in
the context of a capitalist society, however, socialism has markedly altered their
spatial structures. They are cities in transition. Therefore, their research must fo-
cus on studying the processes of change rather than on the sole description of
static spatial patterns (L. Sýkora, 2000). One of the cardinal transformation pro-
cesses than participate in changes of intra–urban structures of post–communist
cities is suburbanisation. The process operates in nowadays very dynamically
transforming peripheral area of cities, the suburban zone. The comparative analysis
as a scientific method based on comparison of two or more objects by use of iden-
tical methodological approach has been implemented in the study of the two
post–communist cities, Prešov and Olomouc, with the emphasis on migration
tendencies in their suburban zones.
Suburban zone
The conception and interpretation of suburban zone varies in literature to a large
degree. It is not only because of rather a subjective approach towards the prob-
lem, the presence of relativism and postmodern thinking, but also because of the
fact that the suburban zone is itself a very complex, changeable and dynamic
phenomenon. There exist several notions referring to the area of suburban zone:
rural – urban fringe, fringe belt, suburb, suburban zone, urban periphery, urban
hinterland. Generally, it is possible to identify several common features of subur-
ban zone (SZ onwards). SZ encloses the compact city. From the morphological–
functional point of view it is a heterogeneous area characterised by the interfer-
ence of urban and rural land use forms. From the social point of view it is the
area, where the rural way of life of autochthonous inhabitants is pervaded by the
way of life of  alochthonous, hence the citylike inhabitants, mostly with higher
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social status. Administratively, SZ is generally formed by the areas which admin-
istratively are not part of the city. SZ is internally differentiated by the rate of
urbanisation that decreases outwards from the city centre, and successively verges
into urban shadow.
Suburbanisation
Suburbanisation is one of the main transformation processes that participate in
the changes of the spatial organisation of towns, especially their suburban zones.
It is the process operating in the industrial and post–industrial phase of
urbanisation. Through this process the rate of urbanisation of the areas lying in
the suburban zone, spatially separated from the compact town (the core of town
agglomeration), is rising. The rise of urbanisation is mainly caused by the devel-
opment of residential areas q.v. the result of immigration of inhabitants from the
inner compact town motivated by the desire for higher quality of living and
healthier environment, and is conditioned by the technological progress in trans-
port. Residential suburbanisation is, on one hand, followed by the move of job
openings and commercial activities from the centre and inner city into its subur-
ban zone, and on the other hand, it is accompanied by the rise of new activities
and their permanencies, i.e. commercial suburbanisation, what can in its advanced
phase lead into existence of rival marginal towns competing with the original
agglomeration. Eventually, the suburbanisation process may end in the change
from a mono–centric urban structure into a polycentric one (R. Matlovič,
A. Sedláková, 2004).
Migration tendencies in suburban zone of Prešov and Olomouc
Mäding infers that migration from the core city to outlying areas can be regarded
as the quantitatively most significant lasting internal migration phenomenon in
post–communist cities. The “motive forces” (pull factors to the urban periphery,
push factors out of the central city) are–unlike the economic factors of extensive
migration–mainly residence related. The process of residential suburbanisation
is characterised by centrifugal migration from the core to the periphery. The growth
of the region was a consequence of growth of the city. The city “overflowed” like
a basin of water (H. Mäding, 2002). Migrations from central town to suburban
zones realized by households with higher social status, is generally a typical fea-
ture of suburbanisation. The town is distinguished by the fall of migration in-
crease, gradually changing into migration decrease of its population. On the con-
trary, the hinterland of a town and the surrounding villages notice the inflow of
citylike immigrants who participate in residential suburbanisation in that area.
However, the intensity of migration within the suburban zone is distributed un-
equally. There is a qualitative and quantitative selection, namely the number of
immigrants, their education, origin, and the target area they have selected. Mi-
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gration tendencies have been accordingly observed in the areas of Prešov and
Olomouc. We presume that there are some similar features in migration patterns
of the cities, since they have several common attributes, e.g. both cities are the
post–communist one, both of them are capitals of regions and districts, they are
situated in the eastern part of the country, rather far away from the capital city,
their number of population is almost similar as well (Prešov: 91 767, Olomouc
100 752 in 2004). The intra–urban structures of Czech and Slovak cities undergo
an intense transformation since the 1990s. However, we also presume that the
intensity of migration process concerned with suburbanisation has been more
significant in Olomouc and the suburbanisation is also more developed in that
city.
The reason for that argument stems from the experience in other spheres of
life in both countries such as social, economic, as well as political condition.
The graph of migration balance in Prešov and Olomouc in 1991–2004 indicates
that both cities manifest almost similar migration development tendencies (Fi-
gure 1). A characteristic feature of both cities is the year 1996 when Prešov and
Olomouc noticed the negative number in migration balance. Since that time the
migration decrease in both cities has been deepening. In case of Olomouc the
migration decrease has been more rapid than in Prešov, but in last two years the
city of Prešov has been showing more significant descent. Since 1996 both subur-
ban zones of cities started to become migration profitable at the expense of their
central city (Figure 2). The most significant relative increase of migration balance
have noticed the suburban communities situated in immediate neighbourhood
of the cities. This trend correlates with the index of housing development in those
areas. The reason for migration towards the suburban zone is first of all the better
Figure 1. Development of migration balance in Prešov and Olomouc in 1991–2004
Source: Statistical Office of SR, Statistical Office of CR.
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quality of dwelling environment. Another reasons include the demand for dwell-
ing in private property which is possible to realize in suburban zone. Some sub-
jective stimuli consequently take significance such as perception of good address
(of good repute), the effort to manifest the pertaining to certain social stratum.
Having analysed the migration balance within the regions and districts of both
cities in 1996–2004, we have determined the areas of suburban zones and speci-
Figure 2. Migration balance of inhabitants in selected cities and their suburban zones in 1996–2004
Source: ŠÚ SR, ČSÚ ČR.
Figure 3. The origin of immigrants coming into selected communities
of Prešov hinterland (1991–2002)
Source: Own field research in communities.
Prešov Olomouc
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fied the communities with the highest potential for suburbanisation (Figure 4);
for the lack of space not all maps are included). Recent analysis has shown (Table 1,
Figure 4) that the suburban zone of Prešov, as well as Olomouc, is spatially dif-
ferentiated in terms of migration increase of population. Communities that no-
ticed the highest average annual migration increase in Prešov suburban zone in-
clude Záborské (20.39‰), Ľubotice (14.76‰), Petrovany (10.97‰), Vyšná
Šebastová (8.91‰), and Župčany (8.05‰). Rather high migration  increase was
also identified in Dulová Ves, Haniska, Fintice, Kapušany, Kendice, and Ruská
Nová Ves. Other villages noticed either the less significant migration increase or
even migration decrease. In the suburban zone of Olomouc there was the highest
migration increase in Hlušovice (46.67‰), Tovéř (24.41‰), Dolany (21.24‰),
Samotišky (20.80‰), Bystrovany (19,67‰) and others (Table 1). Unlike the sub-
urban zone of Prešov, the communities in the Olomouc suburban zone show al-
most all positive values of migration balance. It is possible to find the process of
suburbanisation more developed in that area.
An important factor, when identifying suburbanisation, and evaluating the
selective migration and suburbanisation impact in the hinterland, is the origin of
immigrants moving towards the suburban zone. By the origin of immigrants we
mean the place from which the immigrants moved (their former residence). We
Table 1. Migration balance in suburban communities of Prešov and Olomouc in 1996–2004
Source: ŠÚ SR, ČSÚ ČR.
Migration balance 1996–2004 (‰)
suburban zone of Olomouc suburban zone of Prešov
Bohuòovice 8.71 -0.43 Bzenov
Bukovany 15.34 8.41 Dulová Ves
Bystroèice 10.40 6.32 Fintice
Bystrovany 19.67 7.09 Haniska
Dolany 21.24 -0.04 Janovce
Hluboèky -1.92 4.93 Kapušany
Hlušovice 46.67 5.95 Kendice
Hnìvotín 16.69 14.76 ¼ubotice
Horka nad Moravou 8.46 0.00 Malý Šariš
Koušany-Táaly 6.20 10.97 Petrovany
Køelov-Bøuchotín 17.93 8.66 Podhradík
Mrskles y 14.72 -4.49 Radatice
Samotišky 20.80 3.21 Rokycany
Štarnov 5.18 5.36 Ruská Nová Ves
Štìpánov 2.71 -0.88 Teriakovce
Tovéø 24.41 2.48 Ve¾ký Šariš
Ústín 9.74 8.91 Vyšná Šebastová
Velká Bystøice 4.05 20.39 Záborské
Velký Týnec 8.60 8.05 upèany
Olomouc -3.04 -2.34 Prešov
Ž
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Figure 4. Migration rates in Prešov and Olomounc and its suburban zones in 1996–2004
Author: Alena Sedláková, data source: ŠÚ SR, ČSÚ ČR.
have analysed this problem in the suburban zone of Prešov. An important and
peculiar feature to suburbanisation is in that case rather high percentage of immi-
grants comming from the town of Prešov. The greatest share of immigrants from
Prešov (over 70 %) shows the community of Kanaš and the village of Vyšná
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Šebastová. The other villages with high share of immigrants of Prešov origin
(60% – 70%) include Ľubotice, Veľký Šariš, Podhradík, and Haniska. The immi-
grants of Prešov origin predominate also in the village of Záborské, Malý Šariš,
and Fintice (50% – 60%). Immigrant comming from other, mostly neighbouring
communities and towns dominate in the rest of our observed areas.
Summary
In our contribution we tried to compare the migration processes within the two
suburban zones of post–communist cities, Prešov and Olomouc. The compara-
tive analyses has proved our hypothesis that in both cities there could be identi-
fied the processes of suburbanisation, however, they are of greater significance in
the hinterland of Olomouc. The reason for that lies generally in the Czech and
Slovak socio–economic and political situation.
Both towns are distinguished by the fall of migration increase, gradually chang-
ing into migration decrease of their population. On the contrary, the hinterlands of
towns and the surrounding villages notice the inflow of citylike immigrants who
participate in residential suburbanisation in that areas. The intensity of migration
within the suburban zone is distributed unequally. There is a qualitative and quan-
titative selection, namely the number of immigrants, their education, origin, and
the target area they have selected. Our further research is therefore aimed at some
specific features of suburbanisation participants in the observed areas.
*    *    *
The contribution is part of the grant research project VEGA nr. 1/0367/03
Development tendencies of regional complexes of the Eastern Slovakia in the
period of globalisation and transformation of Slovak society and potential for
their further development. The project is led by doc. RNDr. R. Matlovič, PhD.
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Introduction
Big transformation changes, connected with transition from a centrally planned
to a market economy, took place in Slovakia after 1989. Slovakia, as one of the
post–socialist countries, began its economic, political and social transformation
with a heavy burden of socialist heritage. Amongst the main problems were ob-
solete production structures and industries, poor productivity and economic
management, over employment, low levels of technical infrastructure, and de-
pendence on Central and East European and Soviet markets (I. McMaster, 2004).
Transition has typically been characterised by a collapse of output in state firms,
which was only partially offset by an increase in private sector output. Much of
the decrease in state firms’ output can be explained as the result of change in the
structure of relative prices and the elimination of subsidies. Besides this state
firms lost crucial suppliers and in many cases had to stop production (O. Blanchard,
1996).
Economic reforms centred round the processes of liberalisation of prices, open-
ing of markets, encouraging new private business and processes of privatisation
and structural reform (transfer of state owned enterprises into private ownership
and programmes of industrial restructuring) (I. McMaster, 2004; see S. Djankov,
G. Pohl, 1999). In the first phase of the transition Slovak economy achieved mac-
roeconomic stabilisation, but it also experienced a major decline in officially mea-
sured output and a slower but significant decline in employment (J. Svejnar, 1996).
Foreign direct investments and accession to international organisations (e.g. WTO
and EU) played a very important role in the process of the transition.
In the consequence of growing unemployment and other changes connected
with the transition also the number of commuters decreased and the position of
individual commuting centres changed. The aim of this paper is to identify the
most important changes in commuting in Slovakia in the years 1991–2001, caused
by the transformation process, to investigate some regional aspects of such changes
and to evaluate the factors that caused them. This paper is focused on the evalu-
ation of some changes in out–commuting at the national level of Slovakia, evalu-
ation of the selected changes in out–commuting at the level of the individual
Daniel Michniak
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on Commuting in Slovakia
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districts, and evaluation of changes in commuting to the centres with more than
500 in–commuters.
Data on commuting
The data on commuting were obtained from the March 1991 and May 2001 cen-
suses while 1991 can be considered the initial stage of transformation, in which
there was a large decline in industrial production (O. Blanchard, 1996) and the
most recent data concerning commuting at the national level are from 2001.
According to the methodological guidelines to the census, commuter is a per-
son who works outside his commune of permanent residence. The Statistical Of-
fice of the SR processed the data about commuting based on the data concerning
the place (commune, district) of permanent residence of the commuter and the
place (commune, district) of the job while the daily and other commuting were
discerned. Daily commuting means an everyday travel to work. Persons tempo-
rarily living in the place of work (hostel or rented living place) also quoted daily
commuting; that is commuting from their temporary living place to work. Other
than daily commuting means irregular commuting (for example guarding ser-
vice, free–lance position and the like). The commuting data have been processed
for all communes and they are classified by out–commuting centres. Names are
quoted only in case if more than 10 persons out–commute. It means that in some
cases it is not possible to identify the commune of out–commuting.
Certain inaccuracy in comparison of the out–commuting data is caused by the
changes in the territorial division of Slovakia in terms of communes. In time of
the 1991 and 2001 censuses there were 2,825 and 2,883 communes respectively in
Slovakia. In the time between censuses 16 communes disappeared including 15,
which joined other 13 communes, and one disappeared by joining a couple of
communes. On the other side, 74 new communes were formed by division or
separation, which concerned 57 communes. The quoted changes concerned 145
communes, which existed in the 2001 census.
Changes in out–commuting at the national level
The most important and striking change in commuting between the years 1991–
2001 was the decrease of the number of out–commuters by 201,441 persons from 997,925
to 796,484 (20.2%). Apart from the decreased number of out–commuters, the out–
commuting rate also decreased. While as much as 38.1% of all economically ac-
tive inhabitants commuted outside their communes in 1991, in 2001 they made
up for only 29.0%.
Compared to 1991, the share of economically active inhabitants working in the
commune of their permanent residence also dropped by 6.2% to 45.6%. The in-
crease of unemployment caused by transformation of economics is more obvious
in the share of out–commuters than in the share of economically active inhabit-
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ants working in the commune of their permanent residence as testified to by the
values of Pearson’s correlation coefficient in the set of 72 districts (–0.61 and –
0.51).
If out–commuting is expressed by the share of the out–commuters in the total
number of employed persons, it dropped by 3.6% from 42.4% employed in 1991
to 38.8% in 2001.
In comparison to 1991, the share of persons commuting abroad almost doubled
from 3,5% (35,166 out–commuters) to 6.0% (47,542 out–commuters), while in 1991
the out–commuters to the Czech republic amounted to 3.0% (29,957 out–com-
muters) and out–commuters to other countries constituted only 0.5% (5,209 out–
commuters). The 2001 data do not quote the target country of commuters. We
suppose that commuting to the Czech Republic also dominated in 2001. Com-
pared to 1991, out–commuting to other countries prevailed probably because of
higher wages in the countries of the EU, USA and other advanced countries. The
higher share of commuters to foreign countries is also the consequence of better
travelling possibilities and the improving foreign language skills of Slovaks.
In terms of the share of men and women in the total number of out–commuters, there
were almost no changes at the all–Slovakian level (approximately 60% men and
40% women).
Observing the age structure of out–commuters, it is obvious that the largest change
concerns the out–commuters at the age of 15 to 24 years. The share of out–com-
muters in this category decreased from 24.1% to 14.2%. It is caused by the exten-
sion of the obligatory school attendance years from nine to ten, by increase of
number of university students and the ageing of Slovakia’s population. On the
other side, the share of out–commuters at the age of 45 to 59 years increased
from 20.9% to 27.3%, as also caused by the larger share of this age category in
total population.
As far as the structure of out–commuters by the individual sectors of the national
economy is concerned, the share of commuters, which decreased most, was the
one of agricultural workers (by 8.1% from 13.7% to 5,5%). Restructuring of the
agricultural sector caused it – many agricultural firms were closed, over–employ-
ment decreased, and also because some associated productions were separated
from the agricultural firms).
A similar decrease of out–commuting was observed in that to industrial com-
panies where the corresponding share decreased by 7.6% from 38.6% to 30.9%.
One of the causes of this decrease is the fact that in transformation period many,
formerly parts of industrial companies covering the catering, recreational ser-
vices or departments of foreign trade, separated from their companies and often
transformed into new businesses where the workers reclassified into the sector of
services in contrast to their appurtenance to the industrial branches in 1991.
The decrease of the number of out–commuters in construction was also im-
portant (by 5.0% from 12.9% to 7.9%). In spite of the fact that the number of eco-
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nomically active inhabitants in transport and communications decreased by more
than 21 thousand, their share in out–commuting remained at an approximately
the same level (it increased by 0.2% to 8.0%). The accessible data make it possible
to compare the representation of out–commuting in trade where the increase of
out–commuting was observed by 4.0% from 8.5% to 12.5%.
As the remaining data categories in the framework of the structure of out–
commuters in terms of branches were different in the 1991 and 2001 censuses, the
comparison is impossible. But it is supposed that the share of out–commuters
working in services increased. A certain distortion of the results of out–commut-
ing is also caused by the fact that there is as much as 16.4% of commuters under
the category of “other and not specified” in 2001.
The immediate cause of the decrease of the number of out–commuting per-
sons lies in changes of economic activity of population evoked by transformation
in the individual sectors of the national economy. Compared to 1991 when there
were 2,617,935 economically active persons in Slovakia, this number increased by
130,115 to 2,748,050 in 2001.This increase also manifested in the share of economi-
cally active inhabitants in the total population (increase by 1.4% to 51.1%).
In spite of the increased number of economically active persons, the number
of working persons in Slovakia dropped by 310,874 from 2,313,631 in 1991 to
2,002,757 or by 13.4%. The result of decrease of working persons number and the
increase of economically active persons was the increased number of unemployed.
Whereas in 1991 there were only 107,416 unemployed (4.1% economically active
persons), their number increased as much as to 561,214 (20.4% economically ac-
tive persons) in 2001.
Changes in out–commuting at the regional level
In the period between censuses, the territorial–administrative division changed
and the number of districts increased from 38 to 79, while Bratislava and Košice
were divided into 5 and 4 districts respectively. As it is not appropriate to divide
these cities into smaller units for the study of commuting, out–commuting was
assessed at the level of 72 districts.
The decrease of the number of out–commuters in the period 1991–2001 (Fi-
gure 1) was observed in all districts with the exception of Bratislava where it in-
creased by 5.2%. Presumably, this change is connected above all with the increase
of out–commuting abroad and it is also due to reverse commuting, a new phe-
nomenon in Slovakia, when population of large cities out–commutes to their hin-
terlands. A comparatively low decrease of out–commuters (below 10%) was found
in hinterland of Bratislava (districts of Malacky, Pezinok, Trnava, Piešťany, Myjava)
and in two central Slovakian districts (Žiar nad Hronom, Zvolen). Districts in
western part of Slovakia are remarkable for below–average decrease of out–com-
muters. On the contrary, a decrease of at least 30% of commuters was found in
districts of Medzilaborce (by 42.1%), Veľký Krtíš, Snina, Sabinov, Rimavská Sobota,
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Žarnovica, Zlaté Moravce, Stropkov a Kežmarok (by 30.0%) with the common
feature of high unemployment and in some of them (Medzilaborce, Veľký Krtíš,
Zlaté Moravce) also the decrease of economically active persons.
Likewise, out–commuting rate also decreased from 38.1% in 1991 to 29.0% in
2001. The highest decrease of the out–commuting rate was found in eastern
Slovakia where it reached more than 20% in five districts (Sabinov, Košice – okolie,
Sobrance, Kežmarok, Gelnica). On the other side small decrease (below 5%) was
observed in districts of Liptovský Mikuláš, Banská Bystrica, Zvolen, Žiar nad
Hronom, Trnava, Piešťany, Myjava a Košice, and in Bratislava only a slight rise
(by 0.1%) of out–commuting was observed.
Considering the individual branches of economy, the decrease of number of
out–commuters was most striking in agriculture, industry and construction, i.e.
those most affected by transition. The decrease of out–commuters in agriculture
was observed in whole Slovakia and the least afflicted were the districts with the
highest share of workers in forest management. Likewise, the decrease of num-
ber of out–commuters in industry manifested in the whole territory of Slovakia
with the exception of Bratislava. In construction, the decrease of out–commuters
was recorded in the major part of the Slovak territory (above all in its southern
part), but there also exist districts with an increasing importance of out–commut-
ing in construction (districts of Námestovo, Stropkov, Svidník, Tvrdošín, and Stará
Ľubovňa with out–commuting to large cities and abroad in some districts of north-
ern and eastern Slovakia).
Figure 1. Changes in total out–commuting at the regional level in the years 1991–2001
Source: Author’s map based on data from Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
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Changes in commuting to centres with at least 500 commuters
Transition of economy also led to transformation of various industrial firms, which
were once the most frequent destinations of commuters. In the consequence, the
total employment decreased and some firms were reduced or disappeared which
was logically accompanied by changes in commuting as observable in changes of
mutual position of the individual commuting centres. As jobs are much more
spatially concentrated than economically active inhabitants, the centres with at
least 500 commuters will be given attention.
However, many important commuting centres were affected by territorial
changes in the period between the censuses – some communes were separated.
In order to compare the commuting data for the individual centres, the 2001 data
for centres with more than 500 commuters were adjusted to the territorial situa-
tion in 1991.
Changes in commuting to the largest commuting centres are listed in Table 1
and changes in commuting to centres with at least 500 commuters are depicted
on Figure 2.
While in 1991 there were as much as 197 centres with at least 500 commuters,
their number decreased to 173 in 2001. In 35 centres the number of commuters
dropped below 500 and on the contrary, the number of commuters exceeded the
limit of 500 in 11 centres.
Compared to 1991, the number of largest commuting centres (with at least 10 thous.
commuters) dropped from 14 to eight – now all seats of regional administration –
Bratislava, Trnava, Nitra, Trenčín, Žilina, Banská Bystrica, Prešov and Košice.
The largest commuting centre in Slovakia is Bratislava, while its position in com-
muting has strengthened. While in 1991 there were 74,895 commuters, in 2001 it
was as much as 89,424 economically active commuters to Bratislava, what repre-
sents 11.9% of all commuters in Slovakia. Compared to 1991, this was an impor-
tant increase of commuters by about 14.5 thousand inhabitants (19.4%), above all
in contrast with the national decrease of commuters. This increase was caused by
the fact that Bratislava became the capital of the new state in 1993; its economic
power capable to generate more work opportunities increased and attracted more
commuters. On the one side, the number of commuters to work in agriculture,
construction and partially also industry decreased and on the other, new jobs
emerged above all due to the development of commerce and services of financial
sector, information technology, etc. Bratislava became an attractive centre of com-
muters for inhabitants of the whole country, above all the young people below
34 years (D. Michniak, 2003).
Position of Košice, the second largest commuting centre in Slovakia with 30,486
commuters did not change either in 2001. But compared to 1991, the number of
commuters decreased by 4,563, as caused by decrease of commuters in construc-
tion (decrease by 4.1 thous. commuters) and in industry (decrease by 2.9 thous.
commuters above all in metallurgical and engineering industries).
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An important decrease of number of commuters was also observed in the third
largest commuting centre – Žilina, where the number of commuters decreased by
3,979 commuters. According to the individual branches of economy, the decrease
of commuting manifested above all in industry (decrease by 4.1 thous. commut-
ers), while the chemical, engineering and paper and pulp industries were the
most affected ones.
Compared to 1991, the largest decrease in number of commuters was recorded in
Prešov (decrease by 7,498 commuters). The cause of this decrease is first of all the
decrease of number of employees in industrial firms (engineering, electrical and
clothing industries). While in 1990 total of 17,771 employees worked in industrial
branches, in 1999 it was 12,040 employees which means that employment in in-
dustry decreased by almost a third (by 5,731 jobs) (D. Popjaková 2001).
Apart from actual regional centres more than 10 000 persons commuted in 1991
to towns Zvolen, Nové Zámky, Martin, Michalovce, Dubnica nad Váhom,
Humenné. These industrial centres boast a comparatively diversified structure of
industry, while Dubnica nad Váhom and Martin were afflicted by transformation
of engineering industry (mainly defence industry – see Y. Kiss, 1999), Nové Zámky
was struck by transformation of electrical engineering and food–processing in-
dustries, Zvolen by transformation of engineering and wood–processing indus-
try, Humenné by transformation of chemical industry and Michalovce by trans-
formation of engineering and food–processing industry.
Table 1. Changes in commuting to the largest commuting centres between 1991 and 2001
Note: A – the number of commuters in 1991; B – the number of commuters in 2001;
C – change in commuting between 1991 and 2001expressed in percentage.
Source: Author’s table based on data from Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic.
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An interesting indicator expressing the decrease of commuting to the indi-
vidual centres is the decrease of the number of commuters to the given centre expressed
in percentage. As much as in 33 centres to which more than 500 commuters com-
muted in 1991, the number of commuters decreased by more than a half. The
largest of these centres were in 1991 Dubnica nad Váhom (decrease by 50.6%),
Nižná (by 74.7% to 1,254 commuters), Stropkov (by 54.8% to 1,467 commuters),
and the town Strážske (by 50.6% to 2,131), struck by transformation of chemical
industry. The commuting decrease (by at least 50%) in such centres is attributable
to transformation of firms in different industrial branches, which had dominant
position in the economy of these cities. In centres Cigeľ, Sebedražie, Koš, Modrý
Kameň, Rudňany a Hodruša – Hámre the dumping of mining and quarrying,
production of energy and other materials was the cause of decreased commuting.
That in centres Dubnica nad Váhom, Pohorelá, Závadka nad Hronom and Spišská
Stará Ves was caused by transformation in manufacture of machinery and equip-
ment, centres Hronec, Oravský Podzámok, Slovinky and Báhoň were subjects to
transformation of manufacture of basic metals and fabricated metal products, in
centres Nižná, Stropkov a Oravská Lesná it was transformation of manufacture
of electrical equipment, v Slavošovce it was transformation of the firm dedicated
to manufacture of paper, in centres Turany, Pravenec it was transformation of
wood products, in Podvysoká it was transformation of the firm dedicated to manu-
facture of leather and leather products, in Lipany and Spišská Stará Ves it was
manufacture of textiles and textile products, in Veľký Šariš it was transformation
of manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products). The main cause
Figure 2. Changes in commuting to centres with at least 500 commuters
Source: Author’s map based on data from Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:4086
The Influence of Transformation Changes After 1989 on Commuting in Slovakia 87
of commuting decrease to centre Gabčíkovo was the conclusion of the construc-
tion of the dam.
In spite of the general decrease of number of commuters to the majority of
observed centres in Slovakia, there are centres with increased number of commuters
in comparison to 1991. Apart from Bratislava, which was mentioned above, com-
muting in 21 studied centres increased by more than 250 commuters. This group
covers the centres like Nitra, Prievidza (foreign investments into electrical engi-
neering industry – Yazaki Debnár Slovakia, s.r.o.), Jaslovské Bohunice (nuclear
power station), where the number of commuters increased only by 2.4–7.3%. These
centres maintained their economic basis and the firms existing there are destina-
tions of commuters.
The group of larger commuting centres where the number of commuters in-
creased includes Vráble (by 342 to 2,570 commuters), Ilava (by 629 to 2,656 com-
muters), Senec (by 697 to 2,597 commuters), Pezinok (by 744 to 3,528 commuters),
and Skalica (by 812 to 3,419 commuters). Increase of commuting in Vráble by
15,4% is mainly due to opening of the industrial park IGP Vráble and invest-
ments to firms Semecs s.r.o. and Hefra s.r.o. One of important investors in Skalica
is INA Skalica, s.r.o., producer of bearings. Increased number of commuters in
towns Senec a Pezinok is due to their location near Bratislava, which led to cre-
ation of new work opportunities.
Vicinity of Bratislava also influenced commuting to smaller centres in its im-
mediate hinterland, i.e. Stupava (increase by 343 to 1,059 commuters) and Ivanka
pri Dunaji (increase by 396 to 1,070 commuters). Among the centres where the
number of commuters increased above 1,000 are also two neighbouring communes
of Trenčianska Teplá (increase by 288 to 1,279 commuters) and Nová Dubnica
(increase by 498 to 1,370 commuters) with important investment in electrical en-
gineering industry (the firm Leoni Slovakia, s.r.o. in Trenčianska Teplá producing
car cables and the firm Q Nova, s.r.o. in Nová Dubnica) and the town of Sliač
(increase by 515 to 1,166 commuters). The town of Poltár also drew close to the
limit of 1,000 commuters (increase by 269 to 969 commuters).
New centres with more than 500 commuters also appear in the group of com-
muting centres with less then 500 commuters in 1991. They include the centres
Veľké Leváre and Ľubotice, where more than 400 employees commuted in 1991
and their number slightly increased. In Ľubotice (increase by 462 to 864 commut-
ers) there are various industrial firms in the immediate vicinity of Prešov. This
group include also centres with important investments in industry. In Gemerská
Hôrka (increase by 288 to 530 commuters) new jobs originated in the firm dedi-
cated to hygiene products (SCA Hygiene Products, s.r.o.), more of them were
created in Horná Streda (increase by 373 to 532 commuters) in electrical engineer-
ing industry (Vacuumschmelze s.r.o.), in Vavrečka (increase by 479 to 502 com-
muters) in electrical engineering industry (Punch Campus Námestovo s.r.o.), in
Košťany nad Turcom (increase by 777 to 881 commuters) car industry – produc-
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:4087
Daniel Michniak88
tion of car seats and casings (Trim Leader, a.s.) in machinery (Hansa – Flex
Hydraulik), and in Kolárovo (increase by 855 to 1,222 commuters) in electrical
engineering industry (Kromberg a Shubert, s.r.o.).
Four of new commuting centres with more than 500 commuters in 2001 are
centres created by separation from some towns – they are Hencovce (separated
from Vranov nad Topľou) s 2,234 commuters, Tovarníky (separated from
Topoľčian) with 781 commuters and Lužianky (separated from Nitra) s 777 com-
muters, and Ivanka pri Nitre (separated from Nitra) with 616 commuters. These
communes were considered parts of towns from which they were actually sepa-
rated for the purpose of comparison of commuting data for the years 1991 and 2001.
Conclusion
Transformation changes in Slovakia after 1989 influenced the character of com-
muting. The most important change in commuting which took place in the years
1991–2001 was the decrease of the absolute number of commuters by more than
200 thous. This decrease was recorded in all regions in Slovakia with the excep-
tion of Bratislava (the highest decrease was identified in eastern Slovakia).
Observing commuting to centres with more than 500 commuters, one of the
most important changes resulted in the strengthened position of Bratislava as the
largest commuting centre in Slovakia. Approximately the same number of com-
muters was maintained in some largest centres such as Nitra, Trenčín and Banská
Bystrica in the study period. On the contrary, in1991 more than 30 % decrease of
commuters (more than 7 thous. commuters) was identified in centres Prešov,
Zvolen, Nové Zámky, Dubnica nad Váhom, Humenné, Nováky, Levice, Považská
Bystrica, Bardejov, Vranov nad Topľou, Galanta and Svit.
The key factor influencing the position of commuting centres was their ability
to face up to transformation of economy. The foreign investments played a very
important role in its successful realisation. It is possible to suppose that the posi-
tion of commuting centres with foreign direct investments and centres with in-
dustrial parks will be strengthened. Examples of centres demonstrating the above
said, are centres with growing number of commuters as Bratislava, important
centres are Vráble, Ilava, and Skalica, and the smaller of them include Trenčianska
Teplá and Nová Dubnica. Increase of number of commuters to centres like Senec,
Pezinok, Stupava, and Ivanka pri Dunaji was caused by their position in the im-
mediate vicinity of Bratislava. Among examples of formation of new commuting
centres with at least 500 commuters as fostered by arrival of foreign investors are
Gemerská Hôrka, Horná Streda, Košťany nad Turcom, and Vavrečka.
References:
• Blanchard O., 1996, Theoretical aspects of transition, The American Economic
Review, 86, 2, p. 117–122.
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:4088
The Influence of Transformation Changes After 1989 on Commuting in Slovakia 89
• Djankov S., Pohl G., 1999, Restructuring of large firms in Slovakia, Policy Re-
search Working Papers, World Bank, Washington, p. 1–28.
• Kiss Y. 1999, Regional and employment consequences of the defence industry
transformation in East Central Europe, Employment and Training Papers 32,
p. 1–62.
• McMaster I., 2004, Transition and Transformation in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, EPRC, University of Strathclyde, Strathclyde, p. 1–10.
• Michniak D., 2003, Vybrané aspekty hodnotenia dochádzky do zamestnania
do Bratislavy v roku 2001, Slovenská štatistika a demografia, 13, 4, p. 26–38.
• Popjaková D., 2001, Transformácia priemyslu v regióne Šariša, Geografické
práce, 9, 1, p. 130–138.
• Svejnar J., 1996, Enterprises and workers in the transition: econometric evi-
dence, The American Economic Review, 86, 2, p. 123–127.
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:4089
Alexander Kuchabsky90
Lviv oblast is situated in the western part of Ukraine. The geographical situation
of oblast that borders with Poland will influence the process of Ukraine integra-
tion into European economic organizations, especially in organizing of economic
and political cooperation between Ukraine and Poland.
The particular features of social and political orientations of the region popu-
lation are:
1. Conservatism (from the predomination of some stereotypes of thinking in Lviv
and the cities of this oblast to the rejection of alternative social and political
points of view in rural areas). Just owing to this features, the results of the
political election are, to some extent, predictable and a great deal of the elec-
torate displays the unanimity (98% of voices supporting Ukraine independence
during the referendum of 1991, 94% of voices in favor of L. Kravchuk on presi-
dential election of 1994, 92% of voices in favor of L. Kuchma in the second part
of the presidential election of 1999, 64% of voices in favor of “Nasha Ukraina”
(“Our Ukraine”) bloc on Verkhovna Rada election in 2002, etc).
2. Reserve (a great deal of population has distrust to some state institutions. It
was caused by the long period of region colonial status and by constant inter-
fering with its interests before 1991 and afterwards. The high level of political
consciousness reserve of oblast citizens can be explained first, by the territorial
separatedness of of Galychina from the main territory of Ukraine for a long
time, second, by the peculiarities of religious and interconfessional situation
(the high level of religiousness and Greek–Catholicism domination), third, by
the low level of migration contacts with other regions of Ukraine (it slows
down the relationships and interferes the mutual understanding of cultures).
3. Passivity (as the consequence of unsuccessful experience of state institutions
formation during the First and the Second World War, as a result of unrealized
attempts of influence on the policy of the countries that included oblast terri-
tory in the past, and as a repressive activity against active local population in
the process of the USSR entering). Excessive political activity that is registered
in oblast centre and the discipline of the electorate during election is not the
evidence of public activity. Besides, it has another ground. It’s more likely
that, on the one hand, this phenomenon is the display of psedoactivity of cer-
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tain groups that are trying to act as representatives of region population inter-
ests, but on the other hand, it’s the traditional behavior of local population. For
the last one, the process of election is, first of all, a kind of its direct participa-
tion in state life.
On the whole, social and economic situation in oblast is still tense. For the years
of Ukraine independence, the main features of social and political orientations of
the region population haven’t changed considerably. Besides, in some cases they
were enlarged: it was marked the increase of contradictions between the centre
and oblast, concerning the problem of understanding of tasks and the strategy of
Ukraine development as a state and Lviv oblast development as a main region of
Western Ukraine; some organizations are cultivated the image of the region as
a source of political and interreligious tenseness, the disproportions in oblast eco-
nomic and social development in comparison with other oblasts of Eastern Ukraine
are deepened. Lately, it’s appeared a new tendency of rejection of central authori-
ties’ policy by the region population. They were accused of inconsistency in na-
tional interests asserting, lack of essential results in crime, corruption and shadow
business prevention.
As a result, Lviv region and Western Ukraine as well, might be turned into
depressive region with definite anti government political orientations. It’s obvi-
ous that such trend will be followed by the rise of the separatist and extremist
movements that will slow down social and economic development. In order to
prevent such phenomena, it’s very necessary to work out a complex strategy of
optimization of oblast social and political situation that will take into consider-
ation not only the historical and political realities of the region, but will be based
on its social and economic peculiarities.
The main principle of this strategy must be the understanding of a special role
of Lviv oblast in the process of Ukraine integration into European economic orga-
nizations. The successful implementation of this strategy in Lviv oblast might
become the grounds of its expansion in all oblasts of Western Ukraine.
Political and party life of oblast is also of great interest. Just from the begin-
ning of the process of Ukraine independence renewal in 1991 till the election cam-
paign of 2002, the main characteristic feature of Lviv region political life was po-
litical parties’ multiplication (quantity increase and splitting up). It has led to the
considerable reduction of political parties, and to the limitation of their power.
It’s also caused population distrust to some political organizations and to their
leaders.
The election of 2002 gave impulse to political system formation. Today we
have two powerful political forces that rival for power in a political sphere. The
first is political organizations united around, oppositional bloc” Nashua Ukraine”
(“Our Ukraine”), the second –united around political parties with progovernement
orientation (“Social and Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)”–(SDPU(u)), “The
Regions of Ukraine” etc.)
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At the same time, the activity of a major part of political parties and public
organizations of oblast are based on authorities’ criticism. It’s explained by the
unreadiness of certain political and party organizations as to their participation
in solving of difficult problems of the region (namely, in lobbying its interests on
a national level). It predetermines the focus of region political forces on so called
”protest electorate”. The national deputy election in 2002 was marked by aggra-
vation of social and political situation of the oblast.
The main factor of social and political processes is an interconfessional and
international situation .The interconfessional situation in Lviv region is tradition-
ally marked by particular tension. The main reason of this phenomenon is a con-
siderable concentration of religious organizations and particular interconfessional
structure in Ukraine (Ukrainian Greek–Catholic Church (UGCC) domination).
The tension in interconfessional relations was considerably eased owing to the
purposeful activity of authorities.
The main minorities which traditionally influence social and political situa-
tion in the region are the Russians and the Poles. The problem of polish and Jew-
ish cemeteries maintaining has also a great influence on a political and social
situation. Some right–wing forces are not interested in this problem solving, be-
cause it’s a good source of political capital formation.
Lviv region took an active part in the history of liberation wars of Ukrainian
people for its independence. A great part of region population was subjected to
repression by ruling system till 1991. So, at present time Lviv region is inhabited
by citizens (about 270,000 people with their families) who have undergone some
persecutions in the past and demand special compensations for their moral and
material losses. Besides, in XX century, Lviv region was a scene of mass deporta-
tions of the population. Today it’s inhabited by a great deal of present Poland
natives (from Pidljashja, Nadsjannja, Lubachiv region, etc.). The interests of these
citizens are asserted by the Union of deported Ukrainian communities that has
a particular political influence on the region. There is also a problem with immi-
grants from the territory of Yavoriv military fire base. If the local government
doesn’t pay proper attention to these problems, they will be used by some inter-
ested parties in order to aggravate the political situation in the region.
Social and political situation often depends on economic situation and the level
of social relations development. Lviv region has also to solve some serious prob-
lems in this sphere that are directly related to it’s historical past. Contrary to the
widespread stereotype, Lviv region has never been a region with a high level of
development of social and economic sphere. Significant problems were laid in the
economic structure of the region that was focused on machinery construction, min-
ing and chemical industry. Lack of economic forces and financial basis, that are
very necessary for social sphere development, was compensated by the great con-
centration of scientific and technical potential and high level of culture of Lviv popu-
lation.
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The reasons of unsatisfactory social and economic development of this region
are directly related to its history: first of all, to the long period of colonial exist-
ence as a part of empires (Polish State, Austria, Poland, etc) and to its peripheral
frontier geographical situation (over the last ten years this feature has consider-
ably slowed down social and economic development).
In comparison with other regions of Eastern Europe, Galychina lagging can be
noticed not only in economic sphere, but also in the sphere of agriculture. It was
predetermined by considerable overpopulation of the region and by unfavorable
geographical conditions (the worse soil, hilly and mountainous areas, constant
natural calamities such as floods, etc.)
The attempts to rise the economy of the region was made in the process of it’s
the USSR entering. They were aimed at the disproportion elimination in economic
and social development of western territories (that were included into the USSR
after the Second World War). More over, the main goal was to create a powerful
scientific and industrial centre in the western part of the country that will become
a centre of cooperation between Ukraine and countries – satellites of Central and
Eastern Europe.
Despite, a great number of measures, taken by the USSR, the issue of dispro-
portion elimination wasn’t solved till 1991. For example, the cost of main funds
per capita in Lviv was a third lower than on average in Ukraine. The average
level of population income was lagging behind the national indices by 10–20%
.The situation beyond the oblast centre that concentrated a great deal of the whole
social and economic potential of Western Ukraine was considerably worse.
After the renewal of Ukraine independence in 1991, the social and political
situation of the region has undergone considerable deterioration. Besides, the
disproportions in Lviv social and economic development, that had appeared ear-
lier, were intensified lately. In comparison with other oblasts, Lviv region transi-
tion to market economy was very difficult and painful. The reason is an economic
structure of the region that was formed under the USSR regime and focused on
military– industrial complex.
Since 1999 oblast authorities have succeeded in slowing down the process of
production decrease and in initiating the tendency of crisis phenomena overcom-
ing in social and economic sphere. For the last three years , industrial production
output has increased from 3.1 mln grn to 5.0 bn grn.The rate of increase, in com-
parison with last year, was – 1.2% in 1999, 11.9% in 2000, 42.3% in 2001, 13.5% in
2002. Industrial output increase of the region from January to October 2003 was
13% – it’s close to the average national index.
But it’s too early to talk about total overcoming of crisis phenomena in oblast
economy. The main reason is that Lviv region has undergone considerable indus-
trial production decrease after 1991. For example: in 1998 the industrial produc-
tion output in Ukraine was 50% in comparison with 1990, but in Lviv region this
index went down to 27%. Another problematic issue is dramastic increase of
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production output that can be noticed nowadays and that was taken place on
several giant enterprises. So, The Oil Refining Complex (ORC) “Galychina” gives
a fifth part of the oblast total industrial output.
Despite the industrial output increase, the real income of the population (pur-
chasing capacity) is constantly going down. A great part of population can’t af-
ford to pay for public utilities. Besides, the imperfect procedure of housing subsi-
dies assignment (subjective approach, corruption and abuse of power) leads to
the increase of public utilities debtors. All these factors have the negative influ-
ence on moral and psychology of the region population; cause the distrust to
local authorities as to their capacity in problem solving.
In spite of the fact that the property relations’ reform in the sphere of agricul-
ture was formally completed, the issue of transition to the new approaches in
agriculture management is still one of the most important in social and economic
sphere of the region. This can be explained by attempting to solve the problem
spontaneously, without any legislative and logistic support. The level of devel-
opment of agricultural relations in Lviv region considerably differs from the one
in Ukraine. That’s why, it’s necessary to work out a regional strategy of agrarian
reform. As a result, the gross agriculture output in Lviv region is on average 480
grn. (with this index , Lviv region takes the 19th place in Ukraine).
Ecological situation of the oblast is also difficult. A great number of industrial
operations of Lviv region are the sources of environmental worsening. According
to the data of Ecology and Natural Resources Organization the most dangerous
industrial operations in Lviv oblast are ,first of all, Yavoriv “Sirka”, ORC
”Galychina”and New Rozdil “Sirka”. The others are Dobrotvir TEPS, Sokal plant
of chemical fibres, “Mykolaivtsement”, “Boryslavnaftogas”, holding “Ukrzakhi-
dvugillja”, a special industrial coplex “Radon” and Stebnyk “Polimineral”.
The most important ecological issue is allocation of funds, aimed at the mea-
sures concerning flood and other natural calamities prevention. Maybe it’s neces-
sary to recur to the idea of Stryj reservoir buiding. Besides, the problem of water
supply in Lviv is still the most urgent one: the city population gets the water
according to special schedule.
Stabilization of social and political processes in Lviv region has to provide,
first of all, the realization of urgent measures concerning the problem of over-
coming of social and economic crisis consequences and elimination of a great
number of destructive economic factors. From our point of view, it’s necessary:
• to enlarge the local government authorities in the process of working out the
strategy of social, economic and political development of the region, in order
to take into consideration all its peculiarities;
• to create a favorable investment climate that will stimulate the economic in-
crease in oblast(maybe by means of New Special areas organization);
• to initiate significant changes in legislation concerning the increase of social
status of the participants of nation–liberation movements and the victims of
totalitarian regime.
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Geopolitical Considerations of the Orthodoxy
and Its Aspects in the Republic of Moldova
Valeriu Sainsus
The geographical map obviously reflects the historical evolution of the world states.
But the world geopolitical scheme is different from the geopolitical map. Despite
our existence in the period of the technical–scientific progress of the modernism
and globalization, there is a set of factors that blocks, destabilize, or even impels the
interstate relationships. During history a division in the field of Christian religion
took place determined by objective and subjective reasons. From the geopolitical
point of view clashes of opinions, as well as alliances, are clearly distinguished
when solving apparent problems of international direction. It is difficult to trace
the territorial border between the Catholicism and the Orthodoxy. The line, which
divides territorially this space, may be traced from the Baltic Sea up to the Black
sea, but there is not a clear identified territory when delimiting these two religions.
The states from this space comprise Catholic, as well as Orthodox believers. If
we consider this criterion, then Poland is to be divided, but not the only one, as it
is difficult to tackle this criterion for the Carpathians as well. This was the princi-
ple that motivated the space division of the Romanian territory. Russia, declaring
itself the defender of all the people, monopolized in its hands the orthodox reli-
gion and the orthodox people. More than that, it tried to divide them territorially.
Within this religion a division took place between the orthodox people of old and
new faiths. Being a social phenomenon, this becomes a factor of many social,
political and geopolitical processes. Religion plays a double role: on one hand it
contributes to the formation of the national identity basis, stability growing, civic
peace attainment, and on the other – it is capable to arouse dissension within
people of the same country, thus, being a factor of destabilization.
Regarding the political and socio–economical evolution, it becomes obvious
the fact that the transition to the market economy will leave its stamps. The EU
and NATO block integration will determine the progress of the religious current
reform. The new generations have pure, “pro European” aspirations. In spite of
the many impediments to register the Metropolitan of Basarabia, the start to-
wards a reform has been realized.
Even though we live in a country that is declared to have Latin roots, we are
the only ones who comply with the old orthodoxy rituals. In this way Russia
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realizes the geopolitical expansion through its doctrines. Determined by the fact
that we do not want to modernize, we remain bound and spiritually dependent
on East. Through this fact we are drawn in the eastern space. Being spiritually
divided from the rest of the country, we are manipulated by Moscow. The lan-
guage’s Latinity frightens them even in the sphere of orthodoxy. Let us pay atten-
tion to the fact that the Cyrillic alphabet drew us nearer to Moscow and to the
Slavic orthodox community. Thus, the aim was to alienate us from the West and
to attach us definitely to the geographic space of the Eastern Europe.
The new faith Orthodoxy is regarded as a “westernizing” process, which ex-
plains Russia’s unforeseeable attitude for this space. Today, through Orthodoxy
in Moldova, the appeal to the communist past is done, which tends to keep by
any means and even revive the Moldavian society’s spirituality.
The geopolitical essence of the “orthodox” notion is related to the eastern Chris-
tian church. According to the Romanian Explanatory Dictionary, it is considered to
be the gospel truth, which does not admit anything beside the officially established
line. Religion is the set element of the population’s character and spirituality. The
Moldavian society is tightly anchored to the religion registered by our ancestors.
Nicole Iorga wrote: “The Romanian people were born on the step of the
Church”, meaning that the Romanian people’s formation coincided in time with
the float of the orthodox creed. The great Eminescu used to write, “The Orthodox
Church is the mother of the Romanian people”.
Nowadays in the Republic of Moldova religion represents a geopolitical struc-
tural factor of the population in the territory. In spite of all the attempts to victim-
ize the Metropolitan of Basarabia, the geopolitical division is quite obvious through
the demographic trend: the young generation is close to the Metropolitan of Basa-
rabia and the old one is loyal to the Metropolitan of Moscow. Dosoftei’s exclama-
tion “the Light comes from the East” implies a geopolitical essence of the existent
system as well.
Nowadays 8 denominations and 13 associations (religious societies) are regis-
tered on the territory of the Republic of Moldova with the population of just 4.2
mln people. In Romania, with its population of 22 mln people, there are 14 asso-
ciations. The high number represents a consequence of a difficult geopolitical
situation.
Centered on religion, Russia acquired and maintains its right of political ex-
pansionism in Balkans, Caucasus and the Near East. Often through religion the
appeal for the national identity is made. This is one of the elements that are placed
in the game for geospacial disintegration of the Romanian language, as well as of
the Romanians, Bulgarians and Macedonians. Especially in Basarabia, where the
difference from the Romanian and Moldavian language does not sound convinc-
ing, religion is appealed to. Russia is the country that owns on the territory of
Moldova churches with the direct control coming the Russian Metropolitan (for
example the church from Speia village).
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At present more and more often we hear through mass–media the exclama-
tion “the Metropolitan of the whole Moldova”, which has an essence of an elo-
quent geopolitical pressure through the local authorities of the Republic of Mold-
ova, but not without their implication as well. Nowadays, at the same time with
the system’s fall, Russia has lost its influence in Balkans, but it maintains itself
through the influence of the spirit that is directly realized with the help the Met-
ropolitan of Moldova.
The year 1054 has caused the Christian world’s unity destruction. Communi-
ties of Christian people were represented geopolitically by dualism. Up till 1453,
when the Turks occupied the Constantinople, this center represented two Chris-
tian worlds. Together with Constantinople’s fall, a geopolitical modification in
Orthodoxy has been produced. The West based its principles on rationalism, while
the East was based on mysticism. As a result, Russia hurried to inherit the title of
not only “all the people’s defender”, but that of “the most imposed power in
Balkans” as well. The orthodox states that accepted the new faith were those of
Latin origin. From Moscow’s position they are treated as states that have betrayed
the interests, as well as the orthodox positions, and do not share at all, or just
partially its ideas. As a matter of fact, these states have not become opponents,
but the relations with them are still outdistanced, reserved.
Mainly the Romanian space is the one that breaks Russia’s connections with
the Balkans. These changes are characteristic for Bulgaria as well, but the com-
mon origin of the language makes them much closer.
From this moment Orthodoxy found itself having three opponents:
1) the Christian – Catholic western world;
2) the non Christian (muslim) world;
3) the orthodox world of new faith.
The post Byzantine orthodox world found itself divided in a few Patriarchies:
1) the Alexandria Patriarchate of the orthodox people in Greece;
2) the Patriarchate of the Arabs in Egypt; the Antioh Patriarchate of the Arabs in
Libya, Syria, Iraq;
3) the Constantinople Patriarchate of the Romanians, Bulgarians, Serbians and
Greeks;
4) the Patriarchate in Jerusalem has appeared with a statute apart.
From this moment the thoroughgoing oneness of the orthodoxy has been under-
mined. Determined by this fact Russia has declared itself as being the country
that covers the biggest orthodox territory after Constantinople’s fall, which from
the geopolitical point of view makes it the ancestor of the orthodox politics. The
radical differences from the Latin world, the lack of political domination and of
unchristian regimes were the distinctive elements of Orthodoxy. Through this
fact there was developed an idea according to which the Russian people is “the
God bearer” (bogonosets). More than that, in the XXth century through the events
of the World War II Russia developed the idea of “people bearing victory” (narod
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pobedonosets). According to the Russian historian V. Mavrodin “the Russian who
joins the Greek orthodox Christian creed will expose himself to paganism, poi-
son, defilement”.
The Christian term, as well as the later term of “orthodox” is identified with
the notion of Russian or Russian people (L. Marrodin, 1978, р. 143).
The geopolitical problem that always was on the agenda of the time is the
relations with the orthodox world beside Russia’s borders. These states found
themselves in a dilemma not to comply with Moscow spiritual authorities and
the negation of “orthodox empire” existence. Concomitantly, the Constantinople
Patriarchate suffered a transformation from a spiritual–political unexpurgated
doctrine to one of a religious character. Moscow qualified these changes in the
new faith orthodox religion as being incomplete and as a direct collaboration
with Rome. As a consequence a confrontation followed. The Orthodoxy served as
basis for many actions of territorial conquest undertaken by Russia. The Church
was not a rival, but the state’s supporter in its matters of expansionism and pro-
tection of “all the Russians”. This fact made Russia to be convinced that by its
actions of expansionism it would fulfill a “divine mission”, and this has kept the
domination of the empire. Thus “a perfect cesaropapism” was born, where the
Church and the State become synonyms, and the citizen considers himself as an
“agent of Christian reunification”.
It is quite hard to estimate the orthodox element value in the coloratura of the
Russian geopolitical factor. The Orthodoxy and the Slav origin have been the set
elements for the imperial Russia’s geopolitical doctrine, which is known under
the term “panslavism”. The aim of this doctrine was to defend the values and the
orthodox people, and to unite all the Slavs under “the double–headed eagle” of
the third Rome as well. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union we indeed
witnessed some fellowships based on this principle (Yugoslavia and Armenia).
Today the Russian Federation represents the country with the most numerous
orthodox people in the world and the main force of eventual pan orthodoxy. Rus-
sia – and later the Soviet Union – constituted a model for the other communist
regimes regarding the way of treating the religious problem. The relation be-
tween the Orthodox Russian Church and the Russian state was always very close.
The victory of the bolshevism in Russia and the imposed atheist regime leaded to
the repression and obedience of the religious life. But, respecting the old tradi-
tional line, the religious leadership was actively used when the regime’s legiti-
mating and its plans were necessary. In respect with this context, in 1927 the
Patriarch Serghii declared that “the (communist) country’s joys and grieves” are
those of the Russian Church as well. The clergy, and especially its leaders, have
become a component of the political regime’s control apparatus. The chance of-
fered for a while by the access to the archives after the Soviet Union’s dissolution
gives us the chance to learn new information about this phenomenon. Constantin
Harciov, the president of the Religious Problems Council (1984–1989) confirmed
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the fact that the Russian Church had been strictly controlled by the Central Com-
mittee of the Communist Party and by the KGB. The Patriarchate’s department of
Foreign Ecclesiastic Relations contained many KGB agents. The discovered materi-
als in the KGB archives show at present that, four of the six permanent members of
Moscow Patriarchate Saint Synod have been, at least up till present, KGB agents.
The whole subsequent evolution of the Russian Orthodox Church followed
a typical course for the events’ evolution in the former communist countries: re-
placement of the menial procommunist discourse by a radical nationalist one. Al-
exii II, one of the brejnevist ecclesiastic nomenclature Enlighteners (entitled patri-
arch in the mid 1990’s – in may, 1990 the patriarch Pimen died), continued the
“serghianstvo” philosophy (named in this way in honor of patriarch Serghii
(d. 1944)). In December 1990 he signed the ”Letter of the fifty three”, through which
Gorbaciov was suggested ”to take immediate measures in order to counteract sep-
aratism, the anti–State subversive actions, the interethnic incitements and dissen-
sions, for this reason making use of the law and power you have been invested
with”.
The disappearing of the Soviet Union has let the Orthodox Church to be one of
the most consistent forces dedicated to the empire salvation. In the mid 1990’s the
patriarch Aleksii declared the following: “the Moscow Patriarchate recognized
territory comprises not only Russia, but the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Baltic
countries, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Middle Asia as well”.
Already in 1993 the patriarch Aleksii handed in to the president Eltsin an open
ultimate – either he signs the recently adopted law through which the foreign
missioners activities are withdrawn, or “the Russian Orthodox Church will be-
come an opponent – thus a member of the Red – Brown coalition”. In fact, the
Russian Orthodox Church integrated into this alliance as its principles are against
the values promoted by the western democracies. The Orthodox Church pres-
sure allowed, in spite of the president’s Eltsin opposition, the adoption of a con-
servative law, through which the rights of the “unrecognized” religions are con-
strained. The numerical limits imposed and the proofs of 15 years of existence
serve as a condition for the registration. At their turn, the Russians of the right
wing were put in the situation to reform their view towards the Russian Ortho-
dox Church as an institution that would play, potentially, an important role in
supporting the soviet state’s unity. The same position was adopted by the left
wing as well. Mass–media transformed the alliances between the politicians and
church into public events, in this way allowing them to have a greater political
impact.
The evolution of the orthodox churches in the neighboring countries was in-
fluenced by the evolution of the self–conducting institutions.
The reversion to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church became a top subject at the
end of the ninth decade. In June 5–6, 1990, seven orthodox bishops, over 200 priests,
500 secular people came together at a council in Kiev, where Mstislav (Skripnik)
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was elected to be the Ukrainian Patriarch of the Ukrainian Self–conducting Or-
thodox Church. Then, the metropolitan bishop Filaret, who was in close relations
with the future president Kravciuk, came to be the leader of the self–conducting
tendency. In order to stop this movement of self–conduction and under the pres-
sure of the Moscow Patriarch, on 27th of May 1992 a Bishop Synod of the Ukraini-
an Orthodox Church proclaimed metropolitan bishop Vladimir the Head of the
independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Filaret, at his turn, tried in June 1992
to create a new entity – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kiev Patriarchate.
Movements alike appeared in Moldova as well. In October 1992, at the request
of the metropolitan bishop Vladimir and of the orthodox community in Moldova,
the Saint Synod of Moscow decided to declare the Moldova Diocese as an inde-
pendent church. At this moment the Romanian Orthodox Church entered the
competition. The Patriarch Teoctist entitled a basarabian metropolitan – bishop
Petru from Balti, who was working as a temporary administrator.
As a consequence, the Orthodox Church in Basarabia has been divided into
two structures: one that is under Moscow, and the other that under Bucharest.
Both of them are of old faith; function according the old calendar before 1923. The
greatest part of the moldovan flock continues to be under Moscow’s government.
Still, there is a slow, but a constant passing process to the church under Roma-
nia’s authority. It is obvious that the Russian Church authorities are tightly at-
tached to the state apparatus (let us just recollect the symbolical presence of the
Russian patriarch at the ceremony for handing in the suitcase with the nuclear
codes to president Putin); they are afraid to lose their influence on the popula-
tion, realizing the fact that once the Metropolitan regains the legal statute, the
flock will reform its view towards the Romanian church.
The Metropolitan of Basarabia was reactivated by a synod act of the Romanian
Orthodox Church on the 19th of December. The Russian Church operated violent-
ly what concerns the Romanian Church’s initiative to regain in possession its
confessional space. All Moldova’s authorities of those times blamed the restart of
the Metropolitan of Basarabia. Lucinschi (ex president), Sangheli (ex prime min-
ister), Snegur (ex president) – they are just a few of those who considered the
Metropolitan of Basarabia appearance to be “subversive and harmful”. The Gov-
ernment refused to consider the functional statute of the Romanian Metropoli-
tan, which up till now is not legalized, although it has under its leadership more
than 400 000 believers and over 1500 parishes.
After many cases brought against the government by the representative of the
Metropolitan, in August 1997 the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Moldova de-
cided in favor for the Metropolitan of Basarabia, but the Government appealed the
Supreme Court of the country. Vladimir threatened even with a civil war in case
the Metropolitan of Basarabia regains legal statute. Lucinschi declared that he would
discuss the problem with Alexii in Moscow. The elected representative to defend
the Metropolitan case, the Member of Parliament Vlad Cubreacov, at present vice
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president of the Popular Front Party, managed to internationalize the problem,
making Strasbourg to formulate a motion with the same title through which the
Moldavian Government is summoned to recognize the Metropolitan of Basarabia.
For the moment, the process is still in development. Until the Metropolitan
does not gain a legal statute it does not have any chance to extend itself on the
territory. The help from the Romanian Patriarchate is limited by the law condi-
tions of the Republic of Moldova, but it will have to obey the decision taken at
Starsbourg regarding the Metropolitan statute legalization.
In 1999, November 10, the European Court for the Human Rights in Stras-
bourg announced officially the Government of the republic of Moldova concern-
ing file nr. 45701/99.
Thus, the fact that Russia had, has and will continue to have great political and
confessional influence in the zone of the satellite states is obvious. We are to un-
derstand the fact that in order to achieve the EU integration goal, first of all we
have to acquire an ethnical, confessional and geopolitical maturity.
Starting with the XV century, the Orthodox Geopolitics is synonymous with
the term “the Russian geopolitics”. This notion inspired the exclamation “the
neighboring countries”. After the XV century a political degradation of the Otto-
man Empire started together with the Balkan peoples’ fight for the national liber-
ation, which encouraged Russia through the support of the orthodox demands.
Still, Russia met a counterstroke because of the fact that such political – ideologi-
cal conceptions as the Great Greece, Great Bulgaria, Great Romania, Great Serbia
appear, and many peoples started to claim for the territories where the respective
populations used to live. This fact was hardly accepted by Russia.
By 1913 Greece had doubled its territory, but it affected the geopolitical inter-
ests of other orthodox peoples, as the Greeks laid claim to the territories of Mace-
donia and Frachia. Bulgaria and Serbia claimed these territories too.
Along the formation of Yugoslavia in 1920, with Russia’s support, in its com-
position were included not only orthodox territories, but catholic ones as well.
The appearance of Romania was not welcomed by Russia because the feelings
of the unity with the Latin world persisted. From the orthodox positions this
unity with the Latin world was interpreted as an absolute joining with the Vati-
can Church that has the aim to influence the East politically and spiritually. That
is why Russia looked for some favors when supporting Romania; it approved
and supported the anti Turkish and Greek Phanariots movement in exchange for
the domination over Basarbian territory inhabited by Romanians. Moscow views
the Romanian Orthodoxy as Latin culture integration. Here from comes the idea
that the Romanians tend more to Rome, and the Romanian nationalism is consid-
ered anti Greek.
Bulgaria starts in 1970 to form the Bulgarian religious autonomy, and the basic
idea was to unite in a geopolitical block all the orthodox people in Balkans who
are loyal to Moscow. Simultaneously with the geopolitical independence, the idea
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of “the Great Bulgaria that would bring together the whole population” appeared.
It was expressed by the idea of “Bulgaria – three seas”, that meant Bulgaria’s
unification with Frachia and Constantinople. There are some historical moments
when the Bulgarian Orthodoxy deviated from the Moscow line. These feelings
were estimated as being “pro West”. Still, if taken from the ethnical position,
there are no diversions.
Albania comprises more denominations: Sunit – Albanians, Bectas – Albanians,
Catholic – Albanians and the Christian Albanians. Albania appeared due to an
orthodox factor. Fan Holice was an acolyte of Moscow and was directly support-
ed by it. At present, there is a distinctive dualism in this country. The geopolitical
interests of the Byzantine orthodox people collide the interests of the Russian
Patriarchate.
One of the basic particularities of the Balkan orthodox people is expressed by
the existence of two geopolitical contradictions with religious aspects: the orien-
tation towards Russian geopolitics, and the line “Moscow – the third Rome” ori-
entated against the catholic, anti Turkish worlds, but as well against the orthodox
people who loosen Moscow’s positions in Balkans.
Secondly, even if they are Balkan orthodox people, they are pity for the catho-
lic people.
And, at last, by the facts stated above, Moscow interprets the enforcement of
the Turkish influence positions, and the Anglo-Saxon influence to be estranged
from the Moscow Patriarchate.
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Roman Lozynsky
Modern Tendencies of the Development
of Ethnolingustic Situation in Ukraine
Independent Ukraine inherited a great deal of social problems from the former
Soviet Union. However, in modern scientific literature the most frequently
attention is focused on the problems of social–political and economic development
of the young state, often not paying attention to not less important social–cultural,
ethno–cultural, religious problems etc. Language problem is one of the most
important but insufficiently investigated problems of Ukraine. It essentially
influences the development of many processes and phenomena, being an
inseparable feature of modern social life of the country.
The essence of language problem implies that along the absolute advantage of
Ukrainians (about 80% of the total amount of citizens) in the composition of the
population of the country, de facto Ukraine is bilingual state, as in the past
a considerable part of Ukrainian population was subject to language russification,
that is, changing its native language from the nationality language into Russian
one. Absence of Ukrainian State system for a long historic period, and being as
Ukrainian ethnic territory, a member, first, of Russian empire and then of the Soviet
Union, are the main reasons of russification of Ukrainian population. In these states
official language policy was directed at the limitation of language rights of national
minorities, their assimilation by the Russians, their title ethnos. Language
russification of a considerable part of Ukrainians, Bilorussians, Tatars, Bashkirs
and representatives of many other ethnic communities is the consequence of this
policy. Ethnic communities of Slavonic group whose language is kindred with
Russian, and also some not numerous peoples of European part of Russia
(Karelians, Mordvinians) suffered much from this policy. Russification of
population, first of all, was conditioned by the privileged position of the Russian
language. Thus, the raising of social status was associated with a person’s everyday
communication in Russian. Russification was partly of a forced character, as it
was accompanied with prohibitions and limitations concerning languages of
national minorities in the sphere of secondary and higher education, publication,
mass media etc.
Language russification of Ukrainian population began at the end of the XVII th
and in the XVIII th centuries, in the process of gradual limitation and then
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:40103
Roman Lozynsky104
liquidation of Ukraine’s autonomy, as a member of Russian empire, by the Russian
tsarist power. However, by the second half of the XIX th century, only a small
quantity of Ukrainians was subject to language russification. The thing is, that
above 90% of Ukrainian population lived in the rural areas, and a rural way of life
almost did not create condition for the development of the processes of language
assimilation. Besides, by 1861, a personal dependence of the peasants on the
landowners (serfdom) existed in Russian empire; therefore, Ukrainian peasants
had a limited access to the cities where there were the most favourable conditions
for russification. As a whole a relatively small quantity of the Ukrainian population
lived in the cities of Ukraine; mostly the representatives of other ethnic groups,
namely: Russians, Jews and Poles lived there.
After the emancipation, the possibilities for language russification of Ukrainians
essentially increased. Some factors favoured this. First of all, rather intensive
industrial development of separate regions of Ukraine promoted resettlement of
Ukrainian peasants into the towns. There, in Russian–language environment, they
gradually adopted a spoken Russian language. The development of education
sphere, including Ukraine, is another factor of russification. The Russian language
was the instruction language in higher school on the part of the territory of Ukraine,
being a member of Russian empire. At last, tsarist power limited the possibilities
for the development of the Ukrainian language on the legal level: Valuyev’s {1863}
and Ems’s {1876} instructions prohibited publishing religious, school, scientific–
popular, scientific books, words on music in Ukrainian and importing any
Ukrainian books from abroad.
Factors, mentioned above, enhanced the privileged position of the Russian
language. However, a total degree of russification of the Ukrainian population
remained not so high. Russification was delayed by a rather low level of the
industrial development of Naddnipryanshchyna, Polissya and Podillya, the
regions where a main part of Ukrainians was concentrated. In these regions, the
Ukrainians went on living predominantly in rural areas. Therefore at the end of
XIX th and in the first decades of the XX th centuries, only one powerful region of
language assimilation – Donbas, one of the largest coal mining basins in Europe,
existed, apart from cities and strips of Ukrainian–Russian ethnic borderline. While
exploiting coal deposits, not only Ukrainians from the neighbouring rural areas,
but also Russians, predominantly from central parts of Russia mowed to Donbas
on a mass scale. Thus, a share of non–Ukrainian population, Russian language
environments formed and conditions created promoting Ukrainian russification.
Ethnolinguistic situation in Ukraine in the first quarter of the XX th century,
was represented by the census of the population of 1926, the first valuable Soviet
census, carried out after the establishment of Bolshevik power on the territory of
the larger part of the former Russian empire. According to this census of
population, 2.7% Ukrainians acknowledged Russian as their native language, or
621.9 thousand people out of about 23.2 mln Ukrainian population was observed
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in the following regions: Donbas (Russian was acknowledged as native by 9.6%
Ukrainians), Polissya (7.6%), Steppe (3.8%).
In the 30–50–s of the XX th century radical changes took place in ethnolinguistic
situation in Ukraine. According to the census of the population of 1959 almost
2.1 mln Ukrainians acknowledged Russian as their native language, that is, 3.3
times more than in 1926, a share of russified Ukrainians increased by 6.5%.
Essential increase of the number of Russian language Ukrainians in Ukraine
was caused by a series of objective and subjective factors functioning in the period
of Stalin regime. Specifically, at the end of the 20–s when Stalin managed to
completely concentrate power of the country into his hands, the processes of
“ukrainianization” taking place in the 20–s of the XX th century with the aim of
enhancing a social role of Ukrainian language, improving the conditions of
national–cultural development of the Ukrainians, and representatives of other
ethnic communities living on the territory of the Soviet Ukraine, were curtailed.
On the contrary, russification policy was renewed. Some show–trials against
nationally conscious Ukrainian intelligentsia took place, a considerable part of it
being killed or sent to Stalin concentration camps. Since the 30–s of the XX th century,
prestige of the Ukrainian language and culture in Ukraine began lowering, and
Russian became a business and communication language in many spheres of social
life. Excessive admiration by the Ukrainian language and culture could become
a ground for unsubstantiated accusations and repressions. All that caused a gradual
refusal of the Ukrainian language and reorientation at the Russian spoken language
by the Ukrainians, especially, by those who looked forward to obtaining professional
or party career. These processes widely spread in the cities of East and South of
Ukraine, environments existed earlier. In the central and western parts of Ukraine,
where Russian and Russian–language population was few, bilinguism was widely
spread. People used Russian at work and Ukrainian at home.
Rather intensive industrialization of the territory of Ukraine, due to which
urbanization level increased from 18.5% in 1926 to 45.7% in 1959, considerably
promoted russification processes. Industrialization was accompanied by migration
of the Russian–language population from different regions of the Soviet Union to
the territory of Ukraine.
Mass resettlements of the population, taking place in the 30–50–s of the XX th century,
especially during world wars, repressions, deportations etc., is one more factor of
Ukrainian russification. Thus, millions of Ukrainians were repressed and exiled into
the eastern regions of the USSR during mass Stalin repressions. During the Second
World War, while hitlerite troops’ moving to the East, a considerable part of the
Ukrainian population was resettled from Ukraine to unoccupied regions of the 30–
40–s of the XX th century, soon returned home. However, they used to return very
often, having formed families, having been subject to language assimilation.
A considerable decrease in the Ukrainian population during famine of 1932–
1933 and during the Second World War became one of the most essential factors
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of russification. As it is known, during famine, according to statistics, within
5–7 mln Ukrainians died. During the Second World War every sixth citizen of
Ukraine was perished. Demographic losses were compensated at the expense of
migrants from Russia, least at other regions of the USSR, first of all, of Russians,
and all, of Bilorussians, Tatars, Jews and representatives of many other ethnic
groups.
In addition to above mentioned, there were some more russification factors.
Thus, the member of Ukrainian– language schools, began decreasing, russification
of higner education sphere began increasing in the most regions of Ukraine. Mixed
marriages and men’s involving into the service to the armed forces of the Soviet
Army were other important factors of language russification. All that caused
weakening Ukrainian language position and mass spreading Ukrainian–Russian
language, so called surzhyk.
In the 60–80s of the XX th century Ukrainian russification lasted. After a short
political “thaw”, during Mykyta Khrushov’s power in Moscow, due to a series of
measures concerning democratization of national–cultural life during Leonid
Brezhnev’s power, russification enhanced its activity. Pseudoscientific doctrine of
forming a new socialist nation, “the soviet people”, where all the ethnic communities
of the former Soviet Union should unite, completely predominated in the country.
One of the main tasks of doctrine was to disguise russification processes
ideologically. In the 70–s of the XX th century, some regions of Ukraine, in Donbas
and the Crimea in particular, were short of schools with the Ukrainian instruction
language. The total number of the population with the native Russian language
predominated over the quantity of Ukrainian language citizens. Similar situation
was in the largest cities of Ukraine – Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk.
Southern regions of Ukraine – Mykolayiv, Kherson, Odessa – became other regions
of rapid russification of the population. The development of sanatorium–resort
sphere favoured Ukrainian russification.
Russification of Ukrainians took place more or less intensively almost in all
the regions of Ukraine. According to the last Soviet census of the population of
1989, almost 17 mln people, or 32,8% population of Ukraine of different ethnic
origin (Russians, Ukrainians, Bilorussians, Jews, Tatars) acknowledged Russian
as their native language. Within 1959–1989 the number of Ukrainians with their
native Russian language increased more than twofold, from 2.1 mln to 4.5 mln
people, or from 6.5 to 12.3% out of the total quantity of Ukrainian population. The
highest share of Ukrainians with native Russian language was observed in the
following regions: Crimean (47.4% out of the total Ukrainians population), Donets
(40.6%), Lugansk (33.6%), Odessa (25.8%), Zaporizhzha (22.9%), Kharkiv (20.6%)
and Kyiv (21.2%).
Proclamation of the independence of Ukraine in 1991 created the conditions
for radical changes of the character of ethnic processes. First of all, the migration
tendency changed. While during the whole Soviet period, upto the 80–s of the
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XX th century, representatives of the different ethnic communities of the former
USSR moved to Ukraine, in the 90–s a contrary phenomenon began, that is, the
returning of a part of the population of non–Ukrainian ethnic origin to their
previous residence. This process first embraced a part of military people of the
former Soviet army of non–Ukrainian nationalities who did not wish to serve in
the Ukrainian armed forces, including members of their families. Soon, tens of
thousands of former migrants of the 80–s of the XX th century who could not adapt
on the Ukrainian territory, and at the same time preserved stable kindred ties in
the regions from which they were moving to Ukraine, returned to Russia and
other countries. Better than in Ukraine, economic situation in many new post–
soviet countries was for them in the 90–s a major stimulus of going outside the
country. Besides, a lot of representatives of different ethnic groups left for the
west (USA, Canada, Germany) on the pretext of disappointment by the post–
soviet reality. At the end of the 80–s of the XX th century emigration of Jews to
Israel also sharply increased. In contrast to the migration of Russians and Jews, in
the 90–s of the XX th century, a considerable quantity of Ukrainians, having lived
outside Ukraine, mostly in the Union of Independent States, returned to their
motherland.
Unfavourable sex–age structure of the majority of ethnic minorities became
another important reason of decreasing in the number of non–Ukrainian
population. It influenced their natural increase, especially caused essentially lower
indices of birth–rate and higher indices of mortality, compared to the Ukrainians.
Detail analysis of demographic situation, created among representatives of
different ethnic communities, testified to the fact that already at the end of the
90–s of the XX th century, in many regions of Ukraine, Ukrainians were the only
ethnic groups (among the most numerous), having positive indices of natural
increase in population. All other ethnic groups were characterized by natural
decrease in population, mortality predominating over birth–rate by many times
among some of them. Poles and Jews had particularly unfavourable demographic
indices. Migratory and demographic processes mentioned above caused essential
decrease in Russian ethnic environments in most regions of Ukraine. The number
of Russian language population first of all decreased due to migrations and
unfavourable indices of natural population movement.
In December, 2001, the first All–Ukrainian Census of the population took place
in the country. According to its data ethnolinguistic situation in Ukraine was
characterized by the following indices. A share of title ethnos, Ukrainians, first of
all, sharply increased in the composition of the population of the country. Within
1989–2001 increased at once by 5.1% points, reaching 77.8%. Emphasizing the
importance of this result, we should admit that in the XX th century a share of
Ukrainians was never so high in Ukraine (in the modern state limits). In the interval
between censuses the quantity of Ukrainians slightly increased in the country
(by 0.3%), on contrary, the total member of Ukrainian inhabitants decreased.
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It happened so, because the quantity of the majority of ethnic minorities, living in
on the territory of the country, essentially decreased. Thus, the quantity of the
Russian in Ukraine decreased by 26.6%, Bilorussian – by 37.3%, Moldavanians –
by 20.3%, Jews – 78.7%, Poles – by 34.2%.
A share of Ukrainians, who acknowledged their nationality language as native,
decreased from 87.7% to 85.2%. The quantity of Ukrainians with native Russian
language increased more than by 20% – from 4.6 mln to 5.6 mln people. However,
the numbers of Ukrainians with native Russian language increased, as from one
to two million citizens of Ukraine, first of all, its eastern and southern regions,
calling themselves Russians during the Census of 1989, in 2001, already identified
themselves as Ukrainians, but with native Russian language. In general, the role
of the Ukrainian language in the country enhanced, and the Russian language –
weakened. Thus, in 2001, 67.5% of the population of Ukraine considered the
Ukrainian language as their native one, what is 2.8 per cent points more than
according to the census of 1989. 29.6% of the population considered the Russian
language as their native one. Thus, compared to the previous census of the
population this index lowered by 3.2% points. Ukrainianization of ethnic minorities
heightened the importance of the Ukrainian language. Thus, a share of the people
with native Ukrainian language essentially increased among Russians (from 1.6%
out of the total amount of Russian population of Ukraine), Bilorussians (from
9.3% to 17.5%), Moldavians (from 6.1% to 10.7%), Poles, Jews, representatives of
other ethnic communities, inhabiting Ukraine.
Ethnolinguistic situation in the regions of Ukraine appeared to be more
interesting. According to the census of 2001, the country has been distinctly divided
into two parts: regions with continuous russification process and regions where
a share of Ukrainians with native Russian language decreased. A share of
Ukrainians with native Russian language increased in the east of Ukraine (Donetsk,
Luhansk, Kharkiv regions), in the south (the Crimean Autonomy, Mykolayiv,
Odessa, Kherson regions) and also in industrial Prydniprovya (Zaporizhzhya and
Dnipropetrovsk regions).
In the regions mentioned above, rather rapid russification of Ukrainians was
taking place during the second half of the XX th century. However, in the southern,
Prydniprovya regions and in Kharkiv regions, after the proclamation of the
independence of Ukraine, russification rate essentially slackened. Taking into
consideration the fact that during census of the population of 2001, a considerable
quantity of the population of these regions changed their nationality from Russian
into Ukrainian, but called Russian their native language causing the increase in
the number of Russian language Ukrainians, one can state that in general the
russification of Ukrainians almost ceased in these regions. Thus, actually the results
of the census of 2001 testify to the fact that in the 90–s of the XX th century the
russification of the Ukrainian population did not cease only in three regions of
Ukraine: Donetsk, Luhansk regions and Autonomous Crimean Republic.
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There is a series of social – political and economic factors favouring a rather
high level of russification of the Ukrainian population in some regions of Ukraine.
Some political forces in the country constantly speculate on the language problem,
opposing Russian language to Ukrainian language population and promising the
proclamation of Russian the second official language to a part of the population
of Ukraine, on the condition of coming into power. Almost just after proclaiming
Ukraine independent, from the side of some political forces of Russia, the attempts
began to use the presence of a considerable quantity of Russian language
population in Ukraine with the aim of exerting political pressure upon the young
country. Extremely active availability of Russian language mass media in
Ukrainian information space also considerably causes the aggravation of the
language problem. Thus, the Russian language prevails in most Ukrainian TV
channels. Besides, citizens of great cities have the possibility of receiving some
Russian state and private TV channels. In most cities of Ukraine one can freely
buy tens of Russian newspapers on various subjects. Russian books have filled
up Ukrainian book markets, as manufacturers of book production in Russia have
considerable tax privileges.
For the nearest years the tendencies of the development of language situation
will be considerably determined by the results of presidential elections which are
to take place at the end of October, 2004. Viktor Yushchenko, the most popular
opponent candidate, is supported, first of all, by citizens of western and central
regions of Ukraine, the least russified ones. Thus, if this candidate wins, from the
side of the power, more probably, we should expect more consecutive language
policy directed at comprehensive functioning the Ukrainian language in all the
regions. Tendencies of the change of language policy, in case of the winning of
the candidate from the existing power, will depend on who will be elected
President.
In spite of the existing difficulties in the revival of the Ukrainian language,
ethnolinguistic situation in Ukraine is gradually improving. Most likely, in the
first decade of the new century, a share of Russian language population in Ukraine
will be shortening. However, complete overcoming negative consequences of
prolonged russification of Ukrainians in the nearest perspective is hardly possible.
In the east and in the south of Ukraine, powerful multimillion all–round Russian
language environments have been formed. In the nearest decades it is hardly
possible to “ukrainianise” the Ukrainian population. Therefore, the language factor
will remain an important factor of Ukrainian foreign and home policy for a long
time, will influence national–cultural development of ethnic communities of
Ukraine, and other spheres of social life.
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Introduction
The task of any structure, representing the interests of the citizens of the region,
country or group of states, is to guarantee their future and defend their interests
in this world overtaken by global processes. Global processes influence the
formation of new attitude towards responsibility. Undetermined information,
globalization processes, which rub boundaries between inside and outside activity
spheres, between home and foreign policies, make society evolution and
development of the states very complicated, so the strategists (states) can manage
national development and development processes with great difficulty.
In the process of world evolution business and state must take equal
responsibility for the management of decisive changes. It is so easy for a state in
the run of ongoing changes to reach and cross the critical limit, when social and
business systems unavoidably experience bigger or smaller shock. Such
misbalances of the state inevitably expand globally and have smaller or larger
influence on other countries or regions.  There appears a necessity to perceive the
effectiveness of the decisions as the efficiency directed towards the correspondence
to goals system (goals including business, social and international needs and
obligations).
Post–soviet countries and developing countries are involved and try to
participate in global processes, but unfortunately we have to admit, that taking
social responsibility by state or business in these countries is not a rule. Only
fundamental reforms of economical system, using specific strategies evaluating
different economical; and political conditions, geographical positions, were carries
out or will have to be carried out in these countries. Influence and pressure of
global processes and inadequate perception of these processes can even more
shake already misbalanced social systems of these states.
Lithuania also during the period of its independence was not able to find
effective balance between policy, economy, business development, formation of
new jobs and national security. Lithuania’s participation in global processes was
smaller, than impact and pressure on economical and social systems. Lithuania
will have to learn to manage country effectively creating effective, scientifically
Antanas Bosas
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based, corresponding economical and social position of the country, traditions,
citizens’ mentality, balanced state management system.
The changes in global process
The problem of management effectiveness of any activity became very urgent as
globalization changes are taking place in the world. It became obvious, that the
possibilities of management effectiveness lie in adaptation and application of
strategic management methodology. It is impossible to foresee exact and reliable
and results of planning management. The prognosis of management results always
has more probability character because of business influence and because of
internal organization’s peculiarities, unavoidable informational in determination
and inaccurate interpretation of information. Some decisions cause desirable
results, but often the final consequences are unexpected as for the elements of
managing subsystem, so for managed subsystem. Moreover, the results of
implementation of certain decisions taken in the context of certain situations may
cause undesirable changes of different scale. In this place appears the necessity to
evaluate possible alternatives during the process of making the decision.
It is impossible to dissociate from the criteria of effectiveness and desirable
goals, perceiving the effectiveness as efficiency, attainment of necessary or best
results. This is where the decision to increase the effectiveness of management
decisions, orientating them towards the compliance of the forecasted results to
the created system of goals (genetic purposive attitude) and realization of this
system by scientific substantiation–teleological principal, comes from. May be
there could be a dispute, if it is possible to foresee future possibilities, purely
genetically evaluating the origin of management decisions, using extrapolation
and created models. However, using present means and methods, it is impos-
sible and hardly will be possible in future to foresee and evaluate precisely the
final set of internal and external factors, systemic changes and the effect of syn-
ergy. But the prerequisites to make more objective and at the same time more
effective management decisions are created.
The changes, which are about to happen and which can be forecasted geneti-
cally, “die out” or reach the critical limit. After passing this limit, social systems
unavoidably experience bigger or smaller shock. The implemented management
decisions cause the process of changes, which affects separate people, organiza-
tions and even countries. Alvin Toffler in his book “Future shock” (A. Toffler,
1997) thoroughly analysed future shock. But he didn’t estimate energetics, prop-
erty allotment, demographic, ecological and other balances, from which vitally
depends stable mankind’s existence. The creative part of the elite, which in 1968
united into Rome’s club, showed some aspects of future shock, concerning strate-
gic problems of mankind. A. Peccei, one of the club’s initiators, performed the
analysis of economical expansion and environment stability’s misbalance prob-
lem.  The only possible conclusion is: when the number of people is increasing
and their needs are developing, it is necessary to coordinate the management of
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planet’s recourses, directing it towards the effectiveness (A. Peccei, 1997). One of
the first Rome club’s projects contained the study “The limits to growth”, pre-
pared in 1972. This project, on the basis of plentiful information, using math-
ematical modelling and modern calculation technique of that time, tried to evalu-
ate the situation and to perform the extrapolation of the changes of global socio–
economical system’s status and separate regions. At the same time they were
looking for possibilities to create economical system, managed in such a way,
that it could satisfy increasing needs of growing society without disturbing the
ecological balance (J. Čepinskis, 2002).
The created models of the research prompted the conclusions, that with the
tendencies and the system of values remaining the same, the society and the
environment, violated by its economical activity, will suffer catastrophic future
shock in 2020–2040. It is difficult to evaluate thoroughly the significance of this
project even after more than 30 years. It is obvious, that the sooner potential threats
and problems are defined; the easier it is to reduce negative consequences of their
display and to adapt to possible changes. The performance of strategic analysis
and synthesis and the reveal of certain global problems were not the end of the
research. In further Rome club’s projects there were attempts to propose possible
ways of problems solution for separate regions. It turned out that almost all over
the world the impact of the economical processes on the environment reached
the parameters, leading to breach of balance, and that it is necessary to start
immediately managing the processes, maturing future shock, such as globalization,
ecological balance.
The main principles, which were used as the basis in Rome club’s activity (global
perspective, holistic thinking and concentration on long term and inter–subject
plans), provide responsibility for everyone, whose aspects of activity have
influence on economical and social recourses, ecological stability, etc. There
appears social ecological responsibility of business for the consequences of made
decisions.
Local processes (reasons) leading to global consequences should be taken into
account. Social systems pay no attention to political boundaries, and regional
processes cause a shock of much wider character, affecting as states, so
corporations, acting inside them. So it would be quite rational to discuss shortly
the perspectives of separate types of states – developed, post–soviet and
developing– and their input into the approaching future shock.
 Three important, affecting each other processes were taking place almost at
the same time in the seventh and eighth decades of last century. First of all it was
rapid development of informational technologies, which exceeded all the limits
of prognosis in this direction. Second process was defined as globalisation, which
raised the meaning of environment as global combination. Third process was
rapid formation of society movements and stakeholders and the increase of their
influence (M. Castells, 1996). The pressure of social, economical and ecological
consequences of all mentioned processes finally affect the countries, which have
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the smallest possibilities to influence these processes. As social systems in today’s
world have no boarders any longer, the third process (the movement of influence
groups) mostly influence self–dependence, business, social and cultural processes
of these states.
Developed countries maximally use informational technologies for the
development of their economy. Information becomes one of the main recourses
in the competitive struggle. Its processing speed and adaptation of strategic
management systems under changing conditions becomes more and more rapid.
Informational technologies form prerequisites to manage the recourses more
precisely, to propose the product better satisfying the needs of the consumer.
Thanks to the globalisation developed countries more and more often move even
the production of intellectual products or part of production cycle to the countries
of post–soviet block or to the developing countries.
Post–soviet countries try to participate in the processes of globalization as much
as possible; most of them seek for integration into Euro Atlantic structures. From
three priority goals of the foreign policy of Lithuanian Republic only one is regional
– good relations with neighboring countries. The rest two are of global character
– to integrate into European Union and NATO. The post–soviet countries often
perform the role of a bridge between East and West. Nevertheless we have to
ascertain, that taking social responsibility of state and business is not a rule in
these countries, but only separate cases. In most of the cases the companies,
established on the basis of developed countries representing capital and influence
groups’ movement condition it. Social systems are not balanced in developing
countries as the influence of world’s processes (information, globalization,
influence groups) and their pressure is accepted and perceived not adequately. In
such a way business social ecological responsibility is even more limited in the
developing countries. Quite often non–strategic goals are prevailing in business
structures, representing these states, or the interests of private capital are closely
related to state interests.  The movements of national influence groups in these
countries are often controversial – from complete absence to carrying out a coup
in the country. Unformed middle class, who according to specialists of politics is
acknowledged as the basis of state’s stability and long–term development, is
characteristic for these countries. The participation of the developing countries in
global processes is often minimal and more related to experienced impact and
stress on economy, than to usage of appearing possibilities.
In Lithuania as in the Central and Eastern Europe the carried out reform of
economic system represented fundamental change of key institutions functions,
ownership forms, enterprise management methods, laws and even mutual
communication and approach to work.  While carrying out such reform, countries
of transitional economy had to follow not only the general principals of reform,
but also to employ specific strategies taking into account different economic and
political situation in each country and even geographical position of the country
(M. Starkevičiūtė, 2000). At the same time Lithuania was involved into two
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transformation processes namely – into the process of global change and into the
process of transformation of Lithuania itself as the national state, which in the
context of global change is sub transformation process. The preceding decade of
existence of the Lithuanian state demonstrates that Lithuania has not formulated
its clear position in geo–economics map of Europe and the world.  Furthermore,
still unclear is composition of the geo–economics atlas – definition of international
and economic limits, determination of national interests, framework of strategic
alliances, contours of economical groupings, etc. Within this context it is very
important to feel and substantiate the crucial long–term objectives of the state
and society’s modernization.  One of such objectives could and should be problem
of the middle class formation in Lithuania.  Without purposeful coordinated
actions by authority, leaders of business community and other important state
functioning spheres it will not be possible to build the middle class rapidly and
efficiently. Perhaps the most important financial–economic, social–democratic,
psychological–value–oriented forming moments of the entire society and its
nucleus focus in this objective.  Dictate of the global economy, which we start to
feel already, should not overshadow realization of our own national goals in the
economy as well as culture, education, health and social care spheres.  Strategic
management on all levels could advantageously and effectively support
maintenance of the necessary balance between development of these spheres and
international cooperation. In my opinion, solely by efficient use of the available
priorities of Lithuania, i.e., the country’s geographical position, benefiting from
possibilities as a maritime and transit country, markets and raw material resources
of the East, Western technologies and very high human potential of this country,
i.e., high competence level of our researchers and scientists and skills of trained
youth, by developing high technology manufacturing, Lithuania would
successfully joint the world processes, guarantee  the development of new quality
society and would avoid the burden  of globalization consequences. However, it
is necessary to comprehend and be able to realize these processes.
In the current phase, more focus should be given to the problems of purposeful
transformation of Lithuanian economy, analysis of factors determining success
of transformation process, preconditions, objectives, consequences, as well as
problems related to integration into the European Union. Successful process of
economical transformation largely influences possibilities of economic potential
development, strengthening of worldwide competitiveness of individual
companies (K. Prunskienė, 2000, p. 97).
It is obvious that taking business social ecological responsibility mostly depends
on macro environment and if macro environment is not demanding, business
and state takes the obligations much slower. It is problematic to formulate the
state’s goals hierarchy in terms of methodology.  Yet, here it is possible to discern
several distinct things: the state’s goals are external and internal.  In terms of the
strategic management methodology, which goals – external or internal – are
dominant under normal conditions of external environment and internal
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environment activity do not raise any doubts. In this aspect, the crucial problem
is compatibility of internal and external environments or compatibility of internal
and external goals. In respect to the state, most probable, it is problems of
compatibility of policies and continuity. Deeper analysis of the state can
predetermine weak places of state’s social ecological responsibility and potential
decisions, which can be applied for regional scale. The problems are much more
evident than the ways of their solution. It is very difficult to foresee strategic
decisions, orientated to the elimination of these problems.
Though global problems in separate regions reveal themselves not in the same
way, the problem basket, forming the context of global crisis, is marked out.
Armament competition is named as the first problem. Armament expenditures
are not effective and can’t be justified. They are useful as far as they contribute to
guarantee national security, but very often the increase of these expenditures cause
analogical action of other countries. The entire burden is laid on economy, business
and household. Another actual problem of globalisation crisis is the gap between
developing and developed countries and the growth of this gap, which especially
revealed during the development of the main world processes (information,
globalization, influence groups). As it was stated (I. B. Bestužev–Lada, 1998), after
the transfer from colonial world political structure, the difference between the
economies of the developing and developed countries was named as “several
times”. Later it was “some tens times”, at present moment the fixed gap is “some
hundreds times”. The most urgent question in the developing countries is not the
question about the influence of global processes, but the question about starvation.
The problems of common welfare and ecology, the stability of the environment
are also the part of the mentioned problem basket. The distribution of goods and
services, transport balance, extraction of the recourses necessary for life should
go with environment’s stability. The problems of atmosphere, water, soil, radial,
chemical, noise and thermal pollution of the environment in the developed
countries are solved more or less successfully. Modern technologies and rational
economical processes are used for this purpose. At the same time there are simple
no recourses to solve these problems in the developing countries.
The goals for changes
The first step is forecasting future problems context with the help of extrapola-
tion and modeling. One should be able to apply this forecast for the increase of
the effectiveness of strategic management decisions. Effective strategic manage-
ment decisions should lead to the goals of new quality. These goals make the
essential prerequisites to transfer to alternative development of civilization and
to avoid possible global crisis, which includes not only world’s ecology, but also
the threat of war and national prosperity.
The first goal – is low energetics. Energetic recourses of the world are not limit-
less. The attempts to use alternative, renewing energy sources were not leading
to real solutions.  There is the statement, that if developing countries reach USA
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:40115
Antanas Bosas116
level in mineral resources usage, the world recourses of oil would finish after
seven years, gas– after five years and coal – after eighteen years. The same or
similar numbers are given in different studies, analyzing the questions of ener-
getics. But the statement, that with today’s rates of technical development   after
240 years people will consume more energy, than comes from the Sun to the Earth,
is even more interesting. These numbers evidently show, that the solution of en-
ergy problems is hidden not in the search of alternative energy sources, but in
low level of energy usage.
The second goal is high stability. Here the balances of global, regional and local
transport, distribution of goods, trade, demography, ecology, dwelling places,
etc. are meant.  The absence of balances unavoidably causes ineffectiveness, irra-
tional usage of the recourses, striving for balance, which is based on aggressive-
ness. The inhabitants of developing countries legally and illegally try to immi-
grate to developed countries. At the same time high rate of birth is certified in the
developing countries, which makes the solution of such problems as unemploy-
ment, poverty and welfare even more difficult. Striving for stability is based on
the system, the main goal of which is to propose optimal decisions, seeking for
social progress, economical growth and coordination of social stability, trying to
satisfy the needs of present and future generations. When economy is not able to
satisfy the bigger part of social needs, the point is reached, when ecological argu-
ments are considered to be of little value. The balance between satisfying the
needs and preserving the environment is lost in such a situation.  The implemen-
tation of this goal becomes more difficult because people can’t be managed as
energy.
The third goal is ecological cleanness. The absence of ecological cleanness can cause
harm not only to fauna and flora.  If it is possible to strengthen business competi-
tiveness using more effectively the resources, so the absence of ecological clean-
ness can completely destroy the possibilities of entire states to compete.  Just the
consequences will quite soon “move” from environment dimension to social one
and then economy will suffer the immense stress of social care expenses.
It will be impossible to implement any from upper mentioned goals if people
don’t understand their importance. This is where the fourth, may be the most
important goal – new quality of education, comes from. If it were possible in the
educational institutions of different levels to form the system of values for young
generation, the constituent part of which is the responsibility for society and en-
vironment, people, who started to live independently, would feel themselves as
not only the members of the society, but also as the part of the environment.  It
would be a weighty step towards moving away the global crisis, as “modus oper-
andi” of such people of course would be oriented to rational usage of the re-
courses, other priority directions of social ecological responsibility.
Named new quality goals should be implemented on the basis of essentially
new principles. In 1995 Rome’s club formulated one of such principles, which
should help to answer most of strategic management questions. The main idea of
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the principle, which is known as “Factor 4” is the following: it is possible to reach
two times bigger result using two times smaller recourses. There were attempts
to substantiate this statement by concrete examples (E. U. Weizsäcker, A. B. Lovins,
H. L. Lovins, 1996). The increase of natural recourses’ effectiveness by four times
is especially urgent for those countries, where environment protection manage-
ment systems and cleaner technologies are not introduced, where there are no
traditions of saving recourses. Number 4 is based on empyreal research: it was
proved that such increase of effectiveness could be reached integrating the most
new achievements of management, technologies and other sciences. The neces-
sity of systematic attitude is emphasized.  It is necessary to take into account not
only direct consequences of the implementation of decisions made, but the influ-
ence upon the other elements of the system as organization. It would be difficult
to disagree – the advantages of systematic thinking convinced everybody long
time ago.  But real implementation demands to change the direction of techno-
logical progress. The efficiency of the recourses should be equally important as
labour efficiency, which was highly emphasized earlier. Finally, using two times
less recourse unavoidably includes the concept of human recourses. How many
people will stay unemployed if to satisfy two times bigger demand we shall need
much less workers, applying the principles of “Factor 4” on a planet scale? Here
we can only once again remember the conception of “future shock”. In this case
the changes, that are about to happen, are unavoidable. So it is possible only to
forecast their consequences, try to avoid negative and maximally use positive
ones.
There naturally appears a question, which should be discussed: in which
countries – developed or developing the application of this principle could find
more favourable ground? There are several opinions on this question.  One of
them states, that it is more effective to instil the technologies, based on the principle
of “Factor 4”, than to reorganize functioning enterprises. This is why it is easier to
do that in the developing countries. On the other hand, it is possible to refer to
another opinion, that usage of novelties in the developing countries is always
related to the problem of their rejection, related to the inertness of thinking, lack
of qualification, values and priorities conflicting with the reasons of novelties.
Trying to evaluate the weight of the arguments of these contradicting opinions
properly, to check their validity it is necessary to make the tests, which shouldn’t
be limited only with the analysis of general tendencies.  It should be urgent enough
research, enabling to foresee the installation scenarios of more effective
technologies and possible problems in post–soviet countries as well, Lithuanian
included.
As during the industrial revolution, so in this stage of increasing efficiency the
states, which will be able to adapt to the changes as quickly and effectively as
possible, will acquire competitive advantages. It is possible to foresee that the
rest countries will have serious economical and social problems; the gap between
developed and developing countries will increase even more. But will “the far
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away” countries avoid social. Economical and ecological shock caused by global
processes? Of course not! They will only have to face fewer negative consequences
for a certain period of time. Previously urgent questions “Is the start given
already?”, “Are there any states which are ready, which have gathered full speed
for the leap?”, “May be the leap is done already, but we do not see its consequences
yet?” become meaningless in this context. The author’s opinion is that “ a spoon
of tar in the world’s barrel of honey” will not become a “bowl of tar” if all the
states of the world understand that they are connected with unbreakable
connections in this durable process.
Conclusions
Only separate economical – financial goals of production and service development
of the states are not able to guarantee effective world’s evolution; present and
future quality of society’s evolution suffer from such one–sidedness, deep
contradictions appear in social and ecological spheres.
If the changes of global socio – economical system and separate regions are not
managed purposefully the world can very quickly come to “future shock” –
especially undesirable and catastrophic results as in surrounding environment,
so in business and social structures.
Social and ecological responsibility of business mostly depends on business
macro environment. Global problems growing into crisis in separate regions
manifest themselves not in the same way, thus the scales of social–ecological
responsibility can differ in tens and hundreds times.
Systematic approach allows seeking for the goals of evolution quality and at
the same time coordinating optimally economical – financial and growing
competition goals with ecological and social goals of macro system. In this way it
is possible to include organically social and ecological responsibility into new
evolution quality system.
Globalization obliterates boundaries between the state’s internal and external
activity spheres, between domestic and foreign policy. Worldwide global
processes, trends and flows are becoming development vectors of any national
economy in economic, social, political, financial, manufacturing and other spheres.
Strategists of national expansion and development process should take and
evaluate the said fact.
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Globalization and Changes: a Lithuanian Case
Ligita Šimanskienė
Introduction
Today, in order to guarantee the global peace and to promote welfare, to dissemi-
nate information on science and technology innovations and to solve environ-
mental problems we need a bigger institution than a national state, which is not
able to solve the most urgent problems of humankind; such problems are no lon-
ger within control of one national state. However this does not mean that
a national state has became obsolete. Central Europe is a region already well inte-
grated with the EU in terms of trade (A. H. Dawson, R. Fawn (eds.), 2002). It is
becoming more strongly connected via investment, when a business culture is
fast approaching the diversity that can be found also in the West. But the legacy
of communism has left national economic structures with shortcomings that only
time and investment can correct. The progress of science and technologies stimu-
lated social, economic and political changes. Globalization and the development
of technologies incite the expansion of competitive environment. National diver-
sities, the values dominating in the national culture – these are the factors domi-
nating the level of competitiveness (D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, J. Perraton,
2002).
A major challenge facing organizations is to manage change effectively. When
organizations fail to change in necessity ways, the costs of that failure may be
quite high. All organizations exist in a changing environment (the globalization
process also) and are them constantly changing. And the question arises: what is
happened when fail all country politic system? What is happened when we don’t
pay any attention to cultural differences? Lithuania has a lot of problems (of course
and possibilities) after the restoration of Independent. And we have a problem if
a frequent case of mechanical adjustment of western business forms and methods
in managing staff, paying no attention to important national Lithuanian values,
personal characteristics is the cause of social conflicts and the performance doesn’t
correspond the desired level. It goes without saying that the processes of trans-
formation in the society directed towards democracy and progress stimulate the
application of modern management theories in managing organization
(L. Šimanskienė, 2004a). This problem existed when we talk about managerial
styles too. What is the impact of cultural diversities on different styles of manage-
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ment? How to define such impact? Does the difference in understanding the is-
sue exist in different countries? Striving for constant improvement in organisation,
for its profitable work and for creation of environment where all its employees
would feel involved, would see their future and the sense of the life, it’s inevi-
table to have a leader of organisation who could be able to consolidate interests of
all employees for achieving of organisational goals. The leader can realise his/
her mission only when he/she has certain specific personal qualities (A. Seilius,
2003). And now we describe researches on typical Lithuanian features and per-
sonal qualities needed for managers in the context of globalization.
Globalization: cultural point of view
Globalization has different meanings to different people. Globalization is a con-
cept which is describing the ever–intensifying networks of cross–border human
interaction (A. Hoogvelt, 1997). This definition perceives globalization in terms
of increased human interactions across the globe. A similar and yet broader defi-
nition of globalization incorporating sociological dimensions is conceived by
Giddens (J. Saee, 2004) in which he portrays globalization in the following fash-
ion: globalization can be defined as the intensification of worldwide social rela-
tions which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are by events
occurring many miles away and vice versa. A more radical definition of global-
ization sees (J. Saee, 2004)  “globalization as a process that is characterized by
awareness of global challenges; the global economy, legal system, culture, and
infrastructure; and the global recognition and acceptance of human rights such as
equality of opportunity, and freedom of thought and expression”.
In the same vein, M. Waters (1995) proffers a sociological definition of global-
ization in which he argues that “globalization is a social process in which the
constrains of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which
people become increasingly aware that they are receding”. Z. Bauman (2002) as-
serts that in fact processes of globalization cause lots of problems: in the world
where capital has lost its permanent abode and national governments have nearly
lost control over financial flood, the greater leverage of economic policy isn’t func-
tioning any more. The image of global confusion most probably reflects new un-
derstanding (it has lost its complicity but that wasn’t necessarily determined by
the sudden end of blocks policy) that things which seemed to be under firm con-
trol or at least “technical control”, in fact are spontaneous and accidental. The
author gives the following definition of the globalization idea; the world matters
are indeterminate, without control and laissez–faire. Cultural–historical peculiari-
ties, two different cultural opinions based on historical formulation form the ba-
sis to assimilate and adapt both Western and Eastern ideas and values, thus be-
coming the “intermediary” between the East and the West. R. Kazlauskas (1993)
emphasized that the nation’s political state and development perspectives are
determined by outside and inside factors. The first belong to the entire complex
of international relations based on treaties (co–ordinate) or compulsion (subordi-
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nate) bonds. The form of the second group factors consists of free inward deci-
sion of every nation to choose the most acceptable form of political regime. D. Held,
A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt, J. Perraton (2002) introduced three types of arguments
for a large–scale discussion about the foundation and importance of cultural glo-
balization. Hyper – globalists describe or predict homogenization based on popular
American culture. Others support those remaining sceptical and emphasizing
the instability of global culture and compare it with national cultures having firm,
even increasing geopolitical contradictions in cultural differences of the main world
civilization. Those who support transform–nationalistic position describe the
mixture and nations as the phenomenon which forms cultural hybrids and the
new nets of global cultures.
J. Tomlinson (2002) emphasizes that in the global world national cultural iden-
tities remain resistant and important. The author states that the remains of na-
tional obstacles for global cosmopolitan identities to arise even because those iden-
tities fully occupy people’s cultural imagination and broaden outlook. At the same
time the author emphasizes that perhaps globalization won’t create entire global
culture according to a certain, historically unique model of national cultures.
However, having accepted this as a distinctive feature, it might turn out that there
are means of estimation of global cultural identity. B. Melnikas (2002) says that
“conversion” of global spaces into new qualitative states found in these spaces
and processes have the tendency to acquire new qualities appearing on the new
scale due to their characteristic changes. Processes of this kind also predetermine
formulation of new forms of such spaces and processes which means that these
spaces and processes in certain periods of development or certain stages of devel-
opment might transform into new spaces and new processes. L. Šimanskienė
(2002a), L. Šimanskienė, V. Venckutė, E. Župerkienė (2003) turned their attention
to the fact that managers should know their subordinates well and especially pay
attention to their nationalities. In their opinion, representatives of every nation
have certain features of their character, and only being aware of them, it is pos-
sible to effectively motivate an employee. In order to manage the organization
successfully, it is necessary to form and cherish the organization culture.
R. D. Lewis (1999), D. I. Jung and B. J. Avolio (1999) made investigations in the
influence of management styles in group performance. The results proved that
the same style of management might be realized in different ways which make
a different effect on motivation and activity of individuals who represent various
cultural groups. P. Žukauskas (2000), who studied the ideas of various authors
about possibilities of penetrating into different markets, states that the means of
actions which might seem effective in one country might appear ineffective in
another. The arguments are convinced by differences which lie in cultural and
living standards of certain countries. P. Zakarevičius (1998) also emphasized that
little attention is being paid to investigations of natural features. It is necessary to
prepare suggestions, recommendations, methodology, with the help of which it
might be possible to change, improve the cosmopolitan management system in
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the way possible to make positive evaluation and eliminate negative national
features. S. Shane, S. Venkataraman, I. MacMillan (1995) defined that national
culture has the direct influence towards organizations cultures as well. They as-
serted that international corporations have more chances to compete than home
organizations because they operate in the diverse environment which makes them
look for means insuring competition. They also emphasized that it is not permit-
ted to export strategies of one country into another without having checked if
they fit that national environment. This fact has to be taken into consideration;
otherwise the attempts might become ineffective. Therefore it is important to re-
alize the existing differences and to use them in business development. G. Hofstede
(1992) who investigated organizations cultures formulated four main models of
values: the distance authority, attempts to avoid in determination, individualism
and collectivism, manhood and womanhood.  The author proved that organiza-
tion cultures together with national and ethical factors are related. He makes
a detailed analysis of the typology of organizations cultures on the basis of the
national–state characteristics .The background of the typologies is made of valu-
able orientations and faith which are characteristic to certain national–state units
and ethnic groups. It has the direct relations with the religion existing in that
society. L. E. Palich, P. W. Hom, R. W. Griffeth (1995) asserted that the famous
Japanese productivity comes from the experience of Japanese enterprises, maxi-
mizing the loyalty to their company. The results of the research stimulated inter-
national investigation in the field of identity. In order to achieve loyalty to their
motherland, some famous companies praise the company’s values with the aim
to remind the employees of their organization’s citizenship. It has been proved
by the research that the usual culture of partnership doesn’t alone restrict and
destroy various national cultural identities which exist in multinational compa-
nies. K. Fladmoe–Lindquist, L. L. Jacque (1995) say that in order to develop trade
and services in other cultures, firstly it is necessary to be aware of differences
which exist among foreign customers and be able to co–operate with employees
in overseas subsidiaries, having in mind that the ethics of their work exists in
different language , mentality, and cultural traditions. It has also been found out
that the greater the cultural distance between the headquarters and the newly
established subsidiary in another country is, the greater is the uncertainty in rela-
tions with overseas employees. S. H. Park, G. W. Ungson (1997) investigated the
loyalty of members of international organizations. The most popular explanation
says that international companies are less stable and the employees are less loyal
than of those working for national companies. However, the research carried out
by authors couldn’t prove it. On the contrary, due to cultural differences these
companies used to work more efficiently because the best features of cultural
differences had taken over. The employees were stimulated mostly by economic
motivation, common actions and close relationship.
According to D. Ulčinskaitė (ed., 2000) the social consequences caused by the
process of globalization might be estimated in three ways. Firstly, increasing
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employment due to abundance of general working power. Because of increasing
working power in well developed countries, the general number of vacancies,
working hours and employees having full–time jobs is constantly going down.
Secondly, the constantly growing scale of deformation of economic activity due
to general integration of finance, economics and culture as well as the rising in-
ternational working power mobility: more people have temporary, forbidden jobs
and avoid paying taxes. Thirdly, because of the importance of increasing global
problems in controlling inside matters, tendencies ought to be taken into consid-
eration from outside, which cause a gap between inner demands spoken up by
the society and the government which finds it necessary to combine it with the
requirements from outside. R. Lekavičienė (2000) states that different cultures
create different situations for individuals and take them into systems of different
pressure. Culture also brings difference into subjective interpretation of reality. It
is said that the objective of cross–cultural research shouldn’t the attempt to ex-
plain the phenomenon of culture but it should prove that culture influences the
behaviors and the way of thinking of an individual. V. Liubinienė (2002) accord-
ing to Berger singles out four features of modernization:
1. Disappearance of small, traditional communities.
2. Appearance of possibilities for personal choice. Due the influence of traditions,
people are becoming unrestricted.
3. Variety of faiths.
4. Thoughts about future.
Advantages and Disadvantages for Lithuania after accession to EU
V. Legkauskas (2000) makes forecasts on the future of Lithuanians in the Euro-
pean Union. The EU declares solidarity of all cultures, equal opportunities for
representatives of all cultures, promotes internal communication and co–opera-
tion. If this idyllic picture comes true, after fifty years the saying “I am Lithuanian”
would have the same meaning for a speaker as today it has the saying “I was born
in Šančiai” (one of Lithuanian’s cities region), but this is not bad. Perhaps, the
author specified rather too short period of time needed to assimilate us in the
common mix of European nations. I would dare to state that this process will
certainly take much more time, besides it is difficult to believe the idyllic picture
will come true.
Therefore it is highly important not only to prepare for the accession in Lithuania
itself, but also to carry active work abroad promoting the advantages of the coun-
try. In further development of this topic we present some thoughts of T. W. Schultz
(1998). The author noted that countries with high–income level while assisting
countries with low–income level in increasing the efficiency of their economies
make some serious mistakes. Firstly –investments to human capital are not given
priority, i.e. there are no investments in the education on school and higher lev-
els, in the health care of society. People of low–income countries themselves give
priority to the aforementioned issues in spite of their limited income. At present
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there is some emphasis on certain disputed issues in education system: too many
specialist are prepared, too many certain professions are duplicated in a number
of universities. Are these accusations reasonable? To my opinion, it is not. The
more educated the nation, the better its economic achievements. Even if at present
we cannot boost of high economic results, the more educated people we shall
have, the higher probability that they would establish companies and create new
jobs. The educated people are more flexible, they better understand the needs of
organisation and as employees they mostly are initiative, seeking for knowledge
and tolerant to diversities in opinions. By the way, instability and social conflicts
in the society has caused the formation of new attitudes towards relationships
among generations and towards the place of young people themselves in the
social structure (K. Šerpetis, 1997). When there are no conflicts in the develop-
ment of society, the younger generation rather consistently intercepts the values,
beliefs and stereotypes of the elder generation, i.e. respective level of mutual iden-
tification is achieved and sustained. However during the time of changes such
inter–relation is broken. That is why the questions arise. Will the young genera-
tion facing the rapidly changing social roles be able to take the niche designed for
it in the social structure? What will be the ideals and values of the contemporary
generation entering the stage of independent life in the state and society of
Lithuania, what prospects for self–realization will the society create for the gen-
eration that is brought up in the dynamic and dramatic conditions of contradic-
tive socialisation? I am convinced that it depends on the inter–relation between
the individuality of the young generation itself and the maturity of social envi-
ronment, which each time creates a unique social and historical situation. As
A. Kazlauskienė (2001) notes, there is fear that such phenomena as “brain leak”
from the country will become a serious problem in the process of Lithuania’s
integration to the Western structures. When Lithuania is a member of the EU and
Lithuania’s citizens are granted the same rights of free employment in the EU
member countries as the citizens of the EU, this could cause the vast wave of
emigration of highly qualified (and not only) labour force from Lithuania. The
number of emigrants will depend on the fact whether people perceive the signs
of positive changes in economic–social situation of their country in the nearest
future.
On the basis of the provided data we can formulate the following advantages
and disadvantages for Lithuania after the accession.
Advantages: open borders for free movement of goods and services; free move-
ment of people; national safety; economic necessity: the more open the country,
the higher economic benefits; cheaper goods because of competition – in benefit
for a consumer; broader attitude towards different phenomena, better knowl-
edge about other European nations and countries; investments into the economy
of Lithuania;
Disadvantages: emigration of qualified Lithuanian specialists to other EU coun-
tries; precedence of the EU laws could have a negative impact on Lithuania (e.g.
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closing of Ignalina power plant); threat to loose the national identity; higher com-
petition for local companies; possible use of Lithuania only as a new market; pos-
sible use of Lithuania as a source of qualified but cheap (comparing to the EU)
labour force; problems due to religious, cultural differences; disdainful attitude
of economically strong  EU countries towards Lithuania.
On the other hand, the EU will gain the following advantages and disadvan-
tages because of Lithuania’s accession:
Advantages: a new market; qualified labour force; more enthusiastic, dexter-
ous people; Lithuania as a “bridge” to the Eastern markets; increased territory of
the EU – a competitive advantage against the USA and Eastern countries.
Disadvantages: the EU will support the weaker economy of Lithuania; pos-
sible problems due to religious, cultural differences; high emigration of unem-
ployed people to the EU countries, which should spend more on social benefits;
possible increase of the crime level.
Theoretical Analysis of Lithuanian Features
B. Melnikas (1998) emphasizes that Lithuania is as a bridge “East – West”. The
transformation process here is constant, because the understanding of the phe-
nomenon should be related not only with dissemination of Western experiences,
models and standards Eastward but also with the opposite–direction process when
the Eastern traditions influence the transformation process. As we endeavor to
identify the character of the Lithuanian nation through customs and traditions,
perception and view of the world, we come to understand what it meant to be
Lithuanian. By adopting and preserving the basic cultural traits of the Lithuanian
nation we can remain Lithuanian even while residing far from Lithuania, our
country of origin. But the most important national mark of a Lithuanian does not
simply know Lithuanian customs and traditions (through this helps to remain
close to one’s origins). A Lithuanian’s most vital national trait is the Lithuanian
language. A. D. Smith (1995) singles out two meanings of “nation”: nation as
a “natural” historical unit and nation as a concrete political objective or ideal. In
fact ethnic nation is an old historical and cultural derivative often religious in its
origin and always closely linked with the rhythm of “nature”. It evokes the feel-
ing of collective ethnocentrism: attachment to one’s ethnic–genetic community,
settled in its area. The other is of a modern, revolutionary and unique rationalis-
tic concept – a political ideal characteristic to the century of enormous changes.
Thus the national feeling becomes ideology competing with other ideologies and
being different due to its strong relationship with its “in–born” collective emo-
tion which has always enriched ethnic association. Only mature national culture
is corresponding the requirements of present civilization can deal with social pres-
sures. Lithuanian countryside and climate also influence personality and charac-
ter of a Lithuanian (L. Šimanskienė, 2002b). Slow temper, melancholia might be
explained by the lack of the sunlight. Short period of vegetation forces a farmer to
stay at home, dream and trust the destiny. Lithuanians don’t belong to the nation
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of sailors nevertheless, they live by the sea. Sad and nostalgic songs are common
to lowlanders. Lithuanian nation developed as the nation of woods and forests.
Lithuanian countryside brings the feeling of lyrics; the nature awakes feelings,
not thoughts. Lithuanian lack of enthusiasm, laziness might be explained as
a peculiar relation with nature, climate, and the stereotype formed by the land-
scape which provides with characteristic features of dreaminess, lyricism, sad-
ness. R. Račiūnaitė (2002) discovered that the autonomy in rural community was
not of great importance. There prevailed the dominant opinion in the nation’s
consciousnesses that only those are happy and successful who keep to the cus-
toms of their ancestors. In the centre of the village community there is the family
and the characteristic restraint seeking for material wealth not for oneself, but to
help others. They were one of the most distinct cultural features developed in the
family of a traditional rural community. According to S. Juknevičius (2002) re-
search these are already altered values, because only 29% of respondents in 1999
said that public work brings benefit in comparison to 47% of respondents in 1990.
D. Mitrikas and others (1999) notes that the Western ideology pays greater atten-
tion to one’s personal needs–health, creative work, travels and money and the
values of the state, nation and family have been losing their  importance. While
the highest values in the world outlook of Lithuanians are: family, wealth, money,
moral virtues, wisdom, belief in God, nation; and the least important are: the
state, travels, and friends. According to D. Ulčinskaitė and others (2000) Lithuanian
people lack the following features: self–independence, honesty, the sense of re-
sponsibility, ability to socialize, efficiency, ability to form a team and manage it,
initiative, ability to gather and facts and make analysis, ability to co–ordinate
performance. R. D. Lewis (2002) says, that Lithuanians have the following spe-
cific features like hospitality, family, honesty, love of nature, saving national iden-
tity, romanticism. L. Šalčiuvienė, V. Auruškevičienė (2002) revealed ten the most
important cultural values characteristic to all ethnic groups in Lithuania: family
orientation, social recognition, risk, power and wealth, freedom, physical and
financial security, job, health, true friendship, flexibility. S. Juknevičius’ (2002)
investigations revealed attitude towards competition: competition is positive as
it stimulates people to work better and search for new ideas. 56% of respondents
approve of the idea, though the numbers of approving respondents have dimin-
ished in comparison to 73% of respondents in 1990. This shows that people still
are afraid of taking responsibility for their lives and prefer waiting for the help
from the government as if the statesmen can and must be responsible for
everyone’s material welfare. According to the results of the research payment is
the most valued at work in contrast to responsibility which is the least valued
among Lithuanian people. In author’s opinion our working conscientiousness in
fact is of the same level like farmers and handicraftsmen. L. Šimanskienė’s (2002a)
research demonstrated that responsibility is one of the most typical features of
a Lithuanian. Why are the results of research different? It might be explained by
having asked respondents different questions with different formulation of ques-
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tions. However, the lack of initiative is demonstrated by all results of research.  It
is rather complicated to compare the data because of different methods and meth-
odology used; respondents were given different lists of values which are partly
similar and it rather complicated to make detailed comparison, nevertheless the
general values are nearly the same.
The Research on Typical Features of a Lithuanian
While planning the research it is necessary to choose the minimal number of re-
spondents in order to make statistically reliable conclusions. Selective methods
are based on the probability theory, though it is impossible to avoid mistakes in
selection, unless all the population took part in the research. In scientific research
95% is reliable (K. Kardelis, 1997). As Ch. Nachmias, D. Nachmias (1985) main-
tain, it takes 385 respondents from 10,000 people in order to get 5% of false an-
swers. So we have inquired 1050 respondents to our opinion this is a sufficient
number to get reliable answers (out of general number of population of 3,490,800
according to the data of 2001). The data of the questionnaire was processed by
SPSS (Special Package for Social Science) program with the one–factorial dispersal
analysis (ANOVA) because variables are evaluated applying the rating scale.
To carry out the research, the questionnaire was prepared with the list of typi-
cal features according to the ones singled out by other authors. The respondents
were asked to rate them by the rate of importance where 7 points went to the
most typical feature while 1 point – to the least typical one. In the formulated
questions both positive and negative alternatives for the answers were given.
1050 respondents filled in the questionnaire (in 2003): 396 men and 654 women of
different age, background and position. 13 respondents – with unfinished sec-
ondary education, 121 – with the secondary education, 88 – secondary education
and profession, 312 – higher education, 486 – with university diploma and 30
students. By age: 39 – under 20; 343 – from 21 to 30; 353 – from 31 to 40; 209 – from
41 to 50; 90 – from 51 to 60; and 16 older than 61. By position at work: 72 – top
managers, 157 – middle managers, 103 – lower rank managers; 508 – professional
workers; 83 – technicians, 83 – workers, 39 – unqualified workers.
The general opinion about typical Lithuanian features is described in table 1
(it is shown average of answers, 1 – least important features, 7 – very important
features).
There is no big difference among average points in assessment. The respon-
dents mentioned the dominating features of jealousy (5.8), diligence (5.7),
hospitability (5.7). Showing initiative (3.8) and trust in others (3.9) seem to be the
least important. The most trusted by Lithuanians institutions are – the Church
and mass media – both of them are only news–providers however have no real
authority to make decisions and impact the contemporary life. The most
Lithuanians mistrust all institutions having real authority (L. Šimanskienė, 2004a).
Mistrusting people are less active. In tables 2 and 3 we can see some information
about Lithuanians point of view to other nationalities in organizations.
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Table 1. Typical Features of a Lithuanian
Source: L. Šimanskienė, 2004a,  p. 92.
Table 2. Is a work collective multinational?
Source: L. Šimanskienė, 2004b, p. 45.
How we see the most respondents answers are positive and they haven’t no-
ticed any problems (79.87 percent) in communication with other nationals. 13.21
percent of respondents mentioned that diversities help to solve problems in orga-
nizations. In summarizing all research: those who deepen knowledge like com-
peting, they think that Lithuania does not need examples of other countries and
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that informal communication is not a necessary feature of leaders – to this group
belong persons who have already acquired education, who work in lower posi-
tions and younger people. Those who value traditions prefer working in groups,
are proud of their country, do not see any problems in working with foreigners
and are of elder age. Those who like working in groups are more punctual, expect
informal communication with leaders, and are proud of their country and like
working with foreigners. Those who are in lower positions are more punctual.
Those who are in higher positions have better education and younger persons
more like competing; also men more value competition. Those who like informal
communicating with leaders love their country do not see any problems in work-
ing with foreigners. Those who are proud of their country think that Lithuania
needs other country’s example (mostly mentioned Scandinavia, especially Swe-
den, also Ireland) and are more willing to work with people of other nationalities.
Men more tend to think that Lithuania needs other country’s example. There are
more young people working in multi–national collectives and they have no com-
munication problems. Younger men more tend to answer that there are no com-
munication problems. All this interpretation can be presented from the other side
(e.g. those who are not engaged in additional learning do not consider competi-
tion as positive; they more prefer informal communication of leaders, etc.).
Research on attitudes towards the personal qualities necessary
for managers/leaders
Another research was performed with task to know personal qualities necessary
for managers in 2004. 1034 respondents filled in the questionnaire: 378 men and
654 women. By position at work the respondents ranged as follows: the top–level
managers accounted for 5.59% of the total number of respondents, middle–level
managers – 17.76%, lower level managers – 14.80%, specialists – 45.72%, techni-
cians – 8.88%, workers – 7.24%. By age the respondents ranged as follows: under
21 year – 4.28%, from 21 to 30 years – 29.61%, from 31 to 40 years – 29.28%, from
41 to 50 years – 27.63%, from 51 to 60 years – 8.55%, over 60 years – 0.66%. In order
to asses what qualities are necessary for a manager, leader of a team, the ques-
tionnaire was prepared with the list of twenty different qualities; the respondents
were asked to rate them, where 1 point went to the least needed quality and
Table 3. Communication problems with other nationals
Source: L. Šimanskienė, 2004b, p. 46.
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7 points – to the most needed one. The average values of the results are: the re-
spondents defined obedience (3.53) and conservativeness (3.49) as the least needed
qualities for a manager, leader while the most needed qualities ranged as follow-
ing: ability to make decisions (6.87), to solve conflict situations (6.81), skill of be-
ing organized (6.75), skill of understanding other people (6.72), responsibility (6.70),
showing initiative (3.53). If to compare the results with the qualities necessary for
a manager, leader as defined by R. Blake, J. Mouton (1985) – showing initiative,
ability to handle information, solving of conflict situations, critical analysis – we
can see that these results are quite similar. These are the qualities which respon-
dents mentioned as the most needed for a effective manager, i.e. exactly these
qualities except: critical analysis, being informed and defending his/her own
opinion – as the latter were not included into the questionnaire. Perhaps inde-
pendence, which was rated at 6.29 points is a similar feature and can in part cor-
respond to defending of his/her own opinion; and responsibility (6.70) – to criti-
cal analysis. So, in part we can state that respondents’ answers about effective
management correspond to managerial elements defined by R. Blake, J. Mouton
(1985).
The results are also interesting, if to compare differences in respondents’ atti-
tude towards traditions and changes depending on their posts. It should be em-
phasized that managers/leaders must react to changes in their environment, they
should be interested in looking for and implementing of innovations, however in
order to avoid mistakes it is necessary to learn from the past. Experience should
help in striving for innovations but should not turn into the source of conserva-
tiveness.
So, as we see in table 4 – even 94.12 % of the top level manager maintain that
when assessing changes it is necessary to look at the past; no one top level man-
ager was only on behalf of traditions. Workers (13.64) and lower level managers
(13.33) are the most conservative while middle level managers (20.37) and techni-
Table 4. What do you value more?
Source: Šimanskienė, L. 2005, p. 32.
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cians (25.93) more tend to emphasise only changes. The analysis shows that simi-
lar results should have been expected, because it is the top level managers who
form the strategic trend of organisation therefore the broader approach is seen by
them as more important, while the lower level personnel are performers who
want clear regulations and as a rule when facing changes they fear uncertainty;
although results of the research in general are excellent as representatives of all
positions have positive attitude towards changes and even 77.27 workers and
73.33 of lower level managers state that when  assessing changes it is necessary to
look at the past.
Other investigated issue was how respondents’ attitudes towards competi-
tion differ due to their position; it is showed in table 5. The results show that even
88.24 % of top–level managers maintain that competition is necessary as it is
a driver of development while technicians (29.63%) and specialists (23.74%) who
maintained that hate pressure, were the most unsatisfied with competitive rela-
tions. Competition as a driving factor was rated with the highest points by the
top–level (88.24%) and middle level managers – these results show that manag-
ers/leaders of organisations understands necessity of looking for ways leading
to better performance and allowing for more effective decisions. It is worth to
mention an interesting fact that workers’ attitude towards competition is more
favourable (63.64%) comparing to the attitude of lower level managers, techni-
cians, specialists. It seems the middle–level managers are more afraid of loosing
their jobs.
Table 5. Competition
Competition is necessary as it is
a driver of development I hate pressure
It’s OK, when
I am not involved
Top level manager 88.24 5.88 5.88
Middle level manager 77.78 16.67 5.56
Lower level manager 60.00 20.00 20.00
Specialist 61.15 23.74 15.11
Technician 48.15 29.63 22.22
Worker 63.64 18.18 18.18
Source: Šimanskienė, L. 2005, p. 33.
Conclusions
The globalization process taking place in the world with all their advantages and
disadvantages determine sudden geopolitical, economical, technological and cul-
tural changes, which inevitably affect European Union, the economical space of
which Lithuania intends to integrate in, so at the same time they affect Lithuania
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as well. Due to the changes in the thinking the independence will be increasing as
people will gain more self–confidence and expect less from the state; having
learned the EU rules the niches for adaptation will be found; broader attitude
towards the world both in cultural and in economic aspects will be formed; equal
opportunities both in the EU countries and Lithuania will come into effect. The
results of the opinion pools carried out in the course of research have shown that
the major part of respondents are in favour of Lithuania’s accession to the EU.
However there is a small part of respondents who are doubting or against the
accession to the EU and they give the following arguments: rules imposed by
bureaucrats from Brussels; we are not needed there; nobody waits for us; we are
useful only as a new market; too high, sometimes even unrealistic requirements,
e.g. closure of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, are demanded; Lithuania has not
been prepared for the different changes and still needs more time to prepare;
after a decade since accession Lithuania ceases to exist, we shall live as in a sla-
very. Those who are in favour of the accession give the following reasons that to
their opinion have benefits for Lithuania: the economic situation of the country
will improve as producers will be able to sell freely their production in other
countries; more jobs will be created because of more foreign investors; opportu-
nity of legal work in other countries; ensured security of the country; having joined
the forces we are useful for all countries; more serious attitude towards Lithuania
(as a “successful” country).
There is no big difference among average points in assessment. The respon-
dents mentioned the dominating features of jealousy (5.8), diligence (5.7),
hospitability (5.7). Showing initiative (3.8) and trust in other (3.9) seem to be least
important. The institutions trusted by Lithuanians the most are – the Church and
mass–media – both of them are only news–providers however have no real au-
thority to make decisions and impact the contemporary life. The most Lithuanians
mistrust all institutions having real authority. Mistrusting people are less active.
The results have shown that obedience and conservativeness were attributed
by the respondents to the least needed manager’s/leader’s qualities while the
most needed ones were: ability to take decisions, to solve conflict situations, skill
of being organized, skill of understanding other people, responsibility, showing
of initiative. If to compare the results with the qualities necessary for a manager,
leader as defined by R. Blake, J. Mouton (1985) – showing initiative, ability to
handle information, solving of conflict situations, standing for his/her own opin-
ion, ability to make decisions, critical analysis – it was corroborated that in part
we can maintain that the respondents’ answers about effective management cor-
respond to managerial elements as defined by R. Blake, J. Mouton (1985).
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The systemic transformation as well as globalisation and Europe’s unification
prop up most of the changes in contemporary Poland. Both conditions and conse-
quences of the changes are so diversified and complex that they are a welcome
subject to scientific deliberation in various aspects. One of these aspects is
multidisciplinary research on threats to public safety.
This article aims at putting forward and conducting an orderly review of hy-
pothesises regarding the impact of the systemic transformation in its political,
economic and social aspects on environmental, social, medical and technical threats
to public safety.
The systemic transformation in Poland
The systemic transformation is considered to be a set of processes and changes
occurring in politics, economy and society as a result of the collapse of the Soviet
Blok in the late eighties of the 20th century (M. Dutkowski, T. Michalski, I. Sagan,
T. Stryjakiewicz, 1999).
The systemic transformation takes on the following:
1. Political aspects:
a. the collapse of the Soviet Blok and decay of the totalitarian political system;
the expansion of NATO and EU;
b. setting up the foundations of a democratic state of law.
2. Economic aspects:
a. restoration of private property and market economy;
b. monetary, financial, tax, banking and insurance reforms;
c. free flow of capital, goods and technology.
3. Social aspects:
a. free flow of people and information; intensification of international con-
tacts among people and organisations;
b. popularisation of consumer lifestyle;
c. increase of unemployment , poverty and social stratification.
Natalia Sypion–Dutkowska
Impact of the Systemic Transformation on the Threats
to Public Safety in Poland
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Threats to public safety
All human beings and every society are surrounded by and are constantly aware
of threats which come both from the environment and anthropogenic sources.
Threats to our life are in fact as old as mankind. It all started with threats stemming
from forces of nature which up to this day constitute dangers we cannot eradicate
or fully resist.
If certain areas of social and public life are taken into account then the following
kinds of threats are distinguished: economic, internal, psychological (psychosocial),
ecological and military (P. Tyrała, 1999).
Development of civilisation, particularly with respect to industrial activities,
has brought about threats generated by man whose conduct and products are far
from being ideal. We are surrounded by various and numerous threats mainly of
unknown and most often of low incidence whose effects can hardly be predicted.
Moreover, we often seem to be unaware of some of them. There is no such
phenomenon as a ‘zero risk’ activity. Production, processing, transport, storage –
are only a few examples of activities which are never 100% safe. Development of
civilisation, new technologies, settlement in areas previously considered unsafe
(e.g. river valleys) make society still more and more exposed to risk (J. Żurek,
1999). Threats, as understood above, tend to concentrate in big cities (T. Horlick–
Jones, 1995).
The feeling of safety seems to be the opposite of the feeling in living under
threat (J. Spiechowicz, 2000). Roughly saying, safety is felt when the level of threat
is relatively low. To show it in graphic terms the following conceptual model
may be drawn (Figure 1):
feeling of safety feeling of threat
reality
Figure 1. Model of safety awareness
Source: P. Tyrała, 2000 (Rys. 1, p. 12).
This is a typical model suitable for sociological research. It is based on a segment
of straight line where the both ends denote two contrary phenomena. A person
subject to research shows the point which subjectively describes the reality at the
moment of carrying out the research. The statement is not stable as the whole
process of denoting safety awareness is dynamic.
Simple lists of threats lead to complex sets of dangers which do not allow of an
explicit answer stating which feeling of threat should be considered to be one
consistent entity. On the contrary, threat awareness incorporates numerous threats
coming out of different phenomena existing around us. The problem a researcher
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faces consists in lack of possibility of drawing up a consistent and closed list of
existing threats. Therefore any list of threats should be regarded as open
(cf. U. Beck, 2000). A general classification of threats may include:
1. Extraordinary threats – unexpected events or situations which develop
dynamically posing danger to people’s health or life. Such events require
immediate counteractions with the use of all measures available to effectively
protect human health and life as well as property and the environment.
2. Constant threats – dangerous events or situations which exist continuously
(e.g. ozone ‘hole’) or which can be expected within a yearly cycle (e.g. severe
winter) or which occur as a result of planned events (e.g. mass public events),
bringing negative effect on human health or life, property or the environment.
They require counteractions with the use of locally available measures
remaining at local governments’ disposal to effectively protect human health
and life, property and the environment.
An additional classification of threats distinguishes four types of threats in relation
to their sources. According to this classification there are environmental, social,
medical and technical threats. Only those threats which occur in Poland have
been taken into account. Range of incidence, length of duration, frequency,
negative effects on people, infrastructure and the environment, cost of
counteractions and other accompanying threats have been defined for each of the
types of threats. Duration and frequency have not been defined for constant threats
as they are, by definition, permanent.
Local threats in Poland are counteracted at the level of gminas as the cost of
compensation for damage or inflicted loss is not significant. Poviats and
voivodships are responsible for covering destructive effects of threats on a regional
scale. They have average financial means at their disposal. Threats on a national
scale require big financial means provided by the national budget whereas threats
of international importance are dealt with by international funds capable of
covering losses on a huge scale.
Environmental threats
Threats to human life, health or property which are caused by the environment
are called environmental threats. They result from extreme or catastrophic natural
phenomena or from improper exploitation of natural resources. For the use of
this paper the author has made an assumption that extraordinary environmental
threats occurring in Poland may be restricted to floods, severe winter and strong
wind (see A. Lisowski, 1993). Their scale varies from local to national. Their
duration is also varied; the bigger they are the longer they last. They occur rarely
but are dangerous for people and their property. They cause less damage to the
environment than to infrastructure. Another extraordinary threat is severe winter.
Its consequences can be done away with in a few months. The cost of
counteractions is either small or average (Table 1).
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Constant environmental threats
This paper analyses the following threats: acid rain, excessive or improper use of
chemicals in agriculture, the ozone ‘hole’ and global warming (green house effect).
Most often they appear to be global problems and therefore cause serious damage
to the environment lasting for many years. The ozone ‘hole’ is the most dangerous
to people as it inflicts numerous diseases which can hardly be cured, epidemic
diseases and allergies (A. Aase, G. Bentham, 1994). The green house effect results
in the greatest number of indirect threats which can hardly be avoided (Table 2).
Social threats
Social threats affect human health, life and property as well as the environment.
They are cause by negative effects exerted by people on other people or public
organisations. These threats may come in the form of:
• well organised or spontaneous social groups using terror;
• permanent disorder of economic and political balance.
For the purpose of this paper the following phenomena are regarded as
extraordinary social threats: wars, terrorism, riots mutinies, economic and political
crises. Their territorial range and frequency are varied and therefore they may
Effects exerted onEnvironmental
threats Scale/range Duration Frequency People Infrastructure The
environment
Duration
of effects
Cost of
removal/
counteraction
Accompanying
threats
Flood from local to
national
weeks/
months several
times a
year
heavy toll
of life,
light
casualties,
disturbanc
e of daily
routines
damage to
buildings and
technical
infrastructure,
possessions
and property,
farms
(equipment and
livestock)
damage and
destruction to
crops,
water
contamination
a few
years to
several
years
average/big land slides,
robberies,
epidemic
diseases,
areas of
poverty
Severe
winter
regional/
national
months twice a
year/a few
years
heavy toll
of life,
disturbanc
e of daily
routines
dislocation of
air,
land and water
traffic;
increased
number of road
accidents,
disturbance to
technical,
social, service
and production
infrastructure
freezing of
crops, plants,
forests
months small/
average
flood,
building
catastrophe
Strong wind local/
regional
Hours several
times a
year
heavy toll
of life,
light
casualties,
disturbanc
e of daily
routines
breakdown of
mains
electricity,
damage done
to buildings
and property,
dislocation of
traffic,
malfunctioning
of technical
and service
infrastructure
degradation of
trees
months/
several
years
small/
average
building
catastrophe
Table 1. Extraordinary environmental threats
Source: author’s own analysis.
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take on different values – from the smallest to the greatest. These are considerable
groups of people rather than property that find themselves at the receiving end
of negative effects. Casualties are frequent in such cases. If infrastructure suffers
then living conditions of the population deteriorate. Extraordinary social threats
rarely affect the environment. They occur relatively rarely in small areas (Table 3).
Constant social threats include: areas of permanent underdevelopment and
poverty, crime, mass public events. They occur on a small scale, except for crime
which takes place all over the world. Permanent social threats greatly affect social
welfare, deteriorate health conditions, lead to social bonds being weakened or
broken. Sometimes social threats result in death. Living conditions get worse
mainly due to property devastation and environment degradation (Table 4).
Medical threats
Medical threats affect human health and life. They come from diseases (espe-
cially epidemic diseases) road accidents and poisoning. They require special medi-
cal treatment.
Only severe cases of epidemic diseases are considered to be extraordinary
medical threats. They are characterized by rapid development. The occur very
Table 2. Constant environmental threats
Source: author’s own analysis.
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Table 3. Extraordinary social threats
Source: author’s own analysis.
Source: author’s own analysis.
Table 4. Constant social threats
rarely while their territorial range varies from local to international. The length of
time varies from very short to very long. Although a great number of people are
involved suffering serious health consequences including loss of life, the envi-
ronment is left intact. Duration of effects is insignificant. They are not accompa-
nied by other threats (Table 5).
An assumption has been made that constant medical threats include:
‘benevolent’ epidemic diseases, road and industrial accidents, poisoning, cancer,
AIDS, inflammation of the liver (type A, B, C, D), allergies and diseases of blood
circulation. Their range varies from local to international. They mainly affect health,
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being fatal in some cases. They hardly have any impact on the environment or
local infrastructure. Their duration is of considerable importance as they may last
as long as several years. Cost of compensation varies from very low to extremely
high. Medical threats are the only ones that are not accompanied by any other
threats (Table 6).
Technical threats
Technical threats affect human health, life and property and the environment.
They are caused by industrial processes, basic and supplementary products and
their improper use as well as excessive use of technical devices, machinery and
materials.
Extraordinary technical threats include: a breakdown of a nuclear power station,
leak of sewage, gas or poisoning substance, maritime and aeroplane catastrophes
Source: author’s own analysis.
Table 5. Extraordinary medical threats
Effects inflicted on
Medical threats Scale/range people infrastructure the
environment
Duration of
effects
Cost of
counteraction
Accompanying
threats
‘Benevolent’
epidemic
diseases
from local to
international
short-term disease
of a great number
of people
– – from a few weeks
to a few months
small –
Road accidents from local to
international
casualties,
disability, death
damage or
loss of
property
– from a few days
to a few years
from small to
big
–
Poisoning from local to
international
short-term disease,
death
– – weeks/months small –
Cancer national long-term disease,
disease
– – from a few years
to several years
or decades
very big –
AIDS from local to
international
long-term disease,
death
infected
patients need
isolation
– from a few years
to several years
or decades
big –
Inflammation
of liver
(type A,B,C,D)
national long-term disease – – from a few years
to a few decades
big –
Allergies international long-term disease special
facilities and
equipment of
buildings
changes to
green areas
of towns
from a few years
to a few decades
very big –
Circulatory
diseases
national long-term disease,
death
– – from a few years
to a few decades
very big –
Table 6. Constant medical threats
Source: author’s own analysis.
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explosions and building catastrophes. These threats are most often single events
which occur rarely and last for a short time. They cause very serious damage to
all kinds of infrastructure including various buildings. Extraordinary technical
threats disrupt people’s daily routines (e.g. evacuation), cause diseases and heavy
casualties. They also result in the environment being seriously damaged, mainly
by contamination of the local area. Except for a nuclear power station breakdown
all other technical threats cause damage which do not last long. Usually financial
measures remaining at the disposal of gminas, poviats and voivodships are
sufficient to counteract such threats (Table 7).
Constant technical threats dealt with in this paper include emissions
contaminating surface and ground water receptacles, atmosphere as well as smog,
noise, vibrations caused by traffic, harmful emissions from legal and illegal rubbish
dumps, electromagnetic radiation caused by electricity mains, broadcasting
stations and other radioactive substances and devices.
Effects inflicted on
Technical
threats
Scale/
range
Duration Frequency
people infrastructure
the
environment
Duration
of effects
Cost of
counteraction
Accompanying
threats
Nuclear
power station
breakdown
international hours/
days
once
a few
years
radiotoxemia,
disability,
epidemic
diseases,
heavy
casualties
destruction
of buildings,
partial
damage and
irradiation of
infrastructure
long lasting
irradiation of
the area,
contamination
of water,
desertification
up to
hundreds
of years
very big fires
Sewage or
gas
emissions as
a result of
mains
breakdown
local/
regional
hours/
days
a few
times
a year
poisoning,
heavy
casualties
damage to
production
facilities,
buildings
and
infrastructure
contamination
of local areas
from a few
weeks to
a few
years
small/average explosion
Leak or
release of
toxic
substances
local hours a few
times
a year
poisoning,
heavy
casualties
contamination
of buildings
and
infrastructure
contamination
of local areas
from a few
years to
a few
decades
small/average fire/explosion
Maritime
catastrophe
local hours a few
times
a year
light and
heavy
casualties
destruction
of the
property
local
contamination
of the sea
weeks/
months
small/average emissions
contaminating
surface water
Aeroplane
catastrophe
local hours a few
times
a year
light and
heavy
casualties
damage to
property,
dislocation of
air traffic
contamination
of atmosphere
weeks/
months
small/average fire, explosion
Fire local hours a few
times
a year
disruption of
daily
routines,
evacuation,
light and
heavy
casualties
damage to
property,
buildings
and
infrastructure
degradation of
the surrounding
area
months/
years
small explosion,
building
catastrophe
Building
catastrophe
local/
regional
hours once
a few
years
light and
heavy
casualties
destruction
of property,
buildings
and
infrastructure
– weeks/
months
from small to
big
fire, explosion,
flood
Explosion local hours a few
times
a year
disruption to
daily
routines,
evacuation,
light and
heavy
casualties
destruction
of property,
buildings
and
infrastructure
degradation of
the surrounding
area
monhts/
years
small fire,
building
catastrophe
Table 7. Extraordinary technical threats
Source: author’s own analysis.
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Table 8. Constant technical threats
Source: author’s own analysis.
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Constant technical threats lead to a general deterioration of living conditions,
mainly by degradation of the environment and damage done to infrastructure.
Almost all technical threats exert a harmful effect on human health contributing
to its deterioration. Constant technical threats usually bring about lasting effects.
It may take from a few to more than ten years to get rid of them. Constant techni-
cal threats are accompanied by many other threats (Table 8).
An attempt at recapitulation
While working on this paper an assumption was made that the systemic transfor-
mation in Poland may have either positive or negative influence on public safety.
Positive influence is understood as soothing and toning down all threats and
their effects whereas negative influence is meant as generating and worsening
them. The systemic transformation in Poland has brought about various forms
and procedures of ‘the state of law’ on local, national and international levels.
They are accompanied by information being made more accessible to the public,
Threats soothed and toned downAspects of the systemic
transformation Environmental Social Medical Technical
POLITICS
Collapse of the Soviet Blok.
Decay of totalitarian system.
Expansion of NATO and EU
acid rain,
ozone ‘hole’,
global warming
nuclear power station
breakdown,
harmful damage
emissions,
traffic catastrophe
Introduction of democratic
state of law
acid rain war, terrorism, riots,
mutinies, economic
and political crises,
crime
permanent harmful
emissions affecting
the environment
ECONOMY
Restoration of private
property and market
economy
acid rain and
chemicals used in
agriculture
political and economic
crises
permanent harmful
emissions affecting
the environment
Monetary, financial, tax,
banking and insurance
reforms
flood political and economic
crises
permanent harmful
emissions affecting
the environment
Free flow of capital, goods
and technology
flood,
severe winter,
acid rain,
ozone ‘hole’,
green house effect
political and economic
crises
road accidents,
cancer, AIDS,
allergies
nuclear power station
breakdown,
harmful emissions
affecting environment,
damage emissions,
catastrophes
SOCIETY
Free flow of people and
information, intensification of
international contacts among
people and organisations
flood wars cancer,
AIDS,
allergies,
circulatory diseases
nuclear power station
breakdown
Spreading consumer lifestyle
Increase of unemployment,
poverty and stratification of
society
Source: author’s own analysis.
Table  9. Soothing and toning down impact of the systemic transformation on threats to public
safety in Poland
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Source: author’s own analysis.
Aspects of the systemic
transformation Generated and worsened threats
Environmental Social Medical Technical
POLITICS
Collapse of the Soviet Blok.
Decay of totalitarian system.
Expansion of NATO and EU
wars, terrorism, riots,
mutinies, crime
Introduction of democratic
state of law
riots, mutinies, mass
public events
ECONOMY
Restoration of private
property and market
economy
areas of permanent
underdevelopment
and pover ty
Monetary, financial, tax,
banking and insurance
reforms
Free flow of capital, goods
and technology
terrorism, crime
SOCIETY
Free flow of people and
information, intensification of
international contacts among
people and organisations
terrorism, crime ‘acute’ and ‘benevolent’
epidemics, AIDS
Spreading consumer lifestyle acid rain, ozone ‘hole’,
global warming
terrorism, crime road accidents, cancer,
AIDS, allergies,
circulatory disorders
permanent
emissions
affecting the
environment
Increase of unemployment,
poverty and stratification of
society
terrorism, crime liver inflammation
(type A,B,C,D),
poisoning
Table 10. Generating and worsening impact of the systemic transformation on public safety
in Poland
increase of social awareness and widespread application of modern and safer
technology.
The systemic transformation in Poland affects positively all groups of threats
in all their aspects (Table 9). The most positive phenomena have resulted from
capital, goods and technology freely coming into the country. All four groups of
positive aspects show here tangible links and connections. Aftereffects of the trans-
formation have the most soothing impact on environmental phenomena, espe-
cially on flood threats. Multifunctional impact of the transformation have mostly
affected social threats, such as economic and political crises, so typical of ‘real
socialism’ before the collapse of the previous system in Poland. Thanks to free
exchange of technology and goods, not to mention improved international rela-
tions, it is possible to more effectively fight social diseases. As far as technical
threats are concerned limiting a possibility of a nuclear power station breakdown
seems to be the most significant.
The systemic transformation in Poland also contributes to generating new
threats to public safety as well as worsening old ones (Table 10). These threats are
mainly related to public matters which remain under the influence of various
transformation processes, such as local wars (as the threat of a global conflict has
recently been ruled out), terrorism and crime. Making consumer lifestyle more
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:40146
Impact of the Systemic Transformation on the Threats to Public Safety in Poland 147
common leads to an increase in all groups of threats, from global environmental
threats to intensification of social diseases.
The characteristics of the impact of transformation processes on different threats
is to some extent ambiguous and therefore cannot be defined as entirely good or
bad. However, the character and extent of positive effects undoubtedly prevail
over bad effects. Citizens of the countries carrying out transformation processes
live in a safer world. At the same time one should remember that, paradoxically
enough, the general feeling is quite the opposite. Most people think that freedom
and democracy have brought about more risk than safety and peace.
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Introduction
The downfall of socialism in the Middle and Eastern Europe led in the last decade
to considerable socio–economic changes in numerous countries of the region.
Paving the way from Council for Mutual Economic Aid and Warsaw Treaty
Organization to the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization
is symbolic of such changes. Most of the countries which belonged to the former
socialist bloc are now members of NATO. Several countries are going to join the
European Union in 2004. This turn of events in politics and economic conditions
required a costly transformation of the economy.
Poland is one of the leaders of this process. The basic transformation of the
economy was carried out in the early 90s including intensive privatization of the
state–owned firms and development of enterprise. The above mentioned changes
laid the foundations of the dynamic economic growth of the mid 90s. An attempt
to reform the public administration and public service sectors was made in the
late 90s. Further reforms concerning administrative division of the country, so-
cial insurance, education and health service were implemented.
The structural reform of the economy and a new geopolitical situation necessi-
tated radical changes in the army. Low budgets allocated to the army year by
year contributed to further reductions of the stuff in all kinds of military forces.
At the same time the Polish Army had to be reorganised and dislocated as a result
of joining the NATO. These changes have been carried out according to the gov-
ernment legislation called “The programme of restructuring and technical
modernisation of military forces in the years 2001–2006”. The programme, among
other things, predicts the complete closure of 71 military garrisons.
The main aim of this paper is to define sensitivity of local socio–economic
systems to the process of garrison closures. This sensitivity is a derivative of the
current economic situation of a given area, quality of human resources, distance
to big cities as well as the importance of a garrison for the local economy which
can be defined on the basis of relations between the size of the existing military
units and the size of the entire local economy (this relation can be defined, for
example, as a relation of the number of workplaces in both entities).
Maciej Tarkowski
Territorial Differentiation of Sensitivity to Socio-Economic
Results Following Garrison Closures in Poland
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Functioning of a military garrison in a given area has a few socio–economic
implications. Military units, to function properly, employ a certain number of
professional soldiers and civil workers in peacetime. The remuneration paid to
the employees, especially to officers, is more or less the same or exceeds the aver-
age pay in the country. Consequently, a military garrison contributes to an in-
crease in demand for goods and services on a local market which may lead to
creating new jobs in the civil sector. In smaller towns officers are part of local
intellectual elite affecting functioning of the whole local society. Another aspect
of a garrison’s functioning, which may be conducive to the development of
a local economy, is securing a garrison’s social and economic needs. The type of
services required by garrisons is very often rendered by the civil sector – includ-
ing even security services offered by specialised civil firms.
Garrison’s functioning is not free from negative economic effects. First of all
they result from garrisons being unable to introduce more effective ways of func-
tioning. This problem refers mainly to areas which are attractive for civil inves-
tors but there are not many garrisons undergoing closure programmes on poten-
tially attractive sites.
The analysis which has been carried out shows considerable differences among
analysed areas with regard to their demographic situation, labour market, eco-
nomic activity, educational potential, standard of living and communications ac-
cessibility.
Such varied features of the areas which have been or are being left by the
armed forces lead to different results of garrison closures. In some towns the
results of closures are hardly noticeable whereas in other towns bring about seri-
ous social and economic problems. For example, attractive areas left by military
troops are likely to be used for economic purposes, thus bringing economic ben-
efits to the local community – local authorities without such favourable circum-
stances may not find any financial means to activate leftover areas.
Methodology of research
In order to assess sensitivity of local socio–economic systems to the process of
garrison closures particular spacial units were assigned to the selected types of
areas (J. J. Parysek, 1982). The research covered 67 gminas (part of administrative
division — urban and rural areas) belonging to 64 poviats (part of administrative
division). There are 71 garrisons located on these areas which are to be closed
down. The socio–economic situation was characterised with regard to closure
results as well as possible ways of their alleviation. The analysis of each spacial
unit covered six aspects: the demographic situation, labour market, economic
activity, educational potential, standard of living and communications accessibil-
ity. Each aspect included two or three features which could take three levels: low
(–1), average (0) and high (1).
Summarising indicators were also calculated for each economic aspect. In this
way a basis for a general indicator was formed to reflect an overall area’s degree
of sensitivity to the loss of jobs and income connected with garrison closures.
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Table 1. Typology criteria of areas with regard to sensitivity to garrison closures (data for 1999)
Source: author’s own analysis.
Indicators, except for communications accessibility, were analysed on two lev-
els: poviat level and gmina level. It depended on how a certain aspect spacially
affected each area. Local labour market issues or secondary education issues are
typical of poviat, whereas, for example, local governments’ finances refer mainly
to gminas (Table 1).
The above presented features give information about a wide range of circum-
stances affecting the socio–economic situation in areas of garrison closures.
A demographic situation is characterised by population growth, balance of natu-
ral increase in population and balance of migration. In the long term the demo-
graphic situation informs how attractive setting down in a given area is and how
individual inhabitants pursue their careers and life goals. Areas without pros-
pects for the future force young people to flee. A negative balance of migration
results, in the long term, in a population ageing and a decrease in natural popula-
tion growth. A level of urbanisation shows the importance of a local urban centre
and indirectly informs about its labour market, namely how closely it is related to
non–agricultural activity, how diversified it is and how much it is concentrated.
The factual level of unemployment directly characterises a labour market. The
rate of unemployment indicates the severity of the situation for a given labour
market. The number of the unemployed people shows the scale of the problem in
case it is solved from outside. For example, in a scarcely populated rural area
with a high unemployment rate the actual number of unemployed persons may
be far less than in a big city where the unemployment rate is low. In the first case
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building a new plant or closing down another one may seriously affect the level
of unemployment, whereas in the second case such a change may remain unno-
ticeable.
Economic activity measured by means of the number of self–employed per-
sons per 10 thousand inhabitants shows not only a climate of enterprise but also
indicates the accumulation of experience of local people. Loss of jobs defines the
local labour market’s sensitivity to such changes.
Educational potential throws light on possibilities of acquiring new qualifica-
tions.
Institutional potential is measured by the number of secondary schools. Schools
of adult education have not been taken into account, as they are principally based
on the existing school network. Organizing schools for adults requires certain
structural changes rather than setting up new schools from scratch. Another im-
portant indicator is the number of schools providing their students with certifi-
cates of secondary education. This kind of education leads to a broader choice of
vocational options. At present, basic vocational education (training) does not of-
fer much choice. Most of those who finish this kind of education become unem-
ployed.
Standard of living reflects the income which is a share of the state tax revenues
coming from individual citizens. Another indicator used in this paper is a level of
poverty measured by the size of social security expenditures. These indicators
show how closures of garrisons may affect local budgets.
Communications accessibility reflects possibilities of using, first of all, educa-
tional services of a higher degree and better developed labour markets in big
cities, particularly in the biggest cities subject to processes which are typical of
metropolises (Kraków, Łódź, Poznań, Trójmiasto, Warszawa, Wrocław) (B. Jało-
wiecki, 2000).
Types of areas
As a result of applying a typology based on the above mentioned criteria ten
types of areas of different sensitivity to garrison closures have been sorted out.
The least sensitive areas represent type A whereas the most sensitive have been
classified as type I (Figure 1).
Only two areas fall under type A – gmina Komprachcice in poviat opolski and
Grodzisk Mazowiecki (Figure 1). Four out of six aspects show high level of devel-
opment and the other two are of average level (Table 2). Both areas are marked
out by a good labour market situation and a high standard of living. The overall
situation in these areas promises bright prospects for socio–economic develop-
ment.
Grodzisk Mazowiecki as part of Warsaw agglomeration enjoys a good demo-
graphic situation and communications accessibility. It is attractive as a settlement
area and at the same time takes advantage of all facilities offered by a capital city
with metropolitan qualities, i. e. Warsaw.
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Figure 1. Typology of areas with regard to sensitivity to socio–economic consequences
of garrison closures
Source: author’s own analysis based on Central Statistical Office data.
Gmina Demographic
situation
Labour
market
Economic
activity
Educational
potential
Standard
of living
Communications
accessibility Total
Grodzisk
Mazowiecki
1 1 0 0 1 1 4
Komprachcice 0 1 1 1 1 0 4
Table 2. Socio–economic characteristics of Type A areas
Source: author’s own analysis based on Central Statistical Office data.
Komprachcice also takes advantage of lying close to a big city and regional
capital. It is, however, situated far away from metropolitan centres. Its attractive-
ness includes good educational potential and a high level of economic activity.
A combination of these two aspects makes this area very flexible in terms of adapt-
ing itself to changing circumstances and economic needs.
Type B is made up of five areas: city of Bochnia, Góra Kalwaria, gmina Puck,
Rudniki and Władysławowo (Figure 1). All these areas are marked out by a high
level of development of three aspects and an average level of development of the
other three aspects. All of them are characterized by a good situation on their
labour markets. Other qualities of these areas are good communications accessi-
bility (except for Rudniki which has a big educational potential) and a high stan-
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Gmina Demographic
situation
Labour
market
Economic
activity
Educational
potential
Standard
of living
Communications
accessibility Total
Bochnia city 0 1 0 0 1 1 3
Rudniki 0 1 0 1 1 0 3
Góra Kalwaria 0 1 0 0 1 1 3
Puck (rural area) 0 1 0 0 1 1 3
W³adys³awowo 0 1 1 0 0 1 3
Table 3. Socio–economic characteristics of Type B areas
Source: author’s own analysis based on Central Statistical Office data.
Gmina Demographic
situation
Labour
market
Economic
activity
Educational
p otential
Standard
of living
Communications
accessibility Total
Jelenia
Góra
0 0 1 1 0 0 2
Mielno 1 -1 1 1 0 0 2
Table 4. Socio–economic characteristics of Type C areas
Source: author’s own analysis based on Central Statistical Office data.
dard of living (except for Władysławowo which enjoys a high level of economic
activity) (Table 3).
A stable development of the analysed areas is secured by the co–existence of
the three aspects mentioned above. A good communications accessibility of some
areas to metropolises is particularly important as the metropolitan centres gener-
ate a big and diversified market as well as a wide educational offer. This, in turn,
conditions a good situation on local labour markets which influence the standard
of living of local inhabitants.
Type C is also made up of five areas: Jelenia Góra, Marki, Mielno, Strzegom,
Zawiercie (Figure 1). These areas are characterized by a high level of develop-
ment of three aspects, average level of two aspects and a low level of one aspect.
An alternative assessment indicates a high level of development of two aspects
and an average level of the remaining four aspects (Table 4).
As the table shows three areas: Jelenia Góra, Mielno and Strzegom, enjoy
a high level of economic activity and big educational potential. However, Mielno
and Strzegom face a difficult situation on their labour markets. In Strzegom’s
case its advantageous location in relation to Wrocław cannot offset a difficult labour
market. A high standard of living and good communications accessibility are ad-
vantages of Marki and Zawiercie. Although Marki is a part of Warsaw agglom-
eration, it has little educational potential. Marki’s inhabitants use Warsaw’s edu-
cational facilities.
A well–developed secondary school system combined with a high economic
activity make an area’s socio–economic infrastructure sufficiently flexible. A good
communications accessibility and a high standard of living are usually a result of
the influence big metropolitan cities draw on such towns.
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Table 5. Socio–economic characteristics of Type D areas
Source: author’s own analysis based on Central Statistical Office data.
Type D is represented by 11 areas (Figure 1). It is typical of them to have one
more highly developed aspect in comparison with the number of aspects weakly
developed. Eight areas have two well–developed aspects and one aspect of low
development (Table 5).
Well–developed aspects include: educational potential (4 cases), standard of
living (4 cases), labour market (3 cases) and economic activity (3 cases).
Four areas in the discussed group are characterized by a low educational po-
tential and three other areas show a low level of communications accessibility.
The above table shows three areas of an average level of five aspects. These
areas present only one highly developed aspect. In Gryfin’s and Oleśnica’s cases
it is communications accessibility whereas Łeba prides itself on economic activity
based mainly on tourism. Areas of the discussed type are characterised by a rather
stable socio–economic situation. Even if one aspect is unfavourable there are two
other aspects which are advantageous and may prevent the bad situation from
worsening. All areas of type D do not show any difficulties within their labour
markets. A low standard of living affects only one town.
Type E is the most common. It includes 15 areas (Figure 1). It is typical of them
to have as many well–developed aspects as poorly developed. Three variants
may be distinguished within the described situation (Table 6):
• all aspects are average in terms of development;
• there is one weak and one strong aspect;
• there are two weak aspects and two strong aspects.
Three cities, i.e. Garwolin, Goleniów and Turek, show average values for each of
the aspects.
The second variant embraces eight areas. In three cases the most developed
feature is communications accessibility, while in another three cases standard of
living is in the lead. The two remaining cases have an average level of educa-
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Source: author’s own analysis based on Central Statistical Office data.
Table 6. Socio–economic characteristics of Type E areas
tional potential. Three out of eight cases are characterised by a low level of com-
munications accessibility.
The third variant refers to four areas: Ustka (rural area), Włocławek (city),
Kostrzyn and Sulęcin. Włocławek and Ustka suffer from a difficult situation on
their labour markets and a poor standard of living. On the other hand these two
areas are economically very active and are supported by a high level of educa-
tional potential. Kostrzyn is also based on its educational potential as well as
economic activity. It has an average situation on its labour market but its commu-
nications accessibility is poor. Sulęcin has the same standard of living and educa-
tional potential as Ustka and Włocławek, but as far as their labuor markets and
economic activity are concerned, the situation is quite opposite – Ustka and
Włocławek show unfavourable labour market conditions and a high level of eco-
nomic activity.
Areas of this type reveal an average level of sensitivity to garrison closures. How-
ever, the situation they are in is diversified and requires individual approach to solve
their problems. Areas whose aspects are of average development display a wide
range of decisions to be taken and activities to be carried out. The problem lies in lack
of clear prerequisites for choosing an appropriate variant. As far as areas of diversi-
fied development of particular aspects are concerned ways of reaction are determined
by actual levels of resources which should be adroitly taken advantage of.
Type F is represented by 13 areas (Figure 1). All of them show one more ‘weak’
aspect in comparison with the number of ‘strong’ aspects. Each of ten areas have
five aspects of average development and one aspect of low level development. Poorly
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Table 7. Socio–economic characteristics of Type F areas
Gmina Demographic
situation
Labour
market
Economic
activity
Educational
potential
Standard
of living
Communications
accessibility Total
Dêbica city 0 0 0 0 0 -1
E³k city 0 -1 0 1 0
-1
-1 -1
Gniezno city 0 0 0 0 -1 0 -1
Œwieszyno 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1
Kozienice 0 0 0 -1 0 0 -1
M³awa 0 0 0 0 0 -1 -1
£ambinowice 0 0 0 0 0 -1
Ostrów
Wielkopolski
city
0
-1
-1 0 0 0 0 -1
Nowe Miasto -1 0 0 0 0 0 -1
Ujazd k.
Kêdzierzyna
0 1 -1 -1 0 0 -1
Dragacz 0 0 0 0 0 -1
Choczewo 0 0 0
-1
-1 -1 1 -1
¯ary city 0 0 0 0 0 11- -
Source: author’s own analysis based on Central Statistical Office data.
developed aspects are usually labour markets and educational potential (each of
them refers to four cases) and communications accessibility (3 cases) (Table 7).
Three areas include two ‘weak’ aspects and one ‘strong’ aspect. Ełk, for ex-
ample, has a developed educational potential, whereas Ujazd near Kędzierzyn
has developed its local labour market. Good communications accessibility is
a feature of Choczewo which lies near Tricity agglomeration.
Areas of this type represent almost average level of socio–economic develop-
ment. Unfortunately, those aspects which are poorly developed are most often
related to difficulties in finding a job or training unemployed inhabitants.
When making employees redundant is the case then new barriers arise forcing
them to look for suitable jobs possibly in a new profession.
Type G is represented by 8 areas (Figure 1). There are two more poorly devel-
oped aspects when compared with highly developed aspects. Six areas do not
show any well–developed aspects. In four of them labour markets and communi-
cations accessibility are in a difficult situation (Table 8).
Radzyń Podlaski has to cope with a difficult demographic situation and poorly
developed secondary education. Another area, gmina Zaklików, is marked by
a low standard of living of its inhabitants.
Two areas of the discussed type enjoy well–developed educational potential.
However, they reveal a low standard of living, poor communications accessibil-
ity and a difficult demographic situation (Ułęż) or troublesome labour market
(Szczecinek).
Seven out of eight areas of this type are located peripherally which makes
solving unemployment problems very difficult. Coping with the closure of a gar-
rison may only add to the existing problems. In case there is no external economic
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Table 8. Socio–economic characteristics of Type G areas
Gmina Demographic
situation
Labour
market
Economic
activity
Educational
potential
Standard
of living
Communications
accessibility Total
Bia³a Podlaska
city
0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -2
Nysa 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -2
Ostróda city 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -2
Radzyñ Podlaski
city
0 0 -1 0 0 -2
U³ê¿
-1
-1 0 0 1 -1 -2
Zaklików 0 0 0 0 -1 -2
Szczecinek
city
0 -1 0 1
-1
-1
-1 -1 -2
Szczytno (rural
area)
0 -1 0 0 0 -1 -2
Source: author’s own analysis based on Central Statistical Office data.
Gmina Demographic
situation
Labour
market
Economic
activity
Educational
potential
Standard
of living
Communications
accessibility Total
Trzebiatów 0 0 0 -1 -1 -3
Gubin city 0
-1
-1 0 0 -1 -1 -3
Mr¹gowo city 0 0 0 -1 -1 -3
Zambrów city 0 1 -1 -1 -1 -3
Okonek 0 0 0
-1
-1
-1 -1 -1 -3
Source: author’s own analysis based on Central Statistical Office data.
Table 9. Socio–economic characteristics of type H areas
aid coming from the state, regional authorities or private investors – local com-
munities may not manage the burden put on them.
Type H is represented by five areas (Figure 1) where socio–economic circum-
stances are bad with regard to three aspects (or four aspects, but in such a case
one of them is advantageous). All of the areas are characterized by poor commu-
nications accessibility and a low standard of living. Additionally, two areas are
marked by a high unemployment rate (Trzebiatowo, Gubin).
Another two areas have poor educational potential (Mrągowo, Okonek).
Zambrów, besides its poorly developed education, suffers from little economic
activity which remains in contrast with a relatively good situation on its labour
market (Table 9).
Areas of the described type constitute one more group of places whose en-
dogenic potential is far too insufficient to induce economic growth and alleviate
social shortcomings without a tangible external help. Gubin will soon lose its
border town significance as a difficult situation on German labour market is not
likely to raise local inhabitants’ standard of living. Considering Mrągowo’s situ-
ation it is worth noticing its two popular entertainment events attracting crowds
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Gmina Demographic
situation
Labour
market
Economic
activity
Educational
potential
Standard
of living
Communications
accessibility Total
Debrzyno 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -4
Rzeczenica 0 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 -4
Nurzec - Stacja -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -4
Source: author’s own analysis based on Central Statistical Office data.
Table 10. Socio–economic characteristics of type I areas
of tourists. These events are perhaps the only beneficial enterprises which are not
enough to enable Mrągowo to compete with other tourist centres of the region.
Trzebiatowo has a similar disadvantage of poor environmental conditions as it
lies between attractive Kołobrzeg and famous Międzyzdroje.
Type I comprises only three areas (Figure 1): Debrzyno and Rzeczenica (which
lie in Człuchowski poviat) and Nurzec – Stacja gmina (which lies in Siemiatycki
poviat). Debrzyno and Rzeczenica show an average demographic situation as
well as a middle–level economic activity. All other aspects are at a low level of
development.
The analysed areas are of peripheral location and therefore the settlement ac-
tion taken after 1945 brought poor results. Most of scarce jobs were created in
State Agricultural Farms (PGRs) which went under increasing unemployment
figures. A long distance to big urban centres and poorly developed infrastructure
deteriorate bad economic conditions. Education in the area seems to be one more
disadvantage, as it is still based on vocational training schools (Table 10).
One of Nurzec’s characteristics is a low level of development of all aspects
with the exception of its labour market which is in a good situation. It is con-
nected with the number of farms owned by single farmers and their families. This
number is bigger than the national average. The majority of such farms is capable
of meeting farmers’ basic economic needs. In this way formal unemployment
figures are relatively low and there is little chance of further urbanization of the
area. Consequently, there are no favourable conditions for private enterprise. The
area is of peripheral significance although it lies not far away from Warsaw. This
close proximity to the capital city causes a permanent outflow of young people
who find it easier to settle down in a big city rather than in rural areas.
The areas described above are counted among the poorest in Poland. Jobs have
always been scarce there, particularly in non–agricultural sectors. Most of the
exciting jobs have been connected with the public sector. Whether garrisons are
to be closed down or not, these areas need an external support. If not given any
help the majority of people who lose their jobs locally will have to look for work
in other areas.
Conclusions
According to the conducted analysis the socio–economic situation of the areas
where garrison closures take place is highly differentiated. Apart from areas ly-
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ing close to big cities and agglomerations with well–developed labour markets
and economic infrastructure there are other areas which have been able to keep
up their economies thanks to co–operation with local garrisons. The ongoing pro-
cess of garrison closures brings about numerous threats to local communities. If
socio–economic conditions are identified soon enough to undertake preventive
measures, then the discussed areas may be given a chance to succeed in tough
economic competition.
The severity of the effects of garrison closures does not depend on an area’s
sensitivity alone, but is also related to the scale of the closure. An area of an average
importance may hardly react to the closure of a regiment, whereas the liquidation
or shifting a brigade to a new place may cause effects comparable with the closure
of a small garrison located in a peripheral and economically neglected area.
Negative consequences of a garrison closure mainly result from two factors:
one is the socio–economic situation and the other one is the size of resources
under closure (number of jobs, the size of the site, infrastructure, broken co–op-
erative links, etc.). Lack of detailed information about the scale as well as limited
access to certain characteristics of closures made it necessary to divide garrisons
into three groups corresponding roughly to the size of a brigade, regiment and
sub –unit1 .
The most sensitive areas of types H and I may seriously react even to closures
of small garrisons. Such areas are usually of peripheral significance and are char-
acterized by difficult socio–economic conditions. They face serious problems con-
nected with creating new jobs or re–training workforce. Furthemore, they are not
attractive enough to find strategic investors.
Areas of types F and G are in a relatively better socio–economic situation than
the previous ones. However, they also suffer from shortage of jobs and poor edu-
cational infrastructure. Most of them are situated far away from big labour mar-
kets. Closures of garrisons of the size of regiments or bigger military units may
undermine local labour markets. As a result, garrison closures lead to a deteriora-
tion of socio–economic conditions.
Types D and E enjoy an average or slightly over–average socio–economic situ-
ation. Most of such areas do not have any serious problems related to labour
markets. Additionally, they have well–developed secondary education or have
easy access to relevant educational facilities. A few cases of economic effective-
ness have also been noted. These areas are sensitive only to closures of big garri-
sons – of the size of brigade.
The remaining areas are economically and socially strong enough to cope even
with closures of big garrisons. Their economic development is resistant to result-
ing changes. Most of such areas are in close proximity to big cities and offer
1 It does not matter if a closure concerns, for example, a brigade or another military unit. What really
matters is the number of lost jobs corresponding to a brigade, similar size of the infrastructure, etc.
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a high standard of living. Military units stationed there do not play a decisive role
in a local economy.
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The History of Năsăudului Land before and after 1989
Năsăudului Land points out to an ethnographical space by definition, a mental
space1 , to which man may belong through his structure of the mind (of what he
thinks and the way he thinks) and of his heart (through the way he “feels” every-
thing around him on a day to day basis).
In the building up of Năsăudului Land as a spatial entity, several factors have
intermingled: the natural, the historical, the administrative, the functional and
the mental one. The last two, in this row, are the most important. This is because,
although Năsăudului Land has been parted, in various periods, into distinct units,
the polarisation of the valleys by the Someşului Mare Corridor has been strong
and permanent at the mental, and, partially, at the economic and social levels
(e.g. the peoples’ unity during difficult events). So, the criteria we have taken into
account, when delimiting this region are the mental, the morphological, the ethno-
graphic, the ethnic, the language, the historical and the functional ones (e.g.
Năsăudului Land as a polarised region).
The cause of the limits’ flexibility, in time and space, is the appearance of the
political, social and economic changes that have determined the reorientation, through
adjustment, of the material and spiritual fluxes, thus resulting (a) new cultural
communions, as well as (b) the stability and fortifying of the old relations. Then,
due to a certain geographical determinism induced by morphology, the fluxes of
mass and interests have been always oriented towards the Someşului Mare Cor-
ridor. We may draw the conclusion that the natural and historical conditions have
been either favourable or imposed restrictions that have led to the individualising
of a space with specific material and spiritual features.
Oana–Ramona Ilovan
Năsăudului Land in “after – 1989” Romania:
Between Effervescence and Decline
1 “Romania is one of the few European countries where the special unit of language, practically with no
dialects, and spoken by an overwhelming population which exceeds 90%, covers such a great number of
territorial subdivisions, each with a distinct material and spiritual identity. Nevertheless, the common binder,
that is the language, did not hinder the separate development of these distinct and well–defined “lands”/
“countries”, situated on both sides of the Carpathian summits. Consequently, each human community of
these regions projected a peculiar and distinct image of the surrounding world, developed other laws, and
cherished different aspirations”. – P. Cocean, N. Cianga, 2000, p. 199.
makieta Michalski.p65 05-12-15, 19:40161
Oana–Ramona Ilovan162
The input–output relations, between the region and the neighbouring regional
systems, lead to the conclusion that Năsăudului Land is an open system, having
thus the possibility of creating and maintaining a status of dynamic equilibrium
– a self–reproductive system.
Past and Present in Năsăudului Land
Năsăudului Land appeared as a system, first, by offering a space with a certain
potential for ensuring peoples’ living, whose gravitation centre is the Someşului
Mare Valley.
The natural factors, defined as the basis that sustains the demographical com-
ponent and the settlements (the action and the interaction factor) have co–oper-
ated, that means a constructive action, to make this space permanently inhabited
by human communities that have individualised themselves through an original
mentality, of strong peoples, of survivors and winners. This type of mentality has
been induced by the functionality, in time, of this regional system, at the social
and economic levels.
The natural geographical potential has been exploited in an adaptive and bal-
anced manner by the human component, so that a traditional co–operation has
developed between the two components of the environment, which are obviously
interrelated. The anthropic premises (historical, social and economic factors) have
been characterised by favourability that conditioned the peoples’ settling, the di-
versification of the settlements and their affirmation and individualising through
specificity. Each of Năsăudului Land geographical environment’s components
has been an important factor in attracting the population. A demographical syn-
ergism has been present, where “the memory of the earth” (both of the places and
of the people) has built an easily recognisable cultural pattern.
Năsăudului Land, as a regional system, is the result of the unitary genetic evo-
lution of the people, a common historical evolution that is to be identified at the
level of delimiting the the “land” at the level of the peoples’ conscience, at the
level of the feeling of belonging to their places. The region has resulted during a
process during which the settlements have associated with one another into so-
cial, economic and political structures. Thus the “land” appears as a stock struc-
ture where the peoples’ spirituality, manifested into traditions, can be recognised
as original by the inhabitants of the neighbouring regions (Maramureşului Land,
Lăpuşului Land, and Dornelor Land). At the same time, Năsăudului Land has
manifested itself as a dynamic structure, where the internal and external interac-
tions have created strong cohesion, at all the levels where the Man–Nature rela-
tion manifests itself, as well as between the inhabitants of this regional commu-
nity.
Nature has printed its sign deeply in the heart and mind of the people of
Năsăudului Land. The harmony of the natural environment, doubled by the unity
of social, economic and ethnographical features has created Năsăudului Land
– a region where the material and spiritual features are combined and organically
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integrated. The peoples’ traditional occupations are agriculture (shepherding) and
forestry. The subsoil resources have supported the development of the mining
activities, these also contributing from the 13th century to attracting the popula-
tion to certain areas. Therefore, we may affirm that the natural resources and the
human activity have supported harmoniously the functioning of this system.
While creating the desirable profile of the region as a functional territorial sys-
tem, we have taken into account the following principles (P. Cocean, 2005, p. 147–
–149): the principle of the efficient exploitation and use of the local resources (both
the natural and the anthropic ones); the territorial equilibrium; the building up of
a functional regional system; the principle of the optimal connections to the
neighbouring territorial entities; the principle of the comparative advantage; the
ecological principle. Following this theoretical context and knowing the reality,
we have identified several polarising nuclei in Năsăudului Land (Figure 1). The
criteria we have taken into account are the cultural traditions and the social and
economic orientation, imposed during the historical evolution of the region.
According to the criterion of polarisation, while having in view the determin-
ing factors, such as the location of the schools, the location of the hospitals, of the
administrative offices, of the commercial units and the circulation of persons and
goods (J. Benedek, 2003, p. 151), one can surely notice that Năsăudului Land is
a region polarised by three urban centres: Năsăud (a rank I polarising centre),
Beclean (rank II), and Sângeorz–Băi (rank III).
The centrality of Năsăud town is determined by two conditions: (1) better in-
frastructure in comparison with all the other settlements of the regional system
Figure 1. Năsăudului Land – the functional features of a polarised regional entity,
in contemporary Romania
Source: author’s own analysis.
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and (2) a more favourable spatial position (on the hydrographical and circulation
convergence axes in the Someşului Mare Corridor, on the river’s larger meadow
and on its terraces). J. Benedek (2003, p. 157) affirms that these two elements are
sufficient and determining for the periodical population afflux towards a settle-
ment situated on a superior development level.
While classifying the urban entities, we have excluded Bistriţa (the main ad-
ministrative centre of the county), situated outside the analysed territory, but which
has a strong social and economic influence upon the territory polarised by Năsăud
and Sângeorz–Băi, while the town of Beclean is oriented towards Bistriţa and Dej
– at the functional level – and towards Năsăud – at the cultural, mental level.
Nevertheless, cultural Năsăud is the one that has governed the entire germinator
process of beliefs specific to the peoples of the region, beliefs and way of life that
have been manifested in the feeling of belonging to the other inhabitants of the
region and to the known places. The cultural, ethnographical function is the one
that has guided the building up of the structure of Năsăudului Land thus render-
ing it coherent. The coordinate of historical, social and cultural evolution has been
the most important for the mental cohesion of the people.
From an economic perspective, the attractivity of Năsăudului Land appears now,
as in the past, in the tradition of forestry, and less in those of mining and
shepherding. Agriculture is complementary to the other economic activities. This
activity is of an individual type and it is not mechanised. Due to the favourable
natural premises, the economy has been of an agro–pastoral type. But after 1990,
several fundamental changes have taken place, which have reoriented the develop-
ment of Năsăudului Land regional system. The Romanian industry has had
a significant decline, a similar involution being characteristic to Năsăudului Land,
situated in the North–West Development Region of Romania.
There were two significant moments in the evolution of the Romanian economy:
the year 1990 (the beginning of the transition to the market economy, a concur-
rence one) and the year 1997 (the great collective redundancies from industry).
Both these moments affected the regional system of Năsăudului Land.
In a study realised by the geographers from the Faculty of Geography, in Cluj–
Napoca (Planul de Amenajare a Teritoriului Regiunii de Nord–Vest (PATR)
– Coordonate majore – 2004), two problem–zones are mentioned for Năsăudului
Land that surely impede its development: Năsăud – Beclean critical zone and Rodna
disfavoured zone. The critical one is situated in the Someşului Mare Valley, be-
tween the two urban centres that give its name (Năsăud and Beclean). In the
study mentioned above, the cause of the economic involution of the zone is iden-
tified with the “bad management that has led to the drastically diminishing of the
activity in the main factories” (Planul de…, p. 253). Due to this, the study points
out that it is possible that this area becomes a disfavoured zone, while the “ten-
dency of ruralising the urban activities is in expansion” (Planul de…, p. 253).
The economy of Rodna disfavoured zone has had the following features: the domi-
nance of the industrial activities, with a functionality highly marked by this sec-
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tor, and the underdevelopment of the service sector. This is why the loss of jobs
(half or even more) led to the chronic economic and social disequilibrium (e.g.
degraded economic development, long–term unemployment, the deterioration
of the living standard).
At the same time, analysing the aspects of the migration in the region of Năsăud
(O.–R. Ilovan, 2005b), during 1987–2003 (so, mostly in the social and economic
context after 1989), we noticed that this phenomenon has been characterised by
some migration tendencies. The peoples’ behaviour reveals some migration models
according to (a) the distance of the rural area to the urban polarizing centres and
of all these to the mountainous space in the north, while considering the valleys
converging to the Someşului Mare River as subsystems of the regional polarised
entity, and according to (c) the economic and social changes specific to the transi-
tion period to a functional market economy (many have left to work in other
European countries, as the unemployment rate was high: e.g. for Rebra village,
from the disfavoured zone, 50% of the labour force was unemployed in 1992 and
85% of those who left the village worked in Spain (O.–R. Ilovan, 2005a)).
We propose the case of Rodna mining zone, as it is useful to be expanded to
the other regions having the same situation. Rodna mining zone was declared
a disfavoured zone in 1999 by means of governmental decision (no. 640/1999).
According to governmental decisions, the disfavoured zones may function from
three to ten years and, for each zone, several investment fields of interest have
been established (e.g. agriculture, production, commerce, environmental protec-
tion etc.), where fiscal facilities have been introduced for the potential investors.
The economic restructuring was necessary due to the involution of the dominant
activity.
Unfortunately, the Romanian government has sustained several passive mea-
sures (compensatory payments after the 1997 collective dismissals, without any
or few programs targeting the reconversion of the labour force) and has not un-
derstood the effects that this policy has on a long term on the mining zone.
Rodna disfavoured zone has more than 1000 km2 and a population of about
50000 inhabitants. It is certain that the disfavoured zones will disappear, with
this status, as an impact of Romania’s inclusion in the European Union struc-
tures. Then, the regional policy targeting the disfavoured zones is also affected
by the closing of the “Concurrence” chapter, in the context of the negotiations
with the EU, which has ended with Romania’s commitment to give up gradually
the facilities granted these years to the disfavoured settlements. Rodna is among
the 22 disfavoured zones, which will have to disappear, with this statute, by the
end of 2009.
The economic rehabilitation of these disfavoured mining zones has been pos-
sible only by granting the statute of “disfavoured zone” to them. Nevertheless,
the fiscal facilities have been unattractive in zones with low accessibility, no pub-
lic utility equipment and no capacity to manage the autochthon natural and hu-
man resource. At present, the “assisted zones” appeared as an alternative to the
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disfavoured ones, where the fiscal facilities have disappeared and thus leading to
a statute of normal functionality, obeying the lows of concurrence. But the as-
sisted zones welcome the implementation of projects, where the local communi-
ties are involved, targeting (a) to eliminate the above–mentioned flaws and (b) to
solve the extant economic and social problems of these areas.
At the present moment, one may argue about the resilience of Năsăudului Land
regional system, knowing that resilience is a measure of the systemic stability:
the greater the resilience, the more stable is the system and more capable to adapt
quickly (P. Cocean, 2005, p. 118–123) or to return to the status prior to the appear-
ance of the change factor.
In this context we try to find the answer to the question: “Is Năsăudului Land
a functional system having in view the two problem zones that appeared after
1989?” In order to find the correct answer we also have in view the following
issues: In which of the two zones (critical and disfavoured) the labour force is
dominant in industry? (We have compared Rodna disfavoured zone to Năsăud–
Beclean critical zone, from the point of view of the different percentages of the
labour force, working in varied branches of the economy as in the year 2002. We
have wanted to determine which are the chances of Năsăud–Beclean critical zone
to become an effervescent one, or to “gain” the attributes of a disfavoured one);
(b) In which of the two zones, the territorial infrastructure is better represented
from a quantitative point of view: the length of the streets (the total length and
the length of the modernised ones); in which of the two zones are dominant the
settlements that have a network for distributing drinking water, natural gas, and
a sewerage network?; (c) Can we discuss in support of the strong urban features
of Năsăud–Beclean critical zone (the diversification of the communities’ economy
– the appearance of more economic branches, determining local employing espe-
cially in the commerce and service sectors?) versus the rural features of Rodna
disfavoured zone?; (d) How are the tourist arrangements from the point of view
of their capacity and type (sufficient versus insufficient)?; (e) Can we identify
discrepancies between the two zones at the level of the tourist arrangements?
One alternative is that Năsăud–Beclean critical zone will become an efervescent one,
being situated at a higher development level, from all perspectives (economy,
infrastructure, tourism etc.) than Rodna disfavoured zone and with no threats of
industrial redundancies with a major negative impact, having in view that the
service sector and the commerce are dominant (in contrast with the disfavoured
zone).
The other alternative is that Năsăud–Beclean critical zone will receive the features
of a disfavoured zone because: the present economic potential is low (both in the
industrial and in the service sector); the low number of the highly qualified labour
force; the tourist potential is little–known due to little advertising; the low techni-
cal infrastructure of the territory; low connection to the county capital (Bistriţa) –
no railway between Năsăud and Bistriţa – therefore the economy of the town of
Năsăud has to lose from this point of view.
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No matter the involution or evolution of the critical zone, we have noticed that
the two zones are closely related as parts of Năsăudului Land regional system:
the development of the critical zone will support the development of the
disfavoured one and the other way around, too.
The impact of the economic activities upon the natural environment is another issue
that should be taken into account. The diversity of economic fields, the private
property and the market oriented economy have determined, in Năsăudului Land,
the appearance of some problems related to the environment and its pollution. At
present, the areas with polluting industries still functioning or partly closed are
situated along the Someşului Mare River, at Rodna, Parva, Năsăud and Beclean.
Then, the intense activities of exploiting and processing the wood after 1989 have
led to the appearance of great amounts of waste.
In this context, of the strong development of forestry, of wood industry, sev-
eral problems related to water, air and soil pollution have come up. The numbers
of the economic units that have activities with a possible negative impact upon
the environment have explosively grown.
Future in Năsăudului Land – Development Perspectives
In identifying the development directions, a SWOT analysis is necessary. Thus,
a strong point of this region is the diversity of the local resources. Moreover, the
existence of the development alternatives is an opportunity that should be taken
into account. Therefore, among the successful solutions for the region’s rehabili-
tation, the following two are the most viable ones: the development of commerce and
tourism (the region having the capacity of promoting multiple tourist functions)
and the development of the furniture industry that can ensure the superior process-
ing of the extant local resource.
We consider that both zones (Năsăud–Beclean critical zone and Rodna
disfavoured one) from Năsăudului Land can be developed and rendered func-
tional if the tourist phenomenon has greater development in the near future. At
present, the hotels of Sângeorz–Băi resort are unoccupied at their full capacity
(1638 places is the capacity of the two hotels), therefore the low number of em-
ployees in the tourism of this area (not even mentioned in the statistics).
The natural tourist potential of Năsăudului Land focuses on the following com-
ponents: the landscape, the climate and the mineral waters (known from the Ro-
man period). The anthropic tourist potential of Năsăudului Land focuses on ethnog-
raphy, religious sites (churches, monasteries, abbeys) and cultural ones (memo-
rial houses of Romanian writers, poets, men of culture; monuments and architec-
tural ensembles built of wood or stone; folklore; “home industry”).
Năsăudului Land is well–known due to the exquisite traditional costumes and
Romanian dance called “from the Someş River”. P. Cocean (1997, p. 93) considers
Năsăudului Land to be a region characterised by originality, by specificity.
L.–I. Grapini (2001, p. 41) notices a move from the spontaneous to festive in what
the traditional local customs are concerned. Therefore, the rural and cultural tour-
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ism have the best conditions, from this perspective, to develop. Moreover, the
region is “placed” between the Rodnei, Ţibleşului and Bârgăului Mountains, where
mountaineering, trips and winter sports are practiced and the zone of Bistriţa,
where cultural tourism is developed.
Because, the tourist potential is not sufficiently exploited and capitalised, the
following three development directions should intermingle in promoting tourism in
Năsăudului Land: mountain tourism (winter sports, spaeotourism, trips etc.) in
Rodnei, Ţibleşului and Bârgăului Mountains; cultural tourism polarised by the three
urban centres and the areas of original rural civilization (e.g. Salva village near
Năsăud; Rodna village near Sângeorz–Băi etc); rural tourism (agro–tourism): “…the
rural tourism has its essential motivation in cultivating the intimate harmony of
man’s return to his existential source, to the mild ancestral traditions” (P. Cocean,
Şt. Dezsi, 2001, p 38). Still, the extant rural tourism is a chaotic one.
We recommend the following actions in order to promote tourism in Năsăudului
Land: (1) superior valorising of the extant potential by arranging and rearranging
those tourist routes that are intensely visited by tourists, as well as the building of
an adequate tourist infrastructure (e. g. chalets in the mountainous area) and in-
tegrating it in several tourist circuits; (2) stimulating the new tendencies in rural
tourism whose development should be harmoniously integrated into the local,
zone and regional development plans, while observing the quality of the tourist
services, the rules of the environmental protection, and the conservation of the
natural and anthropic potential specific to Năsăudului Land.
The solutions we identified for supporting tourism development are, first: winning
some projects financed from non–reimbursable European funds (especially for
bettering the territorial technical infrastructure); investment from those who have
left the region in order to work abroad and send money to their families or come
back in order to invest in their own households or to initiate business in their
local communities. Secondly, the following actions should be taken hopefully, in
the near future: the energy network should be introduced into those communi-
ties that lack it at present; the water alimentation network should be solved as
well as the sewerage system in the rural areas. Still there are no strategies that
target the connection of the rural areas to the natural gas network (the local re-
serve of wood is the energy source). We conclude that the technical infrastructure
of the territory can be characterised as insufficient in order to support a highly
developed tourist activity.
Remodelling the Mental Space of Năsăudului Land
The “lands” represent symbols and reservoirs of territorial identity, creating
a favourable space for the appearance of a functional regional entity in the action
of territorial planning and regional development. They have a dual structure, from
a temporal perspective: static – as they maintain several features that individualise
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them through specificity – and dynamic – due to their continuous metamorphosis
at the level of their spatial extension, sometimes in expansion, on the basis of the
unique spatial elements’ diffusion (A. Dauphiné, 1979 quoted by F. Pendea, 2003,
p. 20–21) and on the basis of the human factor, who adds new attributes. These
new attributes are a proof of his excellence in creating and permanently adapting
the old ones to his economic, social and spiritual needs.
As a part of the Romanian mental space, that of the people in Năsăudului
Land has a series of structural and functional features that confer to it an unques-
tionable specificity, and implicitly, individuality. These features are the follow-
ing (P. Cocean, O.–R. Ilovan, 2005): the peoples’ attachment to reality; the peoples’
spiritual openness to their development to a superior level; the peoples’ habit of
intermingling, in every day life, the real with the fabulous and the mythical; tam-
ing the reality by means of a ludic perception of it (the developed sense of humour
even in tragic circumstances, in order to diminish the sorrow and to put colour to
the sometimes “black face of reality”); the peoples’ awareness of the uniqueness
of their space (mental and physical); the specificity and originality of the material
and spiritual production of Năsăudului Land.
The process of diversifying supposes, always, the apparition of restructuring
in the context of respecting the old norms and habits that are rooted in the man’s
soul and mind. Thus, the new internal structure of the regional space of a “land”
will be one that is adapted to tradition, integrated into tradition, and, thus, not
alienable for the inhabitant of the “land”. Flexibility is more and more present at
the level of the “lands”, because these old regional entities have undergone
a process of adaptation to the new social and economic realities after 1989. One
may notice, from this perspective, not only a social and economical transition, but
also a spiritual–mental one, triggered by the changes in the Romanian society
(e.g. giving up to certain customs usual at the religious or laic fests; giving up to
the traditional costumes, especially in what the younger generation is concerned;
greater mobility etc).
Conclusions
Năsăudului Land is a regional territorial system with structural attributes that
derive from this way of functioning. The structural and functional model of
Năsăudului Land, as a polarised systemic entity, is given by the configuration of
the social and economic relations in the territory, as it reveals certain networks of
mass, energy, information and interest mobility. The spatial and cultural pattern
(the physical and mental environment) of Năsăudului Land is to be recognised in
the entire regional territory.
We conclude that Năsăudului Land, despite its social and economic problems,
is an adaptive, self–controlled, balanced, dynamic and dissipative system, hav-
ing the possibility of becoming an effervescent region if the adequate strategic
plans are implemented in a short time.
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Introduction
At present foreign direct investment (FDI) is worldly considered as one of the
most important impulses for the economic development. The first bigger FDI
influence dates back to the end of the 50s. FDI became a subject of the specific
structural economic policy on the global level in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Today FDI indicators are one of the most important economic indicators of the
national economies. FDI combines capital investment, management contribution
and mutually beneficial exchange of “know–how“ together with open access to
the world markets. FDI requires relative social–economic stability, but at the same
time it helps to ensure this stability. It is necessary to emphasize the influence of
FDI on local economic development, especially in structurally affected regions,
where the most of the FDI goes. In most of the cases FDI is not a solution for
momentary problems of production or development programs, but is an impulse
for creation of conditions for extensive long–term development. This article was
written with the contribution of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic and is
one of the outputs of the grant assignment no 402/03/D089.
Structure and influence of Foreign Direct Investment on the Development
of the Economy
FDI can be divided according to many criteria. One of the most frequently used is
the way of realisation of the investment. “Investment on green field” has, because
of the programme supporting the development of industrial parks, been very
frequent since 1998. This investment is very convenient for the investor because it
can launch a project which meets its needs, but on the other hand he often has to
look for new workers and train nearly all of them. A great amount of the investment
of the multinational companies was carried out by the means of a form of mergers
and acquisitions (M&A – mergers and acquisitions). A major part of M&A was in
a form of privatization via direct selling to a foreign investor. Provided the
investor’s involvment is connected with a large investment into restructuring of
the company and a new production is often possible only because of this
investment we called it “brown field” investment.
Michal Vančura
Foreign Direct Investment in the Countries of Central Europe
with the Emphasis on the Czech Republic
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In transition economies the following phases of FDI inflow (FDI direction
phases) could be outlined:
• First phase “spontaneous“ – occupying of newly developing markets. This
phase is most crucial at the beginning of the economic transformation and is
often in progress within the privatisation of companies. During this first phase
investors usually do not expect any investment incentives, neither from the
state nor from local authorities. In this phase attractive investment opportunities
are usually very rare.
• Second phase “promotional“ – inflow of FDI is characterized by the effort of
the state and local authorities to use FDI in more systematic way within
re–structuralization of local economies. Typical of this phase is the phenomenon
of aiming FDI especially into production sector. In this phase investment
incentives have a key role.
• Third phase “integrational“ – the sector of services starts to take over. Not
only for direct support of production, but also in various forms of strategic
services. Development of services and cooperation aims also at stabilisation of
already existing companies (e.g. support of subcontractors). Within the second
and the third phase logistic centres in the backgrounds of large economic centres
are also starting to develop. Some of them later grow into more complex so
called, integrated development centres.
• Fourth phase „interactive“ – certain saturation begins. Some types of FDI
connected with the second phase search for better conditions in new “low–
cost–countries“ and FDI focus shifts even further into areas of activities with
high added value and high quality of labour. The activities of companies
established during the second and the third phase are also being transformed
in this respect.
Global supplying networks of the multinational companies partly limit the
possibilities of the local suppliers to enter their production system. In the case of
greenfield the contact of investment with the potential home markets might not
be established. In the case of acquisitions and mergers the local suppliers can
even be automatically replaced by global suppliers of the mother multinational
company. If the home company succeeds and becomes a supplier to a local branch
of a multinational company, it might later help it become a part of the company’s
global production system. The local supplier can even start providing supplies to
other multinational companies involved in that particular sector which is regarded
as the highest possibility of growth for the local small and middle enterprises.
Multinational companies usually have very strict requirements for the quality of
subcontracts that only few local subcontractors can fulfil. For the developing
economies, it often prohibits them from taking advantages of possibilities that
the FDI offers. In that case multinational companies thus often import their inputs
or motivate their global suppliers to establish their branches in their host countries.
Especially large projects can be followed by a wave of FDI of their global suppliers
(called “snowball effect”) (M. Srholec, 2004).
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Inflow of FDI into a region brings many positive phenomena. The most
important are:
• number of jobs created – the majority of investments create new jobs in the
region;
• capital – foreign (multinational) corporations generally gain bank loans more
easily, FDI brings new available financial resources;
• productivity of labour – at most of the enterprises FDI contributed to an increase
in the productivity of labour;
• technology – multinational corporations introduce new (modern) technologies
into production;
• new markets – multinational companies let their daughter companies enter
their network of customers (guarantee customers to their daughter companies);
• cooperation – FDI increases the possibility of further cooperation and
participation of other local enterprises (services, subcontracts).
Although inflows of FDI have mostly positive impacts on regions, some negative
phenomena can also be identified. For example:
• hostile takeover – the introduction of FDI with the intention of eliminating
competition and gaining control over the local market with their own products;
• increase of import – an increase in the amount of import of raw materials and
semi–finished products often contributes to bankruptcy of the local producers
of these commodities;
• repatriation of income – is reflected by collection of dividends and capital
outflow;
• regional differences – lower economic efficiency of the local enterprises may
lead to creation of “dual economy” (World Investment Report, 1999).
Global Foreign Direct Investment in 2004
Global foreign direct investment inflows (FDI) decreased in 2004 to $648 billion.
Although it was a little bit more than in the previous year ($633 billion), still it
was the second worst result since 1998. In comparison to year 2000, when the
amount of global FDI was the biggest in history ($1 492 billion), this result meant
a decrease by 57 per cent. The main factor that caused this state was slow economic
growth in most of the world main economies.
If we concentrate only on developed economies we can say, that these
economies experienced significant decrease to the lowest level in the last 7 years
($380 billion, in comparison with 2003 decrease by more than 14 per cent). The
United States retained its position as the number one recipient of FDI, followed
by the United Kingdom. Contrary large increase was achieved in developing
economies. In 2004 the total FDI inflows into these countries were the biggest in
the history and reached $233 billion, which was by more than 28 percent better
(higher) than in 2003. The share of developing economies in global FDI reached
36 per cent.
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Many factors help to explain why the growth of FDI was particularly
pronounced in developing countries in 2004. Intense competitive pressures in
many industries are leading firms to explore new ways of improving their
competitiveness. Some of these ways are by expanding operations in the fast–
growing markets of emerging economies to boost sales, and by rationalizing
production activities with a view to reaping economies of scale and lowering
production costs. Higher prices for many commodities have further stimulated
FDI to countries that are rich in natural resources such as oil and minerals. In
some developed as well as developing countries, increased inflows in 2004 were
linked to an upturn in cross–border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity.
Greenfield FDI continued to rise for the third consecutive year in 2004. Provided
economic growth is maintained, the prospects for a further increase in global FDI
flows in 2005 are promising. Concerning the dynamically developing countries,
China has the biggest FDI inflows (including Hong Kong the FDI inflows reached
$95 billion).
FDI inflows into the 8 EU–accession countries (which were previously classified
under Central and Eastern Europe – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) rose by 69 per cent in 2004, to $20 billion,
with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, in that order, receiving the largest
FDI inflows. Reinvested earnings accounted for more than half of the FDI flows
to these countries, whereas equity investments in new projects and privatization
sales were the dominant forms of FDI in Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania (G. Hunya,
2005).
Figure 1. FDI per Inhabitant in 8 New EU Members in 2004
Source: World Investment Report, 2005.
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Lithuania, Latvia and the Czech Republic experienced the largest increase in
inward FDI flows in 2004 among the 8 new EU members. Flows to Lithuania
more than quadrupled (to $773 million); they more than doubled in Latvia ($647
million), the Czech Republic ($4.5 billion) and Hungary ($4.2 billion); and Slovakia
($1.2 billion) received 68 per cent higher inflows than in 2003, mainly due to the
privatization of three electricity distributors.
The Changes in the Amount of Foreign Direct Investment Flowing
into the Czech Republic
Until 1997 only direct foreign investment (FDI) into equity capital was monitored.
In the period of 1993 and 1997 FDI inflows reached their maximum in 1995
(approximately $2.5 billion). There was a great increase in the amount of money
coming into the Czech economy from abroad in the years after 1995. In 1998 FDI
reached $3.7 billion (including reinvested earnings and other capital) and in 1999
$6.3 billion. In 2000 the Czech economy experienced a slight decline in FDI inflows
to $5.0 billion and in 2000 to $5.6 billion. In 2002 the Czech Republic contrary to
global trends (Global FDI inflows were declining since 2001) experienced another
increase in FDI to $8.5 billion. In 2003 significant decrease in FDI inflow followed.
In 2004, according to preliminary data of The Czech National Bank, the amount
of FDI inflow increased and is expected to reach $4.0 billion.
In the end of 2003 FDI inflow into the Czech Republic reached 1 161.8 billion
CZK ($38.5billion) out of which 767.1 billion CZK was invested into authorized
capital and 394.7 billion CZK into reinvested earnings and other capital). The
major investors into the Czech economy are mainly other countries of the European
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Figure 2. Inflow of Foreign Direct Investment into the Czech Republic from 1990 till 2004
Source: Foreign direct investment 2002. The CNB, 2003. Own calculations.
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Union with the amount of FDI bigger than 1 000 billion CZK (1 064.6 billion CZK
at the end of 2003, out of which the Netherlands 359.2 billion and Germany 238.9
billion CZK.)
Analyses of Foreign Direct Investment in the Czech Republic
according to Regions and Sectors of National Economy
Concerning regional aspect, Prague has always been the biggest recipient of FDI.
Between 1993 and 2003 nearly half of all FDI flowing into the Czech Republic
(46.3%) was invested into companies with headquarters located in Prague. In
Prague more than 750 thousand CZK was calculated per one worker. High amount
of FDI was also invested in Středočeský region and in Ústecký region. Concerning
the district level, the majority of FDI went to districts Mladá Boleslav (654.3
thousand CZK), Beroun (554.0 thousand CZK) and Most (539.8 thousand). More
than 250 thousand CZK per one worker could at the end of 2002 also be found in
districts – Plzeň–město (342.3 thousand CZK), Praha–západ (326.1 thousand CZK),
Kutná Hora (311.1 thousand CZK), Rakovník (304.5 thousand CZK), Teplice (297.2
thousand CZK) and Přerov (253.2 thousand CZK). Contrary, little amount of FDI
Source: Foreign Direct Investment 2003, The CNB, Prague, 2002. Own calculations.
Table 1. Foreign Direct Investment in Regions of the Czech Republic from 1993 till 2002
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was allocated to districts especially in Moravia and districts located in the south–
west of the country. The figures of FDI calculated per one worker in these districts
are following – Kroměříž (15.4 thousand CZK), Domažlice (19.8 thousand CZK),
Hodonín (22.4 thousand CZK), Prachatice (25.8thousand CZK), Karviná (27.7
thousand CZK), Pelhřimov (28.1 thousand CZK) and Písek (28.6 thousand CZK).
From the viewpoint of sectors, most of FDI went into the services. By the end
of 2003 the sector of services gained 550.7 billion CZK. Inside of this sector most
of the foreign investment flew into the financial sector (195.0 billion CZK), the
transport and the telecommunications (169.0 thousand CZK) and the trade (142.5
billion CZK). Between 1993 and 2003 more than 26.5 billion CZK went into the
construction industry. The agriculture, the fishing and the forest industries
received only 280.9 billion CZK of FDI during this period. The total amount of
FDI inflows into all industrial sectors calculated to 31 December 2003 was 584.3
billion CZK. Most of this money went into the manufacturing industry (486.7
billion CZK; 83.3 per cent of the total FDI into industry).
The Inward PZI Performance Index of the Czech Republic Regions
For detailed analyses of the abilities of the Czech Republic regions to attract FDI
the Inward FDI Performance Index can be used. The Inward FDI Performance
Index ranks regions by the FDI they receive relative to their economic size. It is
the ratio of a region share in global FDI inflows into the Czech Republic to its
share in global GDP of the Czech Republic.
A value greater than one indicates that the region receives more FDI than its
relative economic size, a value below one that it receives less (a negative value
means that foreign investors disinvest in that period).
The index thus captures the influence on FDI of factors other than market size,
assuming that, other things being equal, size is the „base line” for attracting
investment. These other factors can be diverse, ranging from the business climate,
economic and political stability, the presence of natural resources, infrastructure,
skills and technologies, to opportunities for participating in privatization or the
effectiveness of FDI promotion.
FDI i / FDI CR
IND i =
GDP i / GDP CR
Where,
INDi = The Inward FDI Performance Index of the ith region
FDIi = The FDI inflows in the ith region
FDICR = FDI inflows into the Czech Republic
GDPi = GDP in the ith region
GDPCR = GDP of the Czech Republic
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The capital Prague has been the most successful region in attracting FDI. Prague
has gained the highest amount of FDI because of its attraction but its statistic
success has also been influenced by the fact, that some companies have their
headquarters located in Prague and thus are statistically included in Prague, even
though their production might be located in a different region of the Czech
Republic. Středočeský region has benefited from the Pregue’s attraction, because
many companies for which proximity of the capital is necessary have located
their companies in this region. Severočeský region has been the third region with
the Inward PZI Performance Index higher than 1.00. It is a region with a long
tradition in the industrial production and a good location near the western border.
Because it is a region with the highest level of unemployment, it is also often
supported by the Czech government to attract more FDI. The two Moravian regions
– Moravskoslezský and Olomoucký have been the least successful in attracting
FDI. These two regions lie far from the western border, far from Prague and the
provided services are insufficient.
Conclusion
In all contemporary economic and political debates FDI topics are always the
most controversial. Protagonists of higher economic integration via free market
and FDI face strong opposition from politicians or economists, who want to protect
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less than 0.55
Figure 3. The Inward FDI Performance Index of the Czech Republic Regions (31 December 2003)
Source: Foreign Direct Investment 2003, The CNB, Prague, 2002. Own calculations.
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local industry by reducing influence and interventions of multinational companies.
Generally it could be said, that the access to FDI depends on the level of economic
development. Developed countries mostly support FDI, but within clear rules
and development strategies. Their experience is that within the sensible structural
and long–term based regional policy, the FDI system risks could be limited to the
level that is, concerning the number of advantages of FDI, highly acceptable. FDI
inflows have been the key driving force of state and regional economies of the
whole world, in developed as well as in developing countries and have contributed
to the increase of these economies. This fact demonstrates among others long–
term highly dynamic development of FDI inflow into the Czech Republic.
Concerning the time standpoint, four characteristic periods could be identified
in the FDI inflows into the Czech Republic. Till 1998 privatization investment
ultimately prevailed. After 1998 thanks to the programme supporting the
development of the industrial parks, there was a huge increase in greenfield
projects. From around 2002 another wave of investment can be identified. This
investment went mostly into strategic services. Concerning the regional level,
Prague has always been the most attractive region for FDI. On the other hand,
Moravian regions, thanks to their peripheral position, have always received the
smallest amount of FDI. It is anticipated that the amount of FDI will be getting
smaller after privatisation has finished and the Czech market has reached some
level of saturation. Foreign investors might gradually lose interest in reinvesting
their profits but might want to repatriate their money (e.g. the payment of
dividends) or they might use their money for the development of strategic concepts
of foreign investors in third world countries.
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The urgent problem of the Belarusian economy is poor activity of international
capital flows. The following arguments evidence it.
First, it is a high level of fixed assets wear and extremely low level of renova-
tion. In 2000 the basic production assets value in comparison with the numbers of
1991 amounted to 134% of the year of 1991 in comparable prices with the general
discount factor of basic production assets of this period (4.24 million times) being
more than industrial goods producers’ price movement (2.39 million times). The
increase of fixed assets value conflicts with the tendency of its quality deteriora-
tion that has an effect on growth of accumulated depreciation from 47% in 1990 to
59% in 2000. At the same time in 1996–2000 the situation got aggravated – where
volume of industry production went up 64.3% (regarding 1995) fixed assets bal-
ance sheet value was reduced by 1%. At the same time the discount factor of
production assets increased 2.5 times faster than the producers’ price. In 2001 the
deterioration of fixed assets was 61% (Table 1).
Olga Laschevskaja
The Problem of Foreign Direct Investment Attraction
in Belarusian Industry
Source: own studies.
Table 1. The activities of industry fixed assets movement
Under continuing increase of basic production assets deterioration discount
factors of basic production assets of industry were set too high. To a certain ex-
tent it concealed “spending” of the fixed capital that was the illustration of the
extensive growth. This conclusion confirms the state of the basic production as-
sets active part, which deterioration has already exceeded the critical level in 1994
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and since then has been growing steadily except 1998 when the renovation ratio
exceeded greatly the retirement ratio (Table 2).
The growth of basic production assets input was achieved due to the signifi-
cant growth of capital investments rate in the economy in 1997–1998. The growth
of investments in the industry in 1997 was 119 % regarding the previous year and
in 1998 – 141 % (accordingly 30,9% and 35,0 % of the aggregate investments in the
economy). However in 1999 the investments in the industry were 27% lower than
in the previous year.
Under the increase of the deterioration of the basic production assets’ active
part its retirement until 2000 did not increase, the retirement ratio that has been
keeping at the level of 3% since 1997. The given fact cannot be referred to as the
preservation of industrial potential. Consideration of the level of productive ca-
pacity usage is enough. In 2001 only 23–67% of the output capacities of separate
kinds of goods were used and the level of loading of a number of manufactures
continues to reduce. Thus in 1999–2001 the tractor producing capacities were
loaded on 55.4–45.9%, woollen fabrics – on 28.5–22.9%, ferro–concrete items – on
31.9–28.1%. As a whole in 2001 the level of industrial capacities usage in the
IV quarter came to 56.5% (has decreased from 59% in the III quarter). Thus the
loading in the chemical industry has decreased to 56.1% (by 4.4%), fuel – to 46.1%
(by 5.5%), food – to 58.0 % (by 3.8%).
The unused capacities, the major part of which is worn out and overpriced,
noticeably increase manufacturing expenses. In a number of branches, in power–
consuming chemical industry for example, technological processes are persistent
and require the equipment to be maintained in operational condition even under
loading reduction. Moreover the enterprises are compelled to bear expenses of
the unnecessary equipment preservation and can’t realise it (at first it was forbid-
den and then it got impossible because of the share market absence and balance
cost overestimation). It makes a ponderable contribution to the increase of other
manufacture expenses. At the same time the experience of the transitional coun-
tries shows that one of conditions of fast private sector development was the
emission of cheap fixed capital to the capital market during the re–structuring
and bankruptcies of the enterprises.
The adverse financial position of the enterprises and imperfection of the taxa-
tion were the reason of no–purpose use of one of the basic production assets up-
Activities 1992 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Renovation Rate 4 1 3 2 7 2 2.7 3
Retirement Rate – Total 4 10 5 3 3 3 7.5 6
Retirement Rate Due to Liquidation 2 3 3 2 2 2 1.9 3
Wear Rate 50 64 72 76 69 76 77 79
Table 2. The activities of industry fixed assets active part movement, %
Source: own studies.
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dating fundamental sources – depreciation. The specific weight of depreciation
charges in the expenses for manufacture as a whole on was reduced from 9.4% in
1990 to 1.4% in 1999 and started growing only in 2000, having made 3.6%. In
1994–1995 in the industry the accrual depreciation volume 1.5–1.4 times exceeded
the means directed on capital investment. In 1997–1998 about half of depreciation
charges were used on capital investments. Thus the share of depreciation charges
in total amount of capital investments made 86% in 1994, 67% in 1996 and 65.% in
1998. From this it follows that there wasn’t even a simple basic production assets
reproduction in the industry. The greatest level of depreciation usage was in elec-
tric power industry and the chemical industry, the lowest level – in mechanical
engineering. And one of the lowest levels of depreciation usage can be found in
machine–tool constructing, tool and motor industry.
One of the principal causes of depreciation no–purpose use is a quality of the
state depreciation policy. The perfection of the depreciation policy is also neces-
sary from the point of view of technological safety (U. Valetka, 2002).
There is a lack of investments during last years. According to government
statistic in 1999 the investment in a fixed capital of the industry decreased in
comparison with the previous year by 27% and on the results of 2001 made only
72.1% from the level of 1998. As a result the basic production assets updating was
slowed down and the level of their active part wear verged towards 80%. This
tendency also had place in 2001 – investments in the industry were 844.8 billion
roubles or 96.8% regarding 2000. The share of the investments in the industry
was 28.6% in the structure of the aggregate investments in the economy. It is
necessary to pay attention, that almost third of investment resources was concen-
trated in the house–building and in the municipal economy (the share of these
branches in gross national product made 4.2%). As a whole the social orientation
of the given stream of investments is clear. However at the given stage the con-
centration of a third of capital investments in housing development is a by luxury
in conditions of critical wear of the equipment of country leading branch – the
industry. Moreover, the issue character of the housing development means ap-
pears extremely inflationary measure as such financing is not supported with the
increase of the goods offer provided with solvent demand. The money through
the building enterprises comes in a national economic turnover very quickly and
strengthens the inflation.
Thus the country hasn’t own sources of basic assets renovation and couldn’t
pass the investment crisis. That conclusion is confirmed with the economic cir-
cumstances in industrial sector of economy. The distinctive feature of Belarusian
economy is that its advanced technology products mismatch the world level of
quality and costs. Under the circumstances of open economy and world raw ma-
terial prices the main goal of reforms is industrial processes modernization to
make the product competitive at the world market.
Negative institutional conditions of the country don’t promote to moderniza-
tion of Belarus industry on the basis of foreign direct investments (FDI). Only
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during the last years the share of FDI in the national economy decreased from
4.2% to 1.6% in 2000. As a whole in 1992–2000 the cumulative foreign invest-
ments in Belarus made 1.236 billion dollars whereas investments in Lithuania
that is three times smaller on the population were 2.4 billion, investments in Po-
land were 52.3 billion dollars. Approximately 80% of FDI in Belarus (985.2 mil-
lion dollars) are “Gazprom” investments in Yamal – Europe gas pipeline build-
ing which has been frozen since 2002 (Belarus…, 2003). In 2001 DFI has made 73.9
million dollars, in the first half of 2002 – 37 million dollars (U. Valetka, 2002).
The most common forms of foreign investment in Belarus are joint ventures
and wholly foreign–owned business. The largest number of joint ventures are
foreign–owned companies from Germany, Poland, the US, Russia, Italy, Cyprus,
the UK, the Czech Republic, Ireland and Switzerland. Apart from the Russian
investments in gas–main Yamal–Europe, the major sources of FDI in Belarus to
date are Germany, Netherlands, Cyprus, the US, the UK and Poland. Most inves-
tors are attracted by the country’s strategic location on the main road and rail link
between Russia and Europe. Notwithstanding this the share of foreign direct in-
vestments is negligible – in 2002 it contributes only 4% of total (4.2% or $286
million in the first half of 2003).
At the same time in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, capital inflows have
been dominated by FDI, the share of which has increased to 70–80 per cent of the
total net inflow. Croatia, Poland and Romania received net portfolio investments
of some $2 billion (which also include around some $5 billion in new (gross)
eurobond issues). The narrowing of yield differentials in some transition econo-
mies also seems to explain part of the outflow of short–term funds, a widespread
phenomenon in the ECE region in the past two years. Croatia was particularly
hard hit in this regard, the $1.5 billion outflow in the first three quarters of 2000
fully offsetting inflows of FDI and portfolio investment. Against a background of
tight financial constraints in 1999, Romania and The former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia attracted more capital in 2000 and boosted their official reserves. In
Yugoslavia, the recently released accounts show some medium–term borrowing
but the bulk of the new funds ($1 billion in the first three quarters of 2000) is
unidentified. Official reserves, secret under the previous government, were $524
million in December (Table 3). In general, the current account deficits of these
countries were easily financed and in most of them official reserves were increased
(Economic Survey…, 2001).
In the three European CIS (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova), financing has re-
mained difficult since the rouble crisis of 1998. Current account surpluses and
increased FDI in Ukraine allowed the repayment of some medium–term funds in
2000 (including IMF credits), but they also seem to have fed an outflow of short–
term capital. The renewed access of Ukraine (and Moldova) to IMF resources in
late 2000 also boosted their official reserves. In Moldova record FDI dominated
capital inflows, but there was also a significant outflow of other funds. Belarus
reported another small capital account surplus, because FDI and unidentified
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(probably short–term) funds, were partly offset by various outflows. Nonethe-
less, the persistent draw–down of official reserves was reversed. In Russia the
acceleration of financial outflows, in part reflecting greater capital flight, was
largely fuelled by the huge current account surplus. Nonetheless, official reserves
(excluding gold) nearly tripled to $24.3 bil.
Incomplete financial account data (including errors and omissions) for a few
Asian CIS indicate that capital flows remained subdued in 2000. In energy–ex-
a Including IMF funds and errors and omissions.
b A positive sign indicates an increase in reserves. Reserves/GDP is the ratio of change in reserves
to the level of GDP (in per cent).
c January–September for Yugoslavia, Latvia, Lithuania and the CIS (except Belarus).
d Excludes Bosnia and Herzegovina and Yugoslavia.
Source: Economic Survey of Europe, 2001 No. 1, p. 156.
Capital and financial account flows a Changes in official reserves b
Billion dollars Capital flows/GDP Billion dollars Reserves/GDP b
Jan.-Sept.Country
1997 1998 1999 1999 2000 2000 1998 1999 2000 c 1998 1999 2000 c 1998 1999 2000 c
Eastern Europe d ...... 20.6 25.8 27.0 15.5 15.4* 24.4* 6.7 7.3 6.6 8.1 6.2 5.4* 2.1 1.7 1.5
Albania .................... 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3* 0.5* 3.5 7.6 12.1 0.1 0.1 –* 2.1 3.4 -1.3
Bosnia and
Herzegovina ............ 1.2 0.7 1.4 1.1* 0.6* 0.9* 16.1 31.2 18.3 -0.1 0.4 –* -2.5 9.9 0.6
Bulgaria ................... 0.6 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.5 1.1 4.3 9.5 8.9 0.5 0.5 0.4 3.8 4.3 3.3
Croatia .................... 2.8 1.7 2.0 0.9 0.6 1.2* 7.8 9.7 6.5 0.2 0.4 0.5* 0.7 2.1 2.5
Czech Republic ....... 1.4 3.3 3.2 1.1 1.8 3.2 5.8 6.1 6.4 1.9 1.7 0.8 3.4 3.1 1.7
Hungary .................. 0.8 3.1 4.4 2.6 1.7 2.8 6.6 9.1 6.0 0.8 2.3 1.1 1.7 4.8 2.3
Poland ..................... 7.4 12.8 11.7 8.0 7.1 10.6 8.1 7.6 6.7 5.9 0.2 0.6 3.7 0.1 0.4
Romania ................. 3.8 2.1 1.5 0.8 1.2 2.3 5.1 4.3 6.3 -0.8 0.2 0.9 -2.0 0.5 2.5
Slovakia .................. 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.0 1.4 1.5 7.1 9.1 8.0 -0.5 0.7 0.8 -2.6 3.7 4.3
Slovenia .................. 1.3 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.6 3.5 4.2 0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.8 -0.4 1.0
Macedonia 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.4* 10.0 8.0 10.2 – 0.1 0.2* 1.2 4.1 4.5
Yugoslavia .............. 1.8 1.1 1.3 1.0* 1.2 .. 6.7 8.2 6.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.7 -0.4 0.4
Baltic states ............. 2.4 2.9 2.2 1.2 1.0 .. 13.0 9.8 .. 0.4 0.1 .. 2.0 0.3 ..
Estonia .................... 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.5 9.4 8.0 9.3 – 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.2 2.5
Latvia ...................... 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.3 .. 11.3 11.9 5.7 – 0.1 – 0.6 2.3 0.1
Lithuania ................. 1.2 1.7 1.0 0.7 0.5 .. 15.8 9.4 5.5 0.4 -0.2 0.1 3.7 -1.8 1.6
CIS ............................ 6.8 -0.4 -20.6 -12.4* -21.6* .. -0.1 -7.4 .. -7.1 2.6 .. -1.8 0.9 ..
Armenia .................. 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 .. 24.1 17.8 15.5 0.1 – – 2.8 1.1 -0.5
Azerbaijan ............... 1.2 1.3 0.8 0.9 – .. 30.3 18.4 -1.4 – 0.2 – -0.4 5.1 0.5
Belarus .................... 0.7 0.8 0.2 – 0.3 0.2 6.8 1.4 2.3 -0.1 – 0.1 -0.5 -0.3 0.7
Georgia ................... 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1* .. 9.6 5.8 3.1 -0.1 – -0.1* -1.9 -1.1 -4.4
Kazakhstan ............. 1.3 0.9 0.3 0.4 -0.4 .. 4.1 1.8 -3.0 -0.3 0.1 0.2 -1.4 0.5 1.8
Kyrgyzstan .............. 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 .. 22.8 20.1 6.4 – 0.1 – -0.4 5.0 2.4
Republic of Moldova 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 .. 6.2 7.4 9.8 -0.2 0.1 – -13.1 4.5 2.0
Russian Federation . -0.1 -6.0 -23.3 -14.7 -20.3 .. -2.1 -12.4 -11.7 -5.3 1.8 13.3 -1.9 1.0 7.6
Tajikistan ................. 0.1 0.1 – –* -0.1* .. 10.9 -2.3 -10.7 – – –* 1.7 -0.7 -0.3
Turkmenistan .......... 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.6* 0.2* .. 36.3 28.0 4.6 0.1 0.1 0.2* 3.3 2.0 6.1
Ukraine ................... 1.7 – -0.6 -0.2 -1.7 .. -0.1 -1.9 -7.6 -1.3 0.3 -0.1 -3.2 1.0 -0.6
Uzbekistan .............. 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 .. 0.7 1.5 1.1 – 0.1 0.1 – 0.4 1.3
Total above d ............ 29.9 28.2 8.7 4.4* -5.3* .. 3.5 1.3 .. 1.4 8.8 .. 0.2 1.3 ..
...........
Table 3. Net capital flows into Eastern Europe, the Baltic states and the CIS, 1997–2000
(billion dollars, %)
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porting Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, current account surpluses were the source
of an outflow of funds (mainly short–term flows) in the first half of 2000. In
Kyrgzstan and Uzbekistan, smaller inflows reflect lower levels of borrowing and
FDI. Most non–energy exporting members of the CIS continue to face chronic
financial constraints stemming from their inability to access the international fi-
nancial markets and, in some cases, to qualify for resources from the interna-
tional financial institutions.
Foreign direct investment in the transition economies is estimated to have in-
creased again in 2000, to about $28 billion. These flows have proved resilient in
the wake of the global financial crises (although Russia is a major exception), an
experience they have shared with emerging market economies in the rest of the
world. Direct foreign equity investment in the emerging markets peaked in 1999,
falling to an estimated $124 billion in 2000. FDI in the transition economies con-
tinues to be driven by the prospects of EU accession in a small number of them
and by privatization programmes, which yielded record foreign receipts in sev-
eral countries. Major sales were completed for example in Poland ($4.3 billion for
a stake in TSPA), Slovakia (1 billion for a stake in Slovak Telecom) and The Re-
public of Macedonia (342 million for a stake in MakTel). FDI, however, has be-
come still more concentrated in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, which
together accounted for over 58 per cent of total FDI in the transition economies in
2000. FDI entirely financed the current account deficits of many countries and
helped to hold down the growth of debt. Conversely, countries receiving little
FDI, particularly some in the CIS have often run into payments difficulties. By
virtue of its dominance of total capital inflows and its relative stability, FDI has
also reduced the vulnerability of these countries to financial crisis, and this in
turn has helped to reinforce the confidence of international investors.
Investors became increasingly averse to emerging market risk in 2000, and
only those countries with the better credit ratings were able to raise funds at good
terms. In general, the conditions obtained by the transition economies continued
to improve, but the volume of external bond issues fell to about $5 billion in 2000
(Economic Survey…, 2000), far below the levels preceding the 1997–1998 crises.
The better terms obtained by creditworthy transition economies (smaller mar-
gins and longer maturities) reflect a more general recovery from the conditions
prevailing during the global financial crisis, in addition to improved economic
fundamentals and progress toward EU accession. These terms increasingly dif-
ferentiate them from other countries in the region. Most of the candidates for EU
membership – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and the Baltic states
are rated as investment grade risks by at least one international rating agency.
Given their prospects for EU accession, international fund managers no longer
consider the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia as emerging market
economies (Financial Times, 2001). The stability of the yields on their external
bonds during the recent financial turbulence in Argentina and Turkey suggests
that this assessment is widely shared.
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Other factors have affected perceptions of creditworthiness as well. Croatia
and Kazakhstan have benefited from political changes and higher oil prices, re-
spectively. However, countries with sub–investment grade ratings have faced
very difficult borrowing terms and some have not been able to borrow at all. Ten
transition economies including Belarus lack international credit ratings (Interna-
tional Banking…, 2000).
But obtaining of international credit rating is not the main problem for
Belarusian government. According to National Programme of Investment Attrac-
tion into Economy up to 2010 great importance is attached to FDI in stimulation
investment activity of the country. According to the government, its policy pri-
orities for attracting FDI are:
• promoting the development of new export–oriented and import–substituting
industries;
• privatisation of state–owned entities by direct sale;
• creating favourable conditions of portfolio investment;
• involving banks in the concentration of financial resources;
• encouragement of leasing.
Thus, the problem of financial restrictions for Belarus and its industry is one of
key problems today. And the tactics of the expanded reproduction of its tradi-
tional structure, not oriented on the demand, just aggravates the given problem,
causing growth of macroeconomic misbalance. It proves the necessity of re–struc-
turing on the base of FDI, which can provide transfer of technologies, new man-
agement approaches and emerging of economic and industrial development in
Belarus.
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Introduction
Besides  spatial  changes,  there  have  been  also  substantial  changes  of  shop-
ping  behaviour  of  the  consumer  population  due  to  the  development  of
modern  large–scale  commercial  concepts  in  the  territory  of  the  Czech  Repub-
lic.  The  Czech  customer  population  very  quickly  modified  its  previous  deep–
rooted  models  of  shopping  behaviour  and  got  closer  to  the  West–European
model  of  consumption.  The  observation  of  this  modification  in  conditions  of
a  relatively  small  consumer  market  is  very  interesting  and  becomes  an  object
of  many  investigations,  particularly  in  the  field  of  sociology  and  psychology.
Whereas  the  consumer  psychology  explains  individuals’  shopping  behaviour
with  respect  to  their  value  system  and  realisation  needs  (Maslow’s  hierarchy
of  needs,  consumption  tree,  typology  of  customers,  etc.,  see  e.g.  J. Vysekalová,
2004),  the  sociological  view  pays  attention  rather  to  the  identification  of
target  groups  of  customers  for  a  certain  consumption  within  a  market
segmentation  and  even  a  geographically  determined  segmentation  within  the
residentially  distinct  structures  (e.g.  city  x  country)  or  regional  and  other
subcultures  (L. G. Schiffman,  L. L. Kanuk,  2004).  Particularly  this  socio–geo-
graphical  aspect  becomes  the  most  frequent  object  of  investigation  of  the  so–
called  behavioural  geography,  a  discipline  looking  for  the  relation  between
the  individual’s  behaviour  in  space  and  its  spatial  exploration.
Czech  population  in  the  period  of  transformation
On  the  basis  of  a  monitoring  of  consulting  companies  Incoma  Research  and
GfK  Praha,  it  is  possible  to  discern  the  individual  stages  of  the  development
of  shopping  behaviour  with  respect  to  the  adaptation  of  the  Czech  popula-
tion  to  the  individual  stages  of  transformation  and  globalisation  of  the
Czech  retail  network.  The  first  stage,  which  ended  in  1996,  was  characterised
by  a  family  shopping  2–3  times  a  week.  People  usually  did  not  prefer
a  certain  brand  name  and  did  not  make  difference  between  cheap  and
expensive  goods.  The  atmosphere  of  the  shopping  centre  and  prices  of
products  were  not  important  for  them.  Hypermarkets  practically  did  not
Zdeněk  Szczyrba
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exist.  The  second  stage  lasted  from  1997  to  2001,  i.e.  for  the  period  of  the
highest  increase  of  large–scale  outlets.  At  that  time,  customers  orientated
themselves  mainly  according  to  product  prices.  Cheap  goods  were  bought  in
discount  outlets  or  in  hypermarkets.  On  the  contrary,  the  third  stage,  lasting
since  2001,  is  already  characterised  by  customers  preferring  their  own
favourite  outlet  or  chain  of  hypermarkets.  Customers  are  more  experienced
and  require  a  price  corresponding  to  the  product  quality.  In  this  stage  of  the
development  of  shopping  behaviour,  shopping  centres  offering  to  their
customers  rich  shopping  and  entertainment  possibilities  play  an  important
role  in  the  decision  process.
According  to  the  study  of  J. Spilková  (2003),  who  investigated  by  the
method  of  observation  the  movement  of  customers  in  a  large  shopping
centre  in  Prague,  Czech  customers  may  be  included  into  one  of  three  groups
according  to  their  shopping  behaviour.  The  first  type  of  behaviour  is  typical
for  those  customers  who  do  only  specific  shopping  in  the  shopping  centre,
i.e.  they  visit  only  a  single  outlet  (usually  the  hypermarket).  Customers  of
the  second  type  follow  the  modern  trend  of  experience/fun  shopping  and
conceive  their  stay  in  the  shopping  centre  as  a  leisure  time  activity,  going
logically  through  all  the  outlets.  The  third  type  is  a  combination  of  both  the
preceding  types;  the  customer  visits  both  the  hypermarket,  and  the  other
outlets  in  the  shopping  gallery.
The  results  of  comparative  studies  show  that  in  the  central  Europe,  it  is
the  Czech  society  that  changed  the  most.  Among  the  countries  of  Visegrad
group  (V4),  it  manifested  the  most  significant  inclination  to  hypermarkets
and  this  inclination  has  been  remaining  high  in  the  long  term  (35%).  In
a  long–term  horizon,  we  also  register  low  preferences  for  small  outlets,
representing  the  independent  domestic  commerce  and  currently  ranking
among  the  least  popular  with  the  Czech  population  (20–25%  of  preference).
Shopping  in  hypermarkets  and  large  shopping  centres  has  become  so
popular  with  the  Czech  population  over  the  last  years  that  there  is  even
 a  feature  film  depicting  this  phenomenon  that  illustrate  the  transformation
of  the  Czech  population  into  consumer  society.  The  story  takes  place  on
a  background  of  the  starting  hypermarket  mania  in  the  Czech  Republic  and
investigates  at  the  same  time  the  impact  of  promotion  on  the  Czech  con-
sumer.  It  appeared  at  last  that  the  fiction  about  the  existence  of  a  new
hypermarket  “Czech  Dream”  was  perfect  and  many  thousands  of  customers
willing  to  shop  succumbed  to  promotion  in  such  degree  that  they  gathered,
a  May  day  of  2003,  on  a  green  field  in  the  Prague  district  of  Letňany  in
order  to  show  to  hundreds  of  thousands  (maybe  millions)  cinema  and  TV
viewers  that  words  as  supermarket  and  hypermarket,  in  connection  with
a  good  promotion,  have  almost  a  “magical”  attraction.  The  very  ending  of
the  film  shows  a  crowd  of  thousands  of  customers  running  towards  a  scene
imitating  the  hypermarket  –  a  large  colour  curtain  fixed  on  a  metal  structure
(see: Figure 1).
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Reasons  of  changes  of  shopping  behaviour
Decisive  changes  in  shopping  behaviour  of  the  Czech  population  took  place
with  the  arrival  of  supranational  commercial  chains  in  the  second  half  of  the
1990s.  This  stage  of  the  transformation  of  the  Czech  retail  was  –  and  still  is,
since  it  is  going  on  –  characterised  by  a  wave  of  a  massive  expansion  of
foreign  companies  in  the  Czech  market.  A  dynamic  expansion  of  the  net-
work  of  large–scale  outlets,  shopping  centres  and  other  specialised  outlets
(in  particular  clothes,  drugstores)  in  dozens  of  Czech  towns  is  a  significant
sign  of  this  process.  More  than  170  hypermarkets  and  almost  50  large–scale
shopping  centres  were  operating  in  the  territory  of  the  Czech  Republic  at
the  end  of  2004.  To  this  number,  we  should  add  around  700  supermarkets,
400  discount  outlets  as  well  as  several  dozens  of  specialised  large–scale
outlets  selling  electric  appliances,  furniture  and  “DIY”  products.  German
commercial  concerns  (Schwarz,  Rewe,  etc.)  and  other  large  commercial
chains  (e.g.  Ahold,  Tesco,  Carrefour)  have  assumed  leading  role  in  the
development  of  modern  large–scale  retail  network.
From  the  regional  point  of  view,  the  highest  penetration  of  large–scale
outlets  is  observed  in  heavily  urbanised  areas  of  the  Czech  Republic  with
sufficient  buying  potential,  defining  the  spheres  of  interest  of  commercial
chains  for  their  further  activities  (determining  the  presence  of  the  individual
selling  formats).  If  we  simplify,  we  can  say  that  from  the  point  of  view  of
buying  power,  the  territory  of  the  Czech  Republic  may  be  divided  into  the
Figure 1. Non–existing  hypermarket  „Czech  Dream”
Source: http://www.czech–tv.cz/specialy/ceskysen/index.php?load=fotogalerie
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“rich”  West,  where  regions  exceed  the  level  of  1.00  of  the  Republic  average
(Prague:  1.33),  and  the  “poor”  East,  consisting  from  regions  with  a  below–
average  buying  potential  caused  by  persisting  economic  problems.  Calculated
per  1000  inhabitants,  the  regions  with  the  largest  selling  area  at  the  beginning
of  2005  were  Ústí  nad  Labem  Region  (120  m2)  and  Moravian–Silesian  Region
(113  m2),  followed  by  Plzeň  Region  (98  m2)  and  Prague  (89  m2),  whereas  the
all–republic  average  was  80  m2.  If  compared  with  year  2002,  when  the
average  of  the  Czech  Republic  was  62  m2  of  selling  area  of  hypermarkets
per  1000  inhabitants,  the  level  of  penetration  of  hypermarkets  increased  by
more  than  25  %1 .
Whereas  hypermarkets  reach  almost  the  whole  market  space  within  the
residential  system  of  the  Czech  Republic  (population  threshold  for  the
localisation  of  a  hypermarket  is  approximately  40–50  thousands  inhabitants
in  the  centre  and  upcountry),  shopping  centres  are  situated  only  in  the
largest  cities.  The  most  shopping  centres  are  located  in  the  capital  city
Prague  (12),  followed  by  Brno,  the  second  largest  city  of  the  Republic  (6).
The  other  large  cities  have  two  shopping  centres  on  average  (Figure 2).  The
minimum  required  population  potential  for  the  localisation  of  shopping
centres  has  stabilised  for  a  longer  time  at  100  thousands  potential  customers
within  the  gravitation  radius  of  the  centre.
Figure 2. The  largest  shopping  centres  in  regions  of  the  Czech  Republic  in  2005
Sourece: Own  studies.
1  Source:  Incoma  Research  +  GfK  Praha  (2005)
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Shopping  centres  –  new  spatial  element  of  the  transformation
of  shopping  behaviour
The  first  large  shopping  centre  in  the  Czech  Republic  was  opened  in  Prague
in  1997  (Centrum  Černý  Most).  There  are  currently  fifty  of  them  and  others
are  rapidly  growing  (four  to  six  per  year).  Over  the  last  years,  shopping
centres  have  become  very  popular.  They  are  visited  by  millions  of  custom-
ers.  For  instance,  the  shopping  centre  Avion  Shopping  Park  in  Brno  has
around  seven  millions  of  customers  per  year  and  the  shopping  complex
Nový  Smíchov  in  Prague  is  visited  by  up  to  fifteen  millions  of  customers
(K. Vitvarová–Vránková,  2005,  p. 103).
According  to  the  research  Shopping  Mall  2004  conducted  by  companies
Incoma  Research  and  GfK  Praha,  17%  of  people  in  large  Czech  cities  visit
shopping  centres  several  times  a  week,  one  third  once  a  week.  As  a  result,
approximately  one  half  of  the  urban  population  visit  one  of  Czech  shopping
centres  at  least  once  a  week.  More  than  one  quarter  of  people  spend  two  and
more  hours  in  a  shopping  centre  during  a  single  visit  (Table 1).  Reasons  for
which  people  prefer  a  certain  shopping  centre  include  in  particular  “pleasant
atmosphere”,  whereas  „overall  advantageous  prices”  are  mentioned  only  in  the
second  place.  Most  visitors  do  not  limit  their  visit  to  shopping  in  the
hypermarket.  The  other  outlets  in  shopping  centres  as  well  as  a  possibility  to
Source: http://www.gfk.cz
Table 1. Customers  in  Czech  shopping  centres  (in  %  of  customer  population  in  towns)
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spend  the  leisure  time  agreeably  are  also  popular.  There  is  already  a mar-
kedly  profiling  group  of  people  visiting  shopping  centres  for  a  number  of
non–commercial  activities,  in  particular  for  cinema–going,  visits  of  cafés  or
restaurants  or  for  practicing  a  sport.
City  of  Olomouc:  shopping  centres  and  issues  of  shopping  behaviour
Olomouc  is  a  corporate  town  and  the  seat  of  Olomouc  Region,  established
on  1  January  2000  as  one  of  fourteen  regions  of  the  Czech  Republic.  The  city
itself  is  the  fifth  largest  city  of  the  Czech  Republic  (102  thousands  inhabit-
ants).  The  city  is  situated  in  the  central  part  of  Moravia,  i.e.  it  has  a strategic
location  from  the  point  of  view  of  transport  and  logistics.  This  feature  is
exploited  also  by  foreign  commercial  chains  locating  in  the  city  and  its
surrounding  their  distribution  centres  supplying  outlets  in  the  eastern  part
of  the  state  territory.
Since  2002,  Olomouc  has  been  among  the  large  Czech  cities  with  a  fun-
ctioning  concept  of  a  regional  shopping  centre  in  its  territory.  Obchodní
centrum  Haná,  located  in  the  suburb  (south–western  periphery)  consists  of
a  large  hypermarket  Carrefour  and  dozens  of  specialised  outlets.  The  total
selling  area  of  the  centre  comprises  12  thousands  m2.  In  2004,  another  large
shopping  centre  Olympia  was  opened  in  the  territory  of  the  neighbouring
community  of  Velký  Týnec  (south–eastern  periphery)  with  a  final  selling
area  of  30  thousands  m2.  There  is  again  a  central  hypermarket  (Hypernova),
operated  by  a supranational  commercial  chain  (Ahold).  A  third  concept  of
the  shopping  centre,  called  Olomouc  City,  was  put  into  service  in  September
2005  (north–western  periphery)  and  extended  the  existing  selling  capacity  of
hypermarket  Globus  by  other  25  thousands  m2  (40  thousands  m2  in  total).
The  centre  houses  a  multiplex  cinema  with  seven  theatres,  surgeries  and
70  more  sales  units  located  in  the  shopping  gallery.  For  the  present,  this  is
the  largest  project  in  the  field  of  shopping  centres  in  the  region  of  the
central  Moravia.
The  development  of  the  network  of  large–scale  outlets  in  the  territory  of
Olomouc  brought  a substantial  modification  of  shopping  behaviour  of  its
inhabitants,  including  the  upcountry.  This  was  confirmed  by  a  first  out  of
a  number  of  consumer  investigations,  carried  out  in  April  2003  (Z. Szczyrba,
2004).  Answers  positively  evaluating  the  entrance  of  foreign  commercial
chains  in  the  territory  of  the  city  clearly  prevailed  in  a  set  of  336  informants
who  were  questioned  about  the  level  of  commercial  offer,  the  expenses  or
the  frequency  of  shopping  in  Olomouc  large–scale  outlets.  According  to  the
investigation,  most  informants  currently  shop  in  one  of  type  large–scale  outlets
whereas  shopping  in  smaller  outlets  loses  its  former  position  and  correlates
with  data  for  the  whole  Republic  (see  above).  Shopping  activities  move  more
and  more  outside  traditional  shopping  areas,  usually  into  suburban  localities.
The  investigation  also  observed  which  of  Olomouc  hypermarkets  is  often  or
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Distance
raShopping te
several times
a week
at least once
a week
several times
a month
at least once
a month
occasionally
0-10 km 23.3 15.0 20.9 17.0 23.8
11-20 km 10.7 32.1 25.0 28.63.6
21-50 km 3.1 18.8 21.9 50.06.2
51 km 10.5 15.8 5.3 52.615.8
Total 17.6 12.8 22.4 18.2 29.0
Source: Investigation  of  the  Department  of  Geography  of  the  Faculty  of  Natural  Sciences  of  Palacký
 University,  Olomouc,  2005.
Table 2. Basic  parameters  of  the  radius  of  the  shopping  centre  Haná  Olomouc
(in  %  of  customer  population)
Table 3. Shopping  Centre  Haná  Olomouc  –  relation  between  the  shopping  rate  and  the
distance  from  the  shopping  centre  (in  %  of  customer  population)
Source: Investigation  of  the  Department  of  Geography  of  the  Faculty  of  Natural  Sciences  of
Palacký  University,  Olomouc,  2005.
at  least  occasionally  visited  by  the  informants.  It  appeared  that  only  a  small
part  of  them  do  not  have  a practical  experience  with  this  type  of  shopping
(14%).  Many  even  stated  several  hypermarkets  simultaneously,  located  within
their  active  information  field,  which  they  occasionally  visit.
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In  spring  2005,  the  shopping  behaviour  in  Olomouc  was  further  investi-
gated  by  a  questionnaire.  This  investigation  should  determine  significant
signs  of  shopping  behaviour  of  customers  of  the  commercial  centre  Haná.  In
total  696  informants  in  a  representative  structure  were  questioned.  Questions
included  in  the  questionnaire  focused  particularly  on  the  determination  of
the  shopping  radius  whose  selected  geographical  parameters  are  docu-
mented  in  Tables  2–3.  It  appeared  at  last  that  customers  show  a  consider-
ably  high  willingness  to  visit  this  shopping  centre.  Almost  60  %  of  custom-
ers  spend  approximately  1  hour  in  the  shopping  centre  Haná  and  other
30  %  spend  there  1–2  hours.  Most  customers  arrive  from  a  distance  up  to
10  kilometres,  but  longer  distances  are  not  exceptional.
Conclusion
Internationalisation  and  globalisation  in  the  retail  branch  in  the  Czech
Republic  caused  a  number  of  changes.  Changes  of  shopping  behaviour  of
the  Czech  population  are  particularly  significant  in  this  respect.  As  we  can
see,  a  great  number  of  customers  like  shopping  in  modern  large–scale
outlets  and  recently  also  in  large  shopping  centres,  representing  for  them
not  only  shopping  possibilities  but  also  a possibility  of  entertainment  and
a  certain  kind  of  recreation  and  relaxation.  Rapid  changes  in  shopping
behaviour  are  so  much  apparent  that  they  were  depicted  even  in  a  feature
film,  illustrating  the  transformation  of  the  Czech  population  into  consumer
society  on  an  example  of  a  fictitious  hypermarket.  This  is  an  interesting
sociological  phenomenon,  inspiring,  among  other  things,  possibilities  of  the
investigation  of  its  spatial  aspects.
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Introduction
It is well understand now that transition from plan to market economy requires
three important types of reforms: liberalization, institutional reform and stabili-
zation. Freeing trade and prices would introduce competition and market prices,
while establishment of private ownership, as a key market institution, would in-
troduce profit–oriented incentives within the firm. At the centre of transition is
the challenge of reallocating resources and restructuring existing enterprises. The
aim of the paper is to show that the lack of economical reforms in Belarus, ante
omnia of institutional framework reforming, is leading to constraint on the growth
of new sectors that should be able to replace the inefficient state sector, and pro-
vide real economical development.
Transition Period: Restructuring and the Role of Institutions
The process of transition to market can be presented as a transformational tetra-
hedron: liberalization, institutional reforms and stabilization are the basis of effi-
cient restructuring of the economy (Figure 1). The globalization of world economy
should be taken in to account: it influences both on the system transformation
process in certain country by means of financial and political support and on the
restructuring of their production structure via world competition and foreign in-
vestment.
If quantitative and qualitative analysis of industrial restructuring directions
and effects in transitive countries has been made, the liberalization and stabiliza-
tion influence on restructuring could and in fact has been carried by many scien-
tists (S. Djankov and P. Murrell, 2000; V. A. Bessonov, 2001), to estimate the role
of institutional factor was more complicated. This is not only the problem for
former planning economy countries. Ronald H. Coase (1991) in his lecture to the
memory of Alfred Nobel said: “These ex–communist countries are advised to
move to a market economy, and their leaders wish to do so, but without the ap-
propriate institutions no market economy of any significance is possible. If we
knew more about our own economy we would be in a better position to advise
them”.
Institutional Barriers for Industrial Restructuring
Uladzimir Valetka
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According to D. C. North (1993), “institutions are the humanly devised con-
straints that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints
(rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior,
conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement charac-
teristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically
economies”. Therefore, institutions form the incentive structure of a society and
the political and economic institutions, in consequence, are the underlying deter-
minant of economic performance.
It was R. Coase (1960) who made the crucial connection between institutions,
transaction costs, and neo–classical theory. The neo–classical result of efficient
markets only obtains when it is costless to transact. Only under the conditions of
costless bargaining will the actors reach the solution that maximizes aggregate
income regardless of the institutional arrangements. When it is costly to transact
then institutions matter.
The costs of transactions became mach higher in the unstable transition econo-
mies. All the more the old (and weak as a rule) incentive structure of economy is
broken, but new is absent. Thus there is a great possibility that enterprises keep
to function in not efficient way or the government could try to decrease high
transaction costs in too expensive way. That is why institutional reforms are the
key moment in industrial restructuring process in transition period.
So institutions provided a crucial underpinning to market–capitalism devel-
opment but the process of building these institutions is fraught with difficulties.
This was not at the forefront of policy discussions during the early years of tran-
Figure 1. Basic elements of transformation process
Source: Author’s own study.
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sition. Stabilization, privatization, and liberalization dominated the agenda. Gradu-
ally the focus has changed, spurred by studies showing the hefty costs of ineffi-
cient state administrations and corruption (D. Kaufmann, 1994) and by the recog-
nition that the relatively poor performance of the CIS countries was not easily
explained by differences in more standard reforms. Some scholars have also as-
cribed the disappointing Czech economic performance to a lack of attention to
corporate governance and the financial system during mass privatization
(J. C. Coffee, 1996). Later, in contrast to the early neglect, institutions came in vogue
(O. Blanchard, M. Kremer, 1997; J. E. Stiglitz, 1999; K. Hoff, J. E. Stiglitz, 2002). But
up to now some authors state that the enterprise level evidence on the link be-
tween institutional reform and enterprise restructuring is still thin (S. Djankov,
P. Murrell, 2000). At the same time they admit that cross–sectoral or cross–county
empirical results (e.g. S. Johnson, D. Kaufmann, A. Shleifer, 1997; O. Blanchard,
M. Kremer, 1997) are stronger.
An influential paper by O. Blanchard and M. Kremer (1997) has claimed that
the absence of contract enforcement mechanisms was a primary factor causing
the dramatic fall in output in early transition in the CIS. They hypothesize that
weak contract enforcement will be more critical for those enterprises whose in-
put–supply relationships are more complex, a prediction that also follows from
the observation that the supply of information and the coordination of decisions
was a central task of the now defunct planning apparatus. There are several pa-
pers that test this hypothesis using enterpriselevel data. J. Konings and P. P. Walsh
(1998) show statistically significant evidence supporting this prediction for Bul-
garia, an insignificant coefficient with the predicted sign for Estonia, and a coeffi-
cient with the wrong sign for the Ukraine. D. Marin and M. Schnitzer (1999) pro-
vide evidence in support of the hypothesis for the Ukraine, while F. Recanatini
and R. Ryterman (2000) fail to support it for Russia.
Institutional reform can lead to improved enterprise efficiency when legal rules
are effective in structuring economic transactions and resolving disputes. Eco-
nomic agents can then turn to public bodies, such as the courts and the police, to
enforce those rules. Although a large proportion of transactions everywhere in
the world are enforced through private mechanisms, such as reputation, these
mechanisms are sometimes costly, especially if the parties feel the need to resort
to private force (J. Hay, A. Shleifer, R. Vishny, 1996). Institutional reforms may
therefore enhance enterprise restructuring if the legal system replaces more costly
private mechanisms of supporting transactions. Focusing on private Vietnamese
firms, J. McMillan and Ch. Woodruff (1999) document the nature of enforcement
of trading relations when formal institutions are virtually non–existent. Only
9 percent of Vietnamese managers thought the courts could enforce contracts, in
contrast to 58 percent of Russian managers and 55 percent of Ukrainian firms
(S. Johnson, J. McMillan, Ch. Woodruff, 1999a). Trading relations depend on prior
reputation, built using information from business networks or prior experience,
with networks used to sanction defaulting customers. But these private mecha-
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nisms may lead to inefficiency. Reliance on private sources of information re-
quires frequent visits to the trading partner to gain information, wasting mana-
gerial time, and limiting the geographic scope of transactions. Moreover, con-
tinuing to deal with customary trading partners means refusing to deal with new
entrants, and consequently less restructuring in procurement activities.
Formal business associations and informal networks can also serve as reposi-
tories of information and disposers of sanctions, supporting transactional activi-
ties. Such associations have emerged spontaneously during the transition pro-
cess, and have been investigated empirically in the case of the early transition in
Russia (F. Recanatini, R. Ryterman, 2000). These studies show that members of
business associations are more likely to undertake restructuring activities than
are non–member firms: affiliation with a business association reduces the prob-
ability of output decline by 47 percent. But there are several reasons why such
a relationship might exist, for example supplying information (F. Recanatini,
R. Ryterman, 2000) or facilitating the supply of credit when credit markets func-
tion poorly (E. Perotti, S. Gelfer, 1999). P. Murrell and R. Ryterman (2000) find
that formal associations do not play a large role in enforcing contracts in Russia,
although informal networks of older enterprises might be important. Similarly,
J. McMillan and Ch. Woodruff (1999) find only a relatively small role for business
associations in dispute resolution in Vietnam.
Another problem in absence of institutions is spreading of criminals. The more
usual way in which criminal groupings are expected to affect businesses is when
such groupings wield their comparative advantage, running protection rackets,
stealing goods and cash, etc. Such criminal activity certainly represents a failure
of institutional reform, in this case of law enforcement institutions. S. Johnson,
J. McMillan and Ch. Woodruff (1999b) find remarkable variation in such activity
across Eastern Europe: while less than 1% of Romanian firms make payments for
protection, more than 90% of Russian firms do so. But these direct costs are only
part of the picture, since criminal activity also reduces the incentive for enterprise
restructuring. For example, in examining the determinants of renovations in
Warsaw and Moscow shops, T. Frye (2000) finds that the quality of police ser-
vices is a critical factor. Using the opinion of managers on whether courts can
enforce contracts as the principal measure of property rights enforcement,
S. Johnson, J. McMillan and Ch. Woodruff (1999) estimate that firms perceiving
property rights to be insecure invest nearly 40 percent less than firms that per-
ceive property rights to be adequate. These studies suggest that, at low levels of
institutional development, lack of enforceable property rights might be more
important than the absence of external financing in determining investment in
new projects or expanded capacity.
The reform of corporate governance was at the heart of the early institutional
reforms. M. Fox and M. Heller (1999) for Russia, and J. E. Stiglitz (1999) more gen-
erally, claim that the failure of corporate governance institutions has been of great
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importance. However, there has been little systematic empirical work at the en-
terprise level on the effects of corporate governance institutions.
Above we have focused on the direct effects of institutional reform on enter-
prises. But indirect effects might be just as important. When good institutions are
lacking, costly substitutes might be needed, perhaps necessitating the so–cold
“second–best measures” in other policy areas. P. Murrell (1992) suggests that oth-
erwise unpalatable old institutions might be temporarily useful for this reason.
J. E. Stiglitz (1999) argues for delays in privatization to give time for the reform of
legal institutions. In contrast, M. Boycko, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny (1995) con-
tend that political pressure for legal reform appears only after privatization.
Those owners who are most effective in a world of perfectly functioning insti-
tutions might be relatively less effective when corporate governance institutions
do not function well or contract enforcement is weak. In examining the imple-
mentation of enterprise transactions, Hendley, P. Murrell R. Ryterman (2000) find
that increases in both state ownership and employee control raise the effective-
ness of enterprise transactions. A decrease in competition increases the success of
transactions. The explanation for these results is that alternative mechanisms sub-
stitute for weak institutions. Weak contract–enforcement institutions can be more
of a problem for outsider owners than for state ownership. Weak corporate gov-
ernance results in a greater need for ownership concentration (S. Claessens,
D. Djankov, 1999), which then limits the sources of outside finance. Increasing
competition can initially have deleterious effects (O. Blanchard, M. Kremer, 1997).
Conversely, institutional innovations can help to moderate the deleterious ef-
fects of less–than optimal policies. J. Prasnikar and J. Svejnar (1998) use data on
458 Slovenian firms that have not gone through privatization and show that work-
ers appropriate depreciation funds less than other funds, because of a rule that
these must be used for investment. Hence a crude institution, a rule and its en-
forcement, can counter deficiencies in polices elsewhere, for example where work-
ers might be tempted to decapitalize state–owned firms.
Evidently, if institutions are to deserve the prominence in policy deliberations
that they presently have, empirical work at the enterprise level is a matter of
some urgency. A number of studies suggest that in the absence of credible insti-
tutions, some otherwise–sensible economic policies do not work well and in fact
might worsen the incentives to restructure. In case of simultaneous inefficiency
in other reforms (e.g. monetary) different alternative mechanisms could establish
and replace effective institutions for a long time. Barter, large–scale nonpayments,
tax evasion, wage arrears are all the examples of such ineffective but steady norms
or institutional traps (V. M. Polterovich, 1999). And the state of institutional trap
is hard to overtake because of its spreading and stabilizing due to coordination
and learning effects among economic agents. In such a situation hysteresis effect
arises when to return economic system in efficient condition we need more time
and financial resources.
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Structural changes in Belarusian industry during transition
Industry is the main sector of the Republic of Belarus and its regions. Its consider-
able part is concentrated in Minsk city (20.3%) (Table 1). As a whole in Minsk
region including the capital, 1/3 of industrial outputs are made. In total amount
of the republic industrial production the greater specific weight have three east-
ern regions – Homiel (18.2%), Vitebsk (17.2%) and Mogilev (12%). As to Grodno
and Brest regions, they have reached a higher level of agricultural development
with a rather small fraction in industrial production of the republic. The rates of
labour productivity growth in their agriculture are higher then average in Belarus.
There are also differences in the territorial location of separate branches. Ap-
proximately 50% of Mechanical engineering production is concentrated in Minsk,
The specific gravity of the region in general industry production
Regions
Industry Electric
Energy
Fuel Iron
Che-
mical
Mechanical
Engi-
neering
Tim-
ber
Const-
ruction
Materials
Light
Indus
-try
Food
Proces
-sing
Brest
Vitebsk
Homiel
Grodno
Minsk-city
Miensk
Mogilev
Belarus
9.8
17.2
18.2
9.9
20.3
12.6
12.0
100.0
6.8
35.9
11.7
5.2
29.4
-
11.0
100.0
0.3
53.2
45.3
0.2
-
0.9
0.1
100.0
0.2
1.1
84.3
1.0
1.9
3.8
7.7
100.0
1.5
12.6
9.3
19.4
4.1
25.1
28.0
100.0
7.8
4.8
9.2
5.6
49.6
14.4
8.6
100.0
16.0
6.5
30.1
9.5
9.9
18.0
10.0
100.0
15.4
11.2
8.0
16.3
22.8
6.8
19.5
100.0
20.6
21.5
7.8
8.6
17.8
8.4
15.3
100.0
16.9
13.7
14.8
15.8
12.2
15.3
11.3
100.0
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Belarus, 2001. – Miensk: Minstat, 2002.
Table 1. The division of industrial production on the regions of the Republic of Belarus, 2001
84.3 % of Iron is made in Homiel region. Practically all production of the republic’s
Fuel branch (98.5%) is massed in Vitebsk and Homiel regions (53.2 and 45.3 %
accordingly). At the same time the specialisation of Brest region is Light and Food
processing industries (20,6 and 16,9 % accordingly in total production of these
branches in republic).
In light of the marked above the differences in directions and degrees of crisis
processes happened in regions have become clear. The greatest decrease of in-
dustrial production (55% to the level of 1990) was registered in areas with an
obvious industrial specialisation – Vitebsk and Homiel regions.
The branch structure and structural shifts in Belarusian industry are illustrated
in the Table 2.
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The m ratio (U. Valetka, 2002) in the Table 2 shows the quantitative changes in
three main industrial structures (employment, assets availability and production)
and can be calculated as:
n – number of branches,
pi – specific gravity of branch i in employment (assets, production)
in basic period,
di – specific gravity of branch i in employment (assets, production)
in accounting period.
Data of the Table 2 show that structural shifts in employment, fixed assets and
production are slowed (see m rate dynamics). As a result of measures attempted
at a state level since 1996 the tendency to overcoming decrease in industry pro-
duction has been attained, and industry has reached the level of 1990. But those
1. m ratio is measured as (3.1) by periods 1990–1995, 1995–2000 and 2000–2001;
2. Growth rates are at constant prices by periods 1995 according to 1990, 2000 to 1995 and 2000 to 2001.
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Belarus, 2001. – Miensk: Minstat, 2002; author’s calculations.
Table 2. Structural shifts in Belarusian industry, in percent
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measures had mainly an administrative nature. The growth of Belarusian indus-
try was extensive. The indicators of Table 3 shows that low structural activity
noted above does not indicate real development of Belarusian industry.
In 2003 the coefficient of depreciation of active part of fixed capital in industry
is over 80%. The share of loss–making enterprises increased from 8,8% in 1999 up
to 40%. The rate of profitability is still two times lower than at the beginning of
transition. This confirms the lack of restructuring in Belarusian industry. It may
be caused by lacking of resources for restructuring as a result of inefficient re-
forms and by deficiency of some kind of reforms as well.
Restructuring and its resources in Belarus
In 2002 Belarusian GDP was about $14 billions (calculations on the base of aver-
age exchange rate). The rate of GDP growth in 2001 and 2002 according to statis-
tical data was 104.1% and 104.7% respectively. Thus in 2002 GDP amounts 96.6%
on respect to 1990 and raised since 1996 on 48%. At the same time investments
amounts 47.5% on respect to 1990 and raised since 1996 on 23.2%. In 2001 invest-
ments were 93.9% over preceding year, in 2002 – 103,2%. The share of foreign
direct investments is negligible – in 2002 it contributes only 4% of total (4.2% or
$286 million in the first half of 2003).
Investment has remained low, because of weak financial sectors (constraining
domestic borrowing), macroeconomic risks (constraining external borrowing) and
soft budget constraints, such as payments arrears and ineffective bankruptcy (dis-
torting profit incentives and inhibiting innovation). For example, banking system
assets on 1.01.2003 were just $5,1 billions or 39% of GDP. Banks credits are only
25.4% of all resources of investments on the beginning of 2003. Creditor indebt-
edness is 2 times higher then money aggregate M2 and is more then 45% of GDP.
Coefficient of enterprises’ possibility to pay is only 17.1% (money resources of
enterprises on bank accounts in per cent to prolonged creditor indebtedness).
Indicator 1990 1996 1999 2000 2001 2002
Number of enterprises 1522 2293 2773 2427 2438 2384
Number of small enterprises (up to 100 employees)1 2616 3935 5680 5895 5921 6046
Number of employees, th. 1537 1113 1156 1150 1124 1050
Degree of wear and tear of active part of fixed
capital, %
50.0 72.0 76.0 77.0 78.5 79.0
Specific weight of loss-making enterprises, % 0.7 19.6 8.8 18.4 29.7 42.0
Rate of profitability, % 22.3 10.6 17.1 15.8 10.8 10.5
1. In 1998 the number of employees on small enterprises was 109 th., in 2002 – 126 th.
Source: Industry of Belarus, 2002. – Miensk: Minstat, 2002.
Table 3. Some Indicators of Belarusian industry Development (without small enterprises)
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The additional problem is competitiveness of Belarusian goods. Belarus had
the highest share of interrepublican trade in total trade before the breakdown of
the USSR, at 85.6% (J. Odling–Smee, 1999). The total export of Belarus in 2001 was
$7.43 billions, import – $8.05 billions. By the end of 2001 the share of CIS countries
in Belarus’ trade still exceed 65%. At the same time, calculations based on the
gravity model predicted that already by 1998 EU would take about 60% of Belarus’
trade and the rest of the world – about 30%, while the share of other transition
economies in Belarus’ trade would be just above 10% (D. Gros, B. Dautebande,
1992). Deviations of actual from predicted trade flows could be attributed but by
the low competitiveness of Belarusian products on Western markets caused by
the very slow path of restructuring of Belarusian industry.
The low level of restructuring is also supported by data on the dynamics of
commodity structure of Belarus foreign trade and revealed comparative advan-
tages (RCA). Both the commodity structure and patterns of RCA have not changed
much since 1992 (EBRD…, 1999). Further evidence of the lack of restructuring is
the high share of barter in foreign trade transactions (20%).
Basic features of developing market institutions in Belarus
While carrying out reforms, it is necessary to concentrate on the development of
private sector. It is known that state sector restructuring is accompanied by re-
dundancies and reduction of workers. The growing new private sector has a big
potential to absorb free work force and can help to overcome the social limitation
of reform connected with unemployment growth during the restructuring of the
large enterprises. First of all it is necessary to reduce the existing market entry
– exit barriers for business. An important element of reforms is to create an infra-
structure to support the development of private sector. The policy of SME sup-
port should have a long–term perspective. It should include the creation of edu-
cation infrastructure, possibility of small business access to funds through
various systems of micro–crediting and insurance of SMEs property. All this is in
requirement in Belarus after more then ten years of transition.
In spite of the availability of all the necessary laws and other tools and institu-
tions for the regulation of entrepreneurial activities, Belarus has very few small
and medium–sized enterprises. The World Bank states that the number of small
and medium sized enterprises in Belarus is 2.5 per thousand people while in the
Ukraine it is 5, in Russia – 6, in Poland – 22, in the USA – 74.2, in EU countries – 45
(Belarus…, 2003). Moreover Belarus is the only transformation economy where
the number of SMEs is vulnerable. According to the Ministry of Statistics in 1999
there were 26787 SMEs in Belarus. In 2001 there were 25404 SMEs and its number
increased up to 29046 in 2002. Belarusian SMEs produce 7% of GDP, and the
entire private sector in Belarus produces just about 20% of GDP.
In Belarus wide scale privatization has been suspended. Since 1992 to 2002,
3667 enterprises of national and municipal property have been reformed (Fig-
ure 2). During this period 728 open joint stock companies have been set up. 193
enterprises (27%) are private without any share of state property. In 98 enter-
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prises (13.7%) the share of the state is less than 25%. Thus only one third of
enterprises became really private in the process of commercialization. In 46.7% of
enterprises the share of the state exceeds 50% plus one share. In fact these enter-
prises remained state owned. The institute of “golden share” was introduced in
32 enterprises. It gives a representative of the state power to block any decision
and to pursue its own policy.
The period between 1995 and 1997 were the most intensive as far as priva-
tization is concerned. Up to 500 enterprises changed the form of property annu-
ally. But then the authorities changed their attitude to privatization. In 2000 only
176 enterprises changed the form of property. In 2001 there were 100 of them and
in 2002 – 194 enterprises. As of January 1, 2003 only one third of all Belarusian
enterprises were transformed into joint stock companies. As we can see at the
Figure 2, government do not plan wide privatization in 2004 (just 250 enterprises
from about 8 thousand reminded state enterprises are considered to be priva-
tized).
Belarus has legislation that regulates the stock market. There is a Securities
Committee and stock exchange. This legislation that regulates securities market
allows the effective protection of small stock holders but it is overburdened by
administrative regulations. Its procedures for ensuring transparency of deals are
vague. It is necessary to have a professional revision of the existing legislation.
Based on this analysis, amendments to the securities legislation will be made. In
Figure 2. Privatized Enterprises of Central and Local Forms of Property in 1991–2003
Source: SME in Belarus., № 9, 2002, p. 10; author’s own data.
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Belarus private stock holders that have got their shares during preferential
privatization (800 th. people) could not sell their shares on the market accord-
ingly to the president decree.
The Civil Code passed in Belarus sets up legal framework for activities of JSC
but its norms and the existing court practice do not ensure effective corporate
management, nor do they ensure protection of stock holder rights especially mi-
nor ones. A repressive tax system, administrative regulation of business, legisla-
tion on licensing, certification, price and production cost regulation along with
frequent control inspections of numerous state bodies, permanent re–registration
of firms – all this make the development of private sector and efficient industrial
restructuring extremely problematic.
Conclusions
Belarus is now in a so–cold “catch–22”: given the extremely low credibility of its
economic policy and of legal guarantees private owners, both internal and exter-
nal factors for economic restructuring have eased up, implying a further lower-
ing of the attractiveness of the country for international partners. To break the
vicious circle, radical changes in the approaches to problem solving are required
in Belarus. Policy–makers should abandon the old prescription of attempting to
create a new administrative rule whenever a problem arises, in favour of solving
the problem at source, through transparent market–based institutions. Conse-
quently, institutional framework reforming in order to overcome existing con-
straint on the new private sector development that will lead to ensuing effective
industrial restructuring, foreign investments and international credits, is still the
core problem in Belarusian economy.
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Irena Smolová
Changes in Exploitation and Mining of Mineral Resources
in the Czech Republic in the Period 1990–2004
Introduction
In the last few years, structure changes in the Czech economy, especially in in-
dustry, have influenced both the role and the importance of branches of extract-
ing and processing minerals and materials of mineral origin. Market economy
caused a restriction or even termination of mining of non–economic deposits,
where mining continued with the help of state subventions in the past. All min-
ing was stopped in the deposits of ores, the mining of coal has been limited sig-
nificantly in many regions. The mining of uranium ores was strictly limited.
Mining spaces in the Czech Republic
At present, (as of 31st December 2004), in the Czech Republic, there are 1005 min-
ing spaces (claim) with a total area of 1 544 km2 (2% of the state territory). The
delimitation of the mining space is only the beginning of a procedure which will
end with permission granted for mining entailing the beginning of the anthropo-
genic transformation of the relief. The mineral sources in the Czech Republic are
owned by the state. They consist of deposits of selected minerals (“exclusive de-
posits”). Additionally, the protected deposit area is established for exclusive de-
posits of mineral resources (in accordance with the Mining Law – see below),
where construction activities unrelated to the extraction of the exclusive deposit
are limited. In 2003, 540 deposits were in operation in the Czech Republic, out of
which 132 million tons of mineral resources were extracted (J. Starý, P. Kavina,
2004). In average, 1.7 kg of mineral resources were extracted from each square
metre. When considering the fact that nearly 90% of the mineral resources in the
Czech Republic are extracted from opencast mines, the extent of anthropogenic
influence on the landscape is obvious. The extraction itself is controlled by the
applicable Bureau of Mines.
At present, the importance of extraction of mineral resources has been shifted
from the area of public interest to the focus of interest of private mining compa-
nies which are attempting to gain economic profit from the mineral resources of
the territory. This also results in a range of conflicts of interest between munici-
palities along with citizen–action associations and the mining companies. Never-
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theless, the “mining lobby” plays an important role in regional development. In
areas with underdeveloped economies in particular the presence of mining com-
panies is approached mostly positively. They represent an important source of
income for the municipal budget and often contribute to off–budgetary incomes
despite the landscape risks and environmental impacts resulting from the extrac-
tion activities. The municipalities where the extractions are carried out benefit
from the income in the form of remunerations set by the mining law as settlement
for the allotments and compensations from the extracted minerals in accordance
with the § 32a of the Law no. 44/1988 Coll., within the meaning of the Law of
ČNR no. 541/1991 Coll. The accounts on which the remuneration’s are paid are
kept by the applicable Bureau of Mines which then distribute this money to the
authorised beneficiaries, i.e. to the municipalities and the state budget. The an-
nual payment of an mining space larger than 2 hectares is CZK 10,000 and it is
multiplied with each extra km2. The annual payment for mining spaces smaller
than 2 hectares is CZK 2,000. According to the Mining Law, the annual compen-
sation for the extracted minerals is calculated as a percentile share of the total
receipts for the extracted mineral at the actual market price (the maximum share
is 10%). 25% of the amount paid to the Bureau of Mines is transferred to the state
budget of the Czech Republic. This money is used for reparation of damages to
the environment caused by the extraction of exclusive and non–exclusive depos-
its. The remaining 75% is transferred to the budget of the municipality. Remu-
neration is paid in accordance with the kind of extracted mineral. The actual rate
depends on the kind of mineral resource and is set by Decree no. 617/1992 Coll of
the Ministry of Economics, with, for example, 5% for oil and natural gas, 0.5% for
underground mined coal, 1.5% for opencast mined coal, 8% for kaolin (China
Figure 1. Extraction of brown coal
Figure 2. Extraction of crude oil
(locality Dambořice)
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clay), 10% for high–percentage limestones, 3% for other types of limestone and
other cement mineral resources, etc.
Extraction of mineral resources in the Czech Republic
Although in modern history the Czech Republic and the previous state forma-
tions within its present area did not rank among leading mining countries, the
utilisation of domestic raw deposits was high in the past. Over the course of each
individual historical period, priorities in terms of extraction of minerals changed,
and this was reflected in the varied intensity of extraction with a number of con-
sequences including noticeable changes in the relief. Ore extraction has, for ex-
ample, a particularly old tradition with the oldest archaeological evidence of gold
panning dating back to the 9th century B.C. In the Middle Ages, Bohemia was the
centre for European mining of gold and silver. The last boom in mining was after
1948, during the period of socialist industrialisation when ore deposits were ex-
tensively extracted, even at the cost of substantial financial losses. Particularly
common was that after long–term historical deep mining which damaged the
environment to a relatively limited extent, i.e. without substantial anthropogenic
transformations of the relief with a maximum attempt at effectiveness, the min-
ing in the 1950s and 1960s broadly affected vast areas with a number of accompa-
nying adverse effects. Vast opencast mining resulted in the destruction and liqui-
dation of numerous underground mines, but especially the emergence of new
anthropogenic shapes on the surface. The extraction was often accompanied by
vast regulations of waterways and the emergence of new accumulated waste heap
formations. After 1989, ore extraction was cut back considerably and later the
mining of base metal deposit (+ Au) in Zlaté Hory was terminated. In 1994, ore
extraction was definitively brought to an end in the Czech Republic. At present,
the areas affected by extraction have been redeveloped and rehabilitated.
A somewhat different trend may be observed in the mining of deposits for
energy producing raw materials. Coal has been mined from the beginning of the
industrial revolution and the mining of uranium ore began after World War II.
The extraction of energy producing raw materials reached its height in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s. After 1989, a state reduction programme was launched, and
the previous extensive mining was reduced considerably. Additionally, volume
and territorial limits were set for coal mining. The extraction of uranium ore has
also been substantially reduced and is limited to the Rožná deposit, where the
uranium ore is mined by the traditional deep–mining method. In North Bohemia,
however, uranium is attained through the leaching of in sit within the arms of the
liquidation program at the deposit in Stráž pod Ralskem. In contrast, the extrac-
tion of oil has been dynamically developing of late in South Moravia in the area
around Hodonín and Břeclav. There is also new interest in the extraction of oil
and natural gas in the Beskydy Mountains in the Trojanovice region where vast
deposits of black coal have been found. The Trojanovice allotment was designed
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for the purposes of extensive stone–coal extraction back in 1989, and with its area
of 63 km2 is the largest allotment in the Czech Republic. At present, coal mining is
concentrated in two areas: Podkrušnohoří (brown coal) and the Ostrava basin
(black coal).
Coal mining in Podkrušnohoří, consisting of the largest destruction to the en-
vironment, in terms of volume, in the Czech Republic, began at the end of the 18th
century in locales with outcrops of coal seams and in shallow opencast mines.
Since the second half of the 19th century, the mining has become more intensive
and the North Bohemia coal district has become the most important coal district
in Central Europe. Deep mining methods predominated at all of the basins
(Chebská, Sokolovská, Severočeská) at that time. From the beginning of the 20th
century, the amount of opencast mining has been increasing, resulting in vast
devastation to the landscape. While the number of opencast mining was about
25% of the total volume of mined coal at the end of the 1930s, in the 1950s, it had
reached an absolute majority. The first reduction in extraction occurred in the
southwest area of Podkrušnohoří in 1833, where mineral water resources protec-
tion zones were established for spa purposes. Consequently, the highest volume
of extraction was concentrated in the Severočeská hnědouhelná pánev (SHP, North
Bohemia Brown–Coal Basin) where 3,5 mld. tons of coal have been extracted so
far, of which 2,6 mld. tons (74.2 %) in opencast mines. In the Sokolov basin, more
than 1 mld. tons of coal have been mined.
Figure 3. Extraction of crude oil and natural gas in Czech Republic in the period 1990–2004
Source: own studies.
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Source: R. Makarius (ed.) 1995, 2005; databáze Českého báňského úřadu.
Table 1. Extraction of mineral resources in the Czech Republic (1991 and 2004 compared)
Building minerals
In addition to minerals fuels, industrial minerals represent the most important
group of raw materials in the territory of the Czech Republic. In this group the
largest reserves are of limestones, kaolin, clays, bentonite and natural (glass and
foundry) sand. Other industrial minerals represent smaller nevertheless impor-
tant raw material potential of the national economy. Kaolin, quartz sand, lime-
stone, clays, feldspar and dimension stone are also important export commodi-
ties.
There are very high geological reserves of construction materials – building
stone, sand and gravel and brick clays – in the Czech Republic.
The landscape contains giant opencast mines, originating due to large vol-
umes of extracted mineral resources, with noise and dust disturbing the surround-
ing environment and the natural system of groundwater often disturbed. Among
the non–ore raw mineral resources, the extraction of limestone has a special posi-
tion. The largest opencast mines include Mokrá u Brna, Čertovy schody, Mořina
in Český kras, Kotouč near Štramberk, Hranice in Central Moravia and Prachovice
in Železné hory. Opencast extraction of limestone often results in disturbances to
the hydro–geological environment.
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Figure 4. Extraction of limestone (locality Smrčník)
Source: I. Smolová, 2004.
SPA = specially protected areas
Figure 5. Extraction of limestone in the Czech Republic in the period 1990–2003
Source: R. Makarius (ed.), 1995, 2005; P. Kavina (ed.), 2004; databáze Českého báňského úřadu.
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Mineral resource extraction in areas with a special status
Mineral resources are even extracted in the Czech Republic in areas with a special
landscape protection status. The strictest rules on the extraction of mineral re-
sources are in areas established by the Nature and Landscape Protection Law no.
114/1992 Coll. In accordance with this law, it is forbidden to extract mineral re-
sources in National Parks (with the exception of extraction of building blocks and
sand for construction within the area of the National Park), in the first zone of
Protected Landscape Areas (CHKO) and in Nature Reserves. Although extrac-
tion in the second and third zones of the Protected Nature Areas is not explicitly
forbidden by Law, it is quite difficult to obtain a permit for extraction.
Although the overall extraction of mineral resources in the protected areas has
decreased after 1989, the amount of extraction in some of them has actually in-
creased. With some mineral resources, e.g. limestone, feldspar or precious stones,
the extraction in the protected areas constitutes a substantial share of the total
amount of extraction of a particular mineral. Extraction has been completely dis-
continued in 7 of the 24 protected areas. While, in contrast, extraction has in-
creased over the last ten years in five protected areas (Železné hory, Slavkovský
les, Pálava, Jeseníky and Český kras). This conflict of interests is aggravated by
the fact that the majority of the decisions regarding extraction come from the
period before 1991, i.e. before the new nature protection laws were passed.
Figure 6 and 7. Extraction of limestone in the Krkonoše Mts. National Park (locality Horní Lánov)
Conclusion
Although in modern history the Czech Republic and the previous state forma-
tions within its present area did not rank among leading mining countries, the
utilisation of domestic raw deposits was high in the past. Over the course of each
individual historical period, priorities in terms of extraction of minerals changed,
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and this was reflected in the varied intensity of extraction with a number of con-
sequences including noticeable changes in the relief. At present in the Czech Re-
public, there are 1005 mining spaces with a total area of 1 544 km2. In 2003, 540
deposits were in operation in the Czech Republic, out of which 132 million tons of
mineral resources were extracted. At present, the importance of extraction of min-
eral resources has been shifted from the area of public interest to the focus of
interest of private mining companies which are attempting to gain economic profit
from the mineral resources of the territory. In the last few years, structure changes
in the Czech economy, especially in industry, have influenced both the role and
the importance of branches of extracting and processing minerals and materials
of mineral origin. Index of mineral production share of the GDP reflects the
changes, as it has decreased from 3.7% in 1993 to 1.3% in 2003. There was a small
decrease from 7% in 1990 to 2.8% in 2003. Market economy caused a restriction or
even termination of mining of non–economic deposits, where mining continued
with the help of state subventions in the past. All mining was stopped in the
deposits of ores, the mining of coal has been limited significantly in many re-
gions. The mining of uranium ores was strictly limited.
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Introduction
Aspiration to preservation of forest permanence, forests resources enlargement
and continuity of their use has been the basic principle of forestry since a long
time. Acquisition of certificate according to the Principles and Criteria of Good
Forestry of Forest Stewardship Council can be the confirmation of proper man-
agement tending towards ensuring of permanent and sustainable offering of vari-
ous functions fulfilled by forests. The certificate is the proof that timber used for
production of goods comes from forests cultivated in persistent way in agree-
ment with criteria established on the international scale. It has the significant
meaning in the context of rising of attractiveness of timber and its products of-
fered for sale in home and foreign markets. It allows also to protect efficiently
forests in the world.
Forest Stewardship Council
Forest Stewardship Council1  – is an international organisation that has come into
being by the initiative of groups representing wood industry, organisations that
have arisen to protect natural environment, forestry, organisations of indigenous
inhabitants, trade unions and institutions issuing certificates. It was created in
order to support and promote forestry taking into account environmental, social
and economic aspects as well. Nowadays it consists of 585 members from 67 coun-
tries (16.06.2003; FSC Doc. 5.2.2.). Each of them belongs and takes part within the
confines of three groups2  [chamber] (A. Czech, 1999):
Elżbieta Mydłowska
Achievement of Sustainable Forestry Assumptions
According to the FSC Level Standard
1 Development of that organisation is strongly supported by World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
and others extragovernmental, ecological organisations. It was founded in Toronto (Canada) in
1993 after the UN Conference The Earth Top in Rio de Janeiro; nowadays the secretariat is situated
in Oxaca (Mexico) (Raport…, 2002; A. Czech, 1999).
2 The belonging criterion is an interest domain. Within the confines of each of those three groups
two subgroups exist. The country of origin decides about affiliation – the North or South subgroup
(A. Czech, 1999).
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1. Environmental Chamber – designed for unprofitable and extragovernmental
organisations as well as individual persons that are interested in biodiversity
and environmental protection problems and their connection with economic
and social aspects.
2. Social chamber – designed for indigenous inhabitants, extragovernmental
organisations, social movements and individual persons engaged in promot-
ing sustainable forestry in economic, environmental and social aspects.
3. Economic chamber – designed for members interested in economic aspects of
forestry i.e. producers, certificate units, wood owners, trade agents, salesmen,
manufactures and consulting firms.
FSC Principles and Criteria are the co–operation results of those groups. They
describe how to lead forestry to be economically justified, ecologically proper
and good for local societies (Table 1).
The obtained certificate means that forestry led by a particular firm is in agree-
ment with FSC Principles and Criteria of good forestry.
Forestry certificate system
FSC certificate system consists of a complete pack: indicatory standards in form
of 10 principles and 56 certificate criteria, the international accreditation program
of certificate organisations, the control certificate of product origin, the trade-
mark that can be applied to sign products from certificated forests and the pro-
motion program (Raport…, 2002).
The base of FSC system operation is ability to decide to give a title of “proper
developed forests” only to owners that deserve the title from natural, social and
economic point of view of all the groups interested in forestry.
The essence of FSC system is the necessity of fulfilment of basic requirements
by a particular forest or a timber–processing firm before receiving the certificate.
Together with it FSC trademark is awarded that informs a potential client that
timber comes from a well–developed forest.
The certification process consists of three basic stages (Figure 1):
1. The preparatory phase that contains the choice of the best suitable certificate
and the best certificate firm.
2. The main phase that contains the full assessment of forestry: a public consulta-
tion, an index estimation and terrain visits. If quality of forestry is sufficient –
the FSC certificate is given for 5 years. During that time economic indexes are
controlled regularly.
3. Surveillance (audits) – the audit in forests is held once or more a year depend-
ing on information flowing to certificate bodies. Everybody can come to a cer-
tificate firm with comments on managed forestry.
The certificate validity can be prolonged for next 5 years after terrain visits and
the consultation with all the interested parties.
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Source: A. Czech, 1999; A. Łopata, 2000; Projekt…, 2002.
Table 1. Principles of Good Forestry FSC
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Figure 1. The certificate process scheme
Source: According to A. Czech, 1999; A. Łopata, 2000.
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FSC as an organisation doesn’t carry out forest certification3. It gives accredita-
tion4  to certificate firms, which according to FSC Principles and Criteria draw up
their own certificate program. As local needs, abilities and conditions require,
different certification processes can be applied. Some of them are used for for-
estry others for timber production processes.
Nowadays 12 firms have the accreditation to issue certificates: Chain–of–Cus-
tody Certification (CoC) – for each processing firm and Forest Management Cer-
tification (FM) – for forests (the state on 25 June 2003, Table 2). Issued certificate
allows also to use FSC name and FSC trademark on products that are made from
timber coming from forests with FSC certificate. It should be mentioned that ac-
creditation is not obligatory. The decision is made by the forest manager.
FSC standards refer to all types of forests and can be applied all over the world.
But taking into consideration great diversity of forests and others aspects influ-
Source: According to FSC Doc. 5.3.1, 2003.
Table 2. List of FSC Accredited Certification Bodies
3 Certification – third party’s action – certificating unit heading to show that the proper level of confi-
dence was provided as for the conformity of the product and its production process with the requirements.
4 Accreditation – a formal acknowledgement by a national accrediting unit certification unit’s
competences, a laboratory or control unit for fulfilling tasks.
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encing forestry, several countries (among them Sweden, Germany, The Great
Britain and Belgium), decided to create their own, national standards basing on
FSC Principles and Criteria accepted by FSC. Certificate firms must use national
standards if they exists, otherwise they implement international standards tak-
ing into consideration suitable and used in a particular country laws, regulations
and comments from social consultations (A. Łopata, 2000).
Till 30 June 2003 r. certifications in FSC system have been carried out on al-
most 37.457 thousands hectares of forests in 57 countries, near 62 % in Europe
(25 countries) (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Percentage of certified forests endorsed by FSC
Source: Own compilation basing on FSC Doc. 5.3.3., 2003.
Sweden, Poland, Canada and the United States belong to leading countries
according to certified forests. They possess together almost 60% of certified for-
ests (Table 3).
The certification process of forestry in Poland started in 1996 thanks to initia-
tive and founds of British firms that imported wood and timber products. In Great
Britain Buyers’ group5  ”95+GROUP” exists uniting more than 90 representatives
of timber industry. They committed to supporting sustainable forestry through
wood purchase only from certificated forests (A. Łopata 1999). There is required
the FSC certificate treated as an environmental marketing tool.
The rate of Polish forests in total wood surface possessing FSC certificate is
significant, jointly 6 790 669 ha of wood surface that is 75.50% of wood surface in
Poland. In general it concerns the public forest sector that is the State property: in
management of the State Forests are 6 786 978 ha (97.14% of the surface adminis-
5 Buyers’ group – the association of firms representing wood industry that committed to supporting
sustainable forestry ideas and its certification through the purchase only certified timber (A. Łopata, 1999).
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Source: Own compilation basing on FSC Doc. 5.3.3., 2003.
Table 3. Forest Management Certification by country
tered by the State Forests) and the Forest Experimental Laboratory in Rogowo –
3 691 ha, operating within the confines of Forest Department of Main School of
Farm Holding (Table 4).
“The State Forests” National Forest Holding consists of 17 Regional Director-
ates6  (Figure 3). Till nowadays (June 2003) the certificate FSC was given to 16
from 17 Regional Directorates of State (RDSF) Forests and Forest Experimental
Laboratory in Rogowo7 . During the certification process there are Forest Experi-
mental Laboratory in Siemianice and Regional Directorates of State Forests in
6 “The State Forests” National Forest Holding administers forests that are the State property (without
national parks, resources of state farm property and possessed for perpetual use). Within the confines
of held management the State Forests leads forestry, administers grounds as well as others immov-
ables and movables related to forestry. It leads the evidence of State property and establishes its value,
it represents the coffers of the State within the confines of administered estate. Supervision over the
State Forests holds the Minister of Environment (Act on forests from 28 Sept 1991 with later changes).
The general manager of the State Forests is responsible for wood state. He manages the whole forestry
with the help of 17 regional managers of regional managements of State Forests.
7 Simultaneously RDLP possess the certificate of Chain–of–Custody Certification.
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Table 4. The structure of forest property in Poland ( 31 XII 2002)
Source: Raport o stanie lasów w Polsce, 2003.
Figure 3. Regional Directorates of State Forests in Poland
Source: Own compilation basing on: data from Information Centre of the State Forests
and www.lasypanstwowe.pl.
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Warsaw and Krosno (Table 5). The result of Poland is placed second in the world
(Sweden is the first) considering forest surfaces with the FSC certificate.
Forestry certificates were carried out by two firms: SGS Poland and SmartWood
– NEPCon/Natural Systems (Rainforest Alliance). The firm identification can be
done basing on certificate number FSC.
Control certificate of the product origin
Control certificate of the product origin allows to follow all the path of prepared
product beginning from the raw material from in a forest through each stage of
the production till a market shelf. The aim of the control is to check if at each stage
certificated and not certificated timber mixing doesn’t follow. The awarded cer-
tificate means that the control of all the process of formation and distribution,
Table 5. Polish certified forests endorsed by FSC
Source: Own compilation basing on: data from Information Centre of the State Forests,
FSC Doc. 5.3.3., 2003; Information Bulletin of the State Forests, 2003 (no. 2, 3, 5, 6).
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starting from a tree growing in a forest, through a transport to a sawmill and its
processing, circulation of raw material in further production stages, ending on
distribution and sale was performed (A. Łopata, 2000). In order to keep the FSC
trade mark all the firms that want to product, buy and sell certified timber prod-
ucts must possess Chain–of–Custody certificate. It refers to owners and manag-
ers of forests, firms gaining wood, sawmills, producers, agents and wholesale
dealers. Exception is only for firms selling prepared products to consumers.
The given certificate allows a producer to use FSC trademark on a product
(Figure 4).
Figure 4. Trademark FSC
„Timber in this product cymes
from proper manager forests,
certified independently
according to rules
of Forest Stewardship Council”
Figure 5. The label of wood carbon produced by Gryfskand firm from timber from the Regional
Directorate of State Forests in Szczecin
Despite dominating role of Europe, in the United States the maximum number
of COC were issued – 396 (15% of all the certificates). The United Kingdom, Ger-
many and Netherlands are the next countries.
Poland is the fifth taking the COC certificates into consideration. Control cer-
tificates of product origin have got 155 firms of timber processing, specialising
Next to the FSC logo there is always a number describing very concretely given
FSC certificate and the certificate firm that admitted the certification (Figure 5).
The FSC control certificate of product origin possess jointly 2 557 firms (Au-
gust 2003) from 60 countries. Most of them are in Europe – 1431, that is about 60%
of total amount, the least in Africa – only 5.01% (Figure 6).
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among others in board production, charcoal, floors, fencing, garden and kitchen
furniture as well as tools. The certificate system was carried out by 5 firms: SGS,
SW, SCS, GFA and SKAL – compare with Table 2. The SGS firm is the leader that
issued 84.5% of all the certificates. Thanks to the certificate each firm can buy
Figure 6. Percentage of certified firms endorsed by FSC
Source: Own compilation basing on materials from FSC ArbeitsGruppe Deutschlande.
Table 6.  Chain-of-Custody Certification by country
Source: Own compilation basing on materials from FSC ArbeitsGruppe Deutschlande.
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and/or sell timber to other certified tradesmen and use the logo of FSC on certi-
fied products.
Many products with FSC trademark are at Polish market. However the infor-
mation on sustainable forestry and as a result on products with FSC logo is very
modest. First of all potential purchasers of timber articles don’t know about certi-
fication. But what should be emphasised they decide about success of certifica-
tion idea of forests and goods.
Conclusions
The demand on “ecological” products and services constantly grows. The eco-
nomical success depends highly on “EKO” label reliability. Signing of goods with
ecological trademarks is the way of market influencing. Ecolabels, indicating prod-
ucts that fulfil requirements of environmental protection, help customers during
shopping. The client consciously choosing ecolabelled products forms the de-
mand (so he has an impact on the supply) and starts to have an influence on the
improvement of environmental state.
In the recent years the development of markets followed, on which purchasers
of timber articles require certificates issued by independent organisations. The
certificate is the proof that timber used for production of goods comes from for-
ests cultivated in persistent way in agreement with criteria established on the
international scale.
The possessed FSC certificate is a guarantee that a product, a service or a pro-
cess are produced in accordance with principles of sustainable forestry and can
be a perfect tool of environmental marketing.
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Spatial Planning as a Basis of Investment
Capacity of a Region
Natalia A. Klimenko
Now in Russia it takes place an underestimation of a practical significance of
spatial planning in problem solving facing to country, in particular, in an accel-
eration of the economical growth rate and heightening of competitive strength of
the Russian economics, in consolidation not only companies, but also of author-
ity patterns takes place.
Substance of spatial planning (or town–planning) not in building cities, but in
supply of the conceptual approach to entity of territories of all levels, i.e. in form-
ing state policies, first of all, in sphere of property and land use ratios. According
to the acting legislation any usage and the progressing of territories is carried on
pursuant to the affirmed town–planning documentation.
The Kaliningrad oblast is the one of few locales of Russia, where per the last
years is active the new approaches of spatial planning adequate the new Russian
legislation and socio–economic realities are designed. Two parallel directions lies
a basic principle of the town–planning documentation working out:
• «traditional designing» – from gathering and analysis of input data, through
a cost and benefits analysis of territories and forecast socio–economic dynamic
to the design plan;
• «designing through the investment offers» – from data acquisition on the avail-
able investment offers, through the feasibility report of the investment design
to an estimation of its territorial influencing and actuation in the design plan.
In 2003 the operation which is still not having of analogs in Russian Federation,
on working out the Territorial complex scheme of spatial planning of the
Kaliningrad oblast and its parts (ТКС) was completed. The purpose of the ТКС
was the elaboration of spatial planning policy till 2030 supplying ecological stable
and competitive functioning of the Kaliningrad oblast, its dynamical progressing
in conditions of strategic interplay between Russian Federation and countries of
the Baltic Sea region.
In frameworks of the ТКС on the basis of comprehensive analysis of problems
and prospects for the oblast development the scheme of zones and medium of
investment was designed. The basic offers on medium boundaries of prime town–
planning budgeting and progressing, and also offer on forming investment zones
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and territories of top–priority economical progressing with determination of
measures on their infrastructural supply are mirrored in it.
The zones of prime town–planning progressing and the constructions are de-
termined as following:
• territory of Kaliningrad city, as a regional center, and zone of its perspective
spatial development;
• territory of forming the Chernyahovsk–Gusev agglomeration, as a subregional
center of a regional system of moving;
• territory of the Sovetsk–Neman agglomeration, as a local industrial zone;
• complex of an international airport “Hrabrovo”;
• the Kaliningrad–Baltiisk port complex;
• the Costal functional recreational zone;
• the Kurshako–Mazursky water route;
• tourist and recreational zones of an oblast;
• fields of valuable mineral resources (amber, oil);
• zones of primary progressing of agricultural production.
As the basic measures on infrastructural supply of development of prime town–
planning progressing and the investments zones are determined:
• building and reconstruction of highways sections of national and regional sig-
nificance;
• building of railway, including sections Gusev–Goldap, brunch–line to termi-
nals of the Kaliningard–Baltiisk port complex; modernization and electrifica-
tion of all railways in the oblast;
• construction and modernization of frontier points;
• reconstruction and increasing capacity of a gas pipeline “Vilnius–Kaliningrad”;
building of gas pipelines to settlements as Neman, Sovetsk, Chernyahovs and
Gusev, Polessk, Gvardeysk, Svetly, Baltiisk, Yantarny;
• development and construction of an infrastructural complex of oil extracting
on a field Kravtsovskoye (D–6);
• modernization of an airport “Hrabrovo” on norms an international air service.
The given schema is generally reflects the frame conditions of investment activity
organization in Kaliningrad oblast pursuant to policy of its socio–economic de-
velopment.
At consequent stages of town–planning budgeting (at a level of separate settle-
ments) the frame conditions acquire nature of the investment offers on certain
sites. So, at present the working out of a Master Plan of the Coastal functional
recreational zone (CFRZ) on a territory of 60.5 thousand hectares is completed.
On the basis of cost and benefits analysis the have been chosen the territories,
which ones on a complex of the factors are favorable for development of a set of
functions within the CFRZ.
1. Spatial development of suburban zones of cities of Kaliningrad, Zelenogradsk,
Svetlogorsk, Pionersky, Baltiisk, Svetly, including:
• territories of housing;
Natalia A. Klimenko
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• territories of secondary accommodation (summer residence, dacha, cottage);
• territories of the manufacturing and municipal service sites;
• territories of large commercial sites (wholesale store, trade enterprises, mar-
kets);
• territories for mass short–term recreation of the townspeople;
• territories of plants of a transport infrastructure;
• territories of engineering infrastructure.
2. Development of sites exploiting unique natural and cultural (historical)
resourcesof this part of the Kaliningrad oblast, including:
• territories of balneal sites of sanatorium treatment;
• territories of long–term and short–term resorts and recreational treatment;
• territories of tourist sites.
3. Landscapes protection and rational development.
In bridge with a Master Plan of the CFRZ the working out is carried on Master
plans of coastal cities: Svetlogorsk, Zelenogradsk, Pionersk, Yantarny.
Thus, spatial planning (town–planning) activity is one of governing factors of
an investment climate forming in locale by means of:
• involvements in forming regional investment policy which is an immediate
activity of government bodies on creation of favorable conditions for invest-
ment activity;
• developments of frame conditions of regulation and stimulation of investment
activity in locale on the basis of investment zoning;
• decrease of resource and budget capacity of investment environment, cutting
of the domestic budgets deficit and heightening of competitive strength of
territories;
• development of a of data base for investors on stands of priorities of the in-
vestment project for economy of locale as well as spatial conditions and alter-
natives to its realization.
Spatial Planning as a Basis of Investment Capacity of a Region
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The Department of Regional Development
Geography of the University of Gdańsk was
established on July 1, 1997 and continues to develop
the accomplishments of the Maritime Geographical
Economy Department of the University of Gdańsk,
headed for many years by prof. dr hab. Jerzy
Zaleski. The present department is headed by dr
hab. Tadeusz Palmowski, and includes the
following staff members: dr Tomasz Michalski,
dr Małgorzata Pacuk, dr Jan Wendt, Renata
Anisiewicz MA, Konrad Kondratowicz MA,
Krzysztof Kopeć MA, Maciej Tarkowski MA, Hanna Stodołowa (Department
Office Staff).
Theoretical research in the University Department of Regional Development
Geography focuses on issues relating to:
• Process of social, economic and political changes in coastal regions;
• Social, structural and economic transformational processes in European post
communist countries.
The main geographical area of research progressed by the Department staff covers:
• Baltic Europe;
• Central and Eastern Europe.
Research issues undertaken by the Department staff concern:
• Social and economic transformations of coastal towns and regions;
• Social and economic transformations of Polish cities and their suburbs;
• Conditions and factors affecting the development of regions, towns and seaside
resorts;
• Development of band structure in Baltic Europe development;
• The role of marine and land transport and transition in developing the economy
of coastal regions;
• Change in the geopolitical importance of the Kaliningrad district;
• Spatial aspects of social, economic, political and ecological transformation
processes in Baltic Europe;
• The development of waterfronts in coastal towns on the example of Baltic
Europe centres;
• Social and economic conditions of the functioning and transformation of coastal
systems man – environment;
• Geopolitical conditions of exploiting marine resources and values;
• The problem of social awareness of the maritime, coastal and Pomeranian issues;
• Territorial zoning of power in Poland;
• Geopolitical conditions of life democratisation processes and economic
transformation in Central and Eastern Europe;
• Consequences of expanding European Union and NATO to include Central
European states;
• Demographic and health transformations in post communist countries.
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